The purpose of this article is to provide a practical legal checklist that updates a predecessor ELIP versions in West’s Education Law Reporter concerning independent educational evaluations (IEEs) at public expense. For ease of differentiation, the updated parts, which are largely in the footnoted supporting authority, are highlighted in underlined bold font.

The 2004 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) legislation and the 2006 IDEA regulations left largely unchanged the parent’s conditional right to obtain an independent educational evaluation (IEE) at public expense. The specified conditions form what amounts to a flowchart-like framework akin to the multi-step test for tuition reimbursement under the IDEA. The extensive and continuing amount of hearing and review officer decisions concerning IEEs at public expense evidence not only the frequency of the issue but also the need for a careful legal analysis. The primary bases for such a legal analysis are the relevant IDEA regulations, court decisions, and policy letters issued by the U.S. Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP).

The IEE reimbursement checklist is arranged in the same sequence as the relevant regulation, starting with the successive pair of procedural steps and culminating in the respective pair of the substantive steps. For each step, the relevant questions

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based on the regulations are in bold italics, whereas those based on OSEP letters are in italics alone. The corresponding answers are in regular font. Finally, the checklist items for the two substantive steps are worded as neutral questions to avoid the unsettled issue of burden of proof.
IEE Reimbursement Checklist

**Procedural Steps:**

1. *Did the parent disagree with the district evaluation?*
   
   • via notification to the district within a reasonable period of time?
   
   If not, in various but far from all jurisdictions and circumstances, it may be an equitable consideration but it is not an absolute prerequisite; thus, move on to the subsequent steps in this analysis.

2. *Did the district file for a due process hearing (or provide the requested IEE) …*?
   
   • at all?
   
   If not, this will sometimes end the analysis in favor of reimbursement unless there are multiple issues or special circumstances, including the parent’s failure at step 1.

   • without unnecessary delay?
   
   A delay of more than 2-3 months is likely fatal to the district’s case, although the exact length will depend on the circumstances rather than being a bright-line test. The district may not delay to seek additional assessments.

**Substantive Steps**

3. *Was the district’s evaluation (or reevaluation or necessary FBA) appropriate?*
   
   In light of the relatively skeletal substantive criteria for district evaluations and the restricted role of the procedural standards, the court outcomes have varied widely depending on the specific facts of the case and the degree of judicial deference to district actions.

4. *Was the parent’s IEE appropriate …*?
   
   • according to the district criteria that are no more and, if necessary, less restrictive than applicable to the district’s evaluation or are in “substantial compliance” with the full district criteria
- As for procedures, the district may require the parents to submit the IEE report by a date certain within any state imposed deadlines, but authority is split as to whether the district may require advance clearance.

- As for timing, the parent’s IEE:
  
  (a) need not be before the district’s filing;
  
  (b) is not subject to a district-imposed deadline

- As for IEE location and evaluator qualifications, the district may:
  
  (a) limit the parents to a comprehensive list if there is allowance for individual exceptions;
  
  (b) include the criteria established by the producer of evaluation instruments;
  
  (c) impose a mileage limit on the IEE as long as this does not prevent the parent from getting an appropriate evaluation;
  
  (d) restrict IEEs to evaluators within the state if there is a sufficient number of qualified evaluators within those boundaries and the parents have the opportunity for an exception based on unique circumstances; and
  
  (e) require the IEE examiner to hold, or be eligible to hold, a particular license when the district does the same for personnel who conduct corresponding evaluation for the district unless only the district personnel may obtain said license.
  
  (f) conversely, the district may not require (i) specified experience or non-affiliation, or (ii) criteria for qualifications different from those required for the district’s own evaluations.

- As for methodology, the IEE need not be the same as the district’s evaluation.

- As for contents, the district may not prohibit the IEE evaluator from including age and grade level standards.

