

**322 Ed. Law Rep. 10**

West