- As for costs, a district may:
  
  (a) establish maximum allowable charges for specific tests if said maximum (i) allows a choice among qualified professionals, (ii) is not limited to the average fee customarily charged in that area, (iii) allows for exceptions for justified unique circumstances, and (iv) applies as well to the district when it initiates an evaluation; and
(b) establish “reasonable cost containment criteria applicable to [both district and parent evaluators]” but only with a provision for an exception when the parents show unique circumstances justifying a higher fee.\(^{45}\)

(c) conversely, if an IEE is necessary outside the district boundaries, the district may be required—if the parent meets the “unique circumstances” exception—to pay for the expenses incurred by the parent for travel or other related costs.\(^{46}\) and the district may not require parents to submit the charges first to their health care insurer.\(^{47}\)

(d) finally, according to limited case law authority to date, if the parents are entitled to reimbursement, it extends to the costs of the private evaluator’s presentation at the IEP meeting\(^{48}\) and is the pre-, not post-insurance amount.\(^{49}\)


34 C.F.R. § 300.502 (2012). The only change was to limit the parent to only one IEE at public expense each time the school district conducts an evaluation with which the parent disagreed. *Id.* § 300.502(b)(5) (2012). This change represents reinstitution of a previous limitation. See, e.g., *Hudson v. Wilson*, 828 F.2d 1059, 41 Ed.Law Rep. 830 (4th Cir. 1987); Letter to Fields, EHLR 213:260 (OSERS 1989). In a recent decision, a federal appellate court upheld the validity of this IDEA regulation in relation to the statute’s purpose. *Phillip C. v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ.*, 701 F.3d 691, 287 Ed.Law Rep. 50 (11th Cir. 2012).

The scope of this checklist does not extend to IEE case law concerning issues other than reimbursement. See, e.g., *K.E. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 15*, 647 F.3d 795, 270 Ed.Law Rep. 479 (8th Cir. 2011); *T.S. v. Bd. of Educ.*, 10 F.3d 87, 87 Ed.Law Rep. 386 (2d Cir. 1993); *G.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist.*, 930 F.2d 942, 67 Ed.Law Rep. 103 (1st Cir. 1991); *S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.*, 92 F. Supp. 3d 143, 322 Ed.Law Rep. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); *P.G. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.*, 65 IDELR ¶ 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); *James D. v. Bd. of Educ.*, 642 F. Supp. 2d 804, 250 Ed.Law Rep. 194 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (concluding that district met its obligation to “consider” parent’s IEE); *L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist.*, 556 F.3d 900, 242 Ed.Law Rep. 23 (9th Cir. 2009) (ruling that failure to provide equivalent opportunity for IEE observation, as required by state law, did not amount to denial of FAPE); *Bd. of Educ.*, v. *H.A.*, 56 IDELR ¶ 156 (S.D. W.Va. 2011), *aff’d mem.*, 445 F. App’x 660 (4th Cir. 2011) (ruling that district’s insistence on its choice of psychologist to conduct IHO-ordered IEE violated parents’ opportunity for meaningful participation); *Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Woody*, 178 F. Supp. 3d 443, 336 Ed.Law Rep. 786 (N.D. Tex. 2016); *Marc M. v. Dep’t of Educ.*, 56 IDELR ¶ 9 (D. Haw. 2011) (failure to consider IEE contributed to denial of FAPE); *Staton v. District of Columbia*, 63 IDELR ¶ 159 (D.D.C. 2014) (ruling that, for purpose of attorneys’ fees, order of IEE to determine student’s eligibility was more favorable than timely settlement offer); *Mangum v. Renton Sch. Dist.*, 57 IDELR ¶ 252 (W.D. Wash. 2011), *aff’d mem.*, 584 F. App’x 618 (9th Cir. 2014) (ruling that district opted for the reimbursement alternative and complied with the applicable IDEA and state regulations, including the requirement to consider the IEE); *Northport Pub. Sch. v. Woods*, 63 IDELR ¶ 134 (W.D. Mich. 2014) (denying dismissal of district’s claim for attorneys’ fees from parent’s attorney); *Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. D.A.*, 792 F.3d 1054, 320 Ed.Law Rep. 8 (9th Cir. 2015); *T.B. v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 628 F.3d 240, 263 Ed.Law Rep. 490 (5th Cir. 2010); *D.S. v. Neptune Twp. Bd. of Educ.*, 264 F. App’x 186, 232 Ed.Law Rep. 107 (3d Cir. 2008) (denying attorneys’ fees where hearing officer ordered IEE at public expense but the ultimate determination was that the child was not eligible); *E.P. v. Howard Cty. Pub. Sch. Sys.*, 68 IDELR ¶ 249 (Md. SEA 2016) (refusing to allow IEE as additional evidence upon judicial review); *T.J. v. Winton Woods City Sch. Dist.*, 60 IDELR ¶ 244 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (ruling that IEE was inadmissible to determine whether the IEP was appropriate when the IEP team had not had the opportunity to consider it); *Plainville Bd. of Educ. v. R.N.*, 58 IDELR ¶ 257 (D. Conn. 2012) (ruling that district violated IEE consideration requirement but did not reach whether this violation did not result in a substantive denial of FAPE); *Sch. Bd. of Manatee Cty. v. L.H.*, 53 IDELR ¶ 149 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (upholding ALJ’s order to provide equivalent opportunity for IEE observation); *M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist.*, 66 IDELR ¶ 217 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (preserving for further proceedings possible § 504
retaliation claim for district’s proposing additional evaluations in response to request for
IEE); Letter to Savit, 64 IDELR ¶ 250 (OSEP 2014) (opining that district must provide the
same opportunity for IEE observation as it does for its own personnel). It also does not
include OSEP policy interpretations concerning IEEs more broadly. See, e.g., Letter to Carroll,
68 IDELR ¶ 279 (OSEP 2016) (extending the district’s IEE obligation to an additional
requested area); Letter to Fisher, 23 IDELR 565 (OSEP 1995) (interpreting the right to an IEE
to extent to assistive technology assessments). Similarly, it does not extend to rulings via the
IDEA’s state complaint resolution process. See, e.g., Farmington Pub. Sch. Dist., 115 LRP
31117 (Mich. SEA 2015). Finally, the coverage does not extend to otherwise relevant cases
decided on technical adjudicative grounds. See, e.g., T.P. v. Bryan Cty. Sch. Dist., 794 F.3d
1284, 320 Ed.Law Rep. 25 (11th Cir. 2015) (mootness based on triennial period for
reevaluation); David P. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 23 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (statute of
limitations); Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Peter C., 21 IDELR 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (jurisdiction
of review officer).

34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b) (2012):

(1) A parent has the right to an [IEE] at public expense if the parent
disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the public agency, subject
to the [following] conditions.

(2) If a parent requests an [IEE] at public expense, the public agency
must, without unnecessary delay, either--

(i) File a due process complaint to request a hearing to show that its
evaluation is appropriate; or

(ii) Ensure that an [IEE] is provided at public expense, unless the agency
demonstrates in [an impartial hearing under the IDEA] … that the evaluation
obtained by the parent did not meet agency criteria

For the additional regulatory language concerning agency criteria at the last step, see id. §
300.502(c) (2012):

(1) If an [IEE] is at public expense, the criteria under which the
evaluation is obtained, including the location of the evaluation and
the qualifications of the examiner, must be the same as the criteria
that the public agency uses when it initiates an evaluation, to the
extent those criteria are consistent with the parent’s right to an [IEE].

(2) Except for the criteria described in [the previous] paragraph …, a public
agency may not impose conditions or timelines related to obtaining an independent educational
evaluation at public expense.

See, e.g., id. § 300.148(b)-(e) (2012). For an analysis of the case law, see, e.g., Thomas
Mayes & Perry Zirkel, Special Education Tuition Reimbursement Claims: An Empirical Analysis,
22 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 350 (2001). For an analogous flowchart-like synthesis, see
Perry A. Zirkel, Tuition and Related Reimbursement under the IDEA: A Decisional Checklist,

In general these administrative decisions do not have precedential value in either strict
or broader sense of this doctrine. For a synthesis showing the frequency of IDELR-published
hearing/review officer decisions specific to one step of the applicable test—the appropriateness of
school district evaluations—and the relative neglect of these three stronger legal sources at the
federal level (i.e., the regulations, court decisions, and OSEP policy letters), see Susan Etscheidt,
Ascertaining the Adequacy, Scope, and Utility of District Evaluations, 69 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD.

The term IEE reimbursement is used generically herein because most of the pertinent
cases arise from a request for reimbursement, although a few are limited to the threshold right,
where the IEE is yet to happen and thus its appropriateness and payment are prospective only.
See, e.g., M.Z. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 521 F. App’x 74, 296 Ed.Law Rep. 92 (3d Cir. 2013) (reversed hearing officer’s order for district to expand its inappropriate evaluation, instead ruling that in wake of failing to provide an appropriate evaluation the district must provide publicly funded IEE).

9 See supra note 5.


11 The language in the regulation puts the burden on the district, but the intervening effects of the Supreme Court’s decision in Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) and any opposing state law leaves this matter an open question. For the interrelationship with the regulatory provision for district filing, see Damarcus S. v. District of Columbia, 190 F. Supp. 3d 35, 338 Ed.Law Rep. 823 (D.D.C. 2016).

12 In a case that does not fit one of the procedural steps the regulatory framework specifically but imported the overall two-step test for procedural FAPE due to the parent’s requested remedy, the D.C. district court ruled that even if the school district’s delay in authorizing an IEE was a procedural violation, the child was not entitled to compensatory education in the absence of resulting substantive loss to the student. Fullmore v. District of Columbia, 67 IDELR ¶ 144 (D.D.C. 2016).

13 For the meaning of evaluation or reevaluation within this context and the preemptive effect of federal regulations, see Haddon Twp. Sch. Dist. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 67 IDELR ¶ 44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016); cf. F.C. v. Montgomery Cty. Pub. Sch., 68 IDELR ¶ 6 (D. Md. 2016) (absence of reevaluation under federal or state law, thereby defeating parent’s claim of disagreement). For a recent OSEP interpretation regarding another scope issue, see Letter to Baus, 65 IDELR ¶ 81 (OSEP 2015) observing that if disagreeing with the evaluation because a child was not assessed in a particular area, the parent has the right to request an IEE to assess the child in that area to determine if the child has a disability and the nature and extent of the special education and related services that the child needs, whereupon the district may file for a hearing to show that its evaluation is appropriate without that addition).

14 See, e.g., Letter to Fields, EHLR 213:260 (OSERS 1989). However, the parent’s failure to provide notification does not nullify the parent’s otherwise justified right to reimbursement. See, e.g., Letter to Anonymous, 55 IDELR ¶ 106 (OSEP 2010); Letter to Imber, 19 IDELR 352 (OSEP 1992); Letter to Kerry, 18 IDELR 527 (OSEP 1991); Letter to Thorne, 16 IDELR 606 (OSEP 1990). Without addressing the OSEP interpretations, courts have split on whether a notification requirement applies. Compare Phillip C. v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 57 IDELR ¶ 97 (N.D. Ala. 2011), aff’d on other grounds, 701 F.3d 691, 287 Ed.Law Rep. 50 (11th Cir. 2012), with R.A. v. Amador Cty. Unified Sch. Dist., 58 IDELR ¶ 152 (E.D. Cal. 2012); cf. T.G. v. Midland Sch. Dist., 848 F. Supp. 2d 902, 282 Ed.Law Rep. 425 (C.D. Ill. 2012) (lack of notification in combination with same lack in hearing complaint was fatal). Moreover, OSEP has taken the position that a district may not require a specified period to correct the perceived deficiency. Letter to Gray, EHLR 213:183 (OSEP 1988). Finally, the threshold issue of the parent’s standing to proceed in court pro se in such matters is not entirely clear. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Chicago, 611 F. App’x 874, 321 Ed.Law Rep. 146 (7th Cir. 2015).


See, e.g., Letter to Anonymous, 56 IDELR ¶ 175 (OSEP 2010); Letter to Anonymous, 23 IDELR 721 (OSEP 1994); Letter to Anonymous, 21 IDELR 1185 (OSEP 1994); Letter to Saperstone, 21 IDELR 1127 (OSEP 1994); cf. Letter to Smith, 16 IDELR 1080 (OSERS 1990) (45-day deadline starts after filing and, thus, is not applicable).

Letter to Carroll, 68 IDELR ¶ 279 (OSEP 2016).

See, e.g., Questions and Answers on Discipline Procedures, 52 IDELR ¶ 231 (OSERS 2000); Letter to Scheinz, 34 IDELR ¶ 34 (OSEP 2009). For a synthesis of the various requirements for appropriateness of an initial evaluation and reevaluation, see, e.g., Letter to Baus, 65 IDELR ¶ 81 (OSEP 2015).


The results at this step have also varied, although the courts have not shown the same deference to districts as they have for the previous step. See, e.g., Breanne C. v. S. York Cty. Sch. Dist., 732 F. Supp. 2d 474, 263 Ed.Law Rep. 122 (M.D. Pa. 2010); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 701 v. J.T., 45 IDELR ¶ 92 (D. Minn. 2006); cf. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Lolita S., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1127, 304 Ed.Law Rep. 280 (N.D. Ala. 2013), aff’d, 581 F. App’x 760, 310 Ed.Law Rep. 686 (11th Cir. 2014) (rejecting district’s argument that the report was expert testimony, not an IEE). For a recent decision where a court upheld reimbursement in a “child find” case where the district delayed its evaluation and used the parents’ IEE despite an ultimate determination that the child was not eligible, see J.P. v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 260 P.3d 285 (Alaska 2011).

34 C.F.R. § 300.502(e) (“must be the same as the criteria that the public agency uses when it initiates an evaluation, to the extent those criteria are consistent with the parent’s right to an IEE”).


Letter to Anonymous, 58 IDELR ¶ 19 (OSEP 2011).

Compare P.L. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 55 IDELR ¶ 46 (W.D.N.C. 2010) (denying reimbursement for IEE where parents did not obtain written approval per district’s handbook), with Letter to Bluhm, EHLR 211:206 (OSEP 1980) (opining that the district may not require advance consultation or clearance).


34 C.F.R. 300.502(e) (2012).

See, e.g., Letter to Anonymous, 56 IDELR ¶ 175 (OSEP 2010); Letter to Parker, 41 IDELR ¶ 155 (OSEP 2004); Letter to Young, 39 IDELR ¶ 98 (OSEP 2003).


Id. at 46,689 (Aug. 14, 2006); see also Letter to Anonymous, 56 IDELR ¶ 175 (OSEP 2010).

Letter to Petska, 35 IDELR ¶ 191 (OSEP 2001) (may not prohibit affiliation with private schools and advocacy organizations or expert witnesses who consistently testified on the parents’ side, and may not require recent and extensive experience in public schools).

34 C.F.R. § 300.502(c)(1) (2012).


Letter to LoDolce, 50 IDELR ¶ 106 (OSEP 2008).

43 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(e) (2012). **For a recent decision where the court upheld a** reasonable cap without reaching the issue of an exception, see Seth B. v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 810 F.3d 961, 326 Ed.Law Rep. 620 (5th Cir. 2016).


46 Letter to Petska, 35 IDELR ¶ 191 (OSEP 2001); Letter to Heldman, 20 IDELR 621 (OSEP 1993).

47 Letter to Thompson, 34 IDELR ¶ 8 (OSEP 2000).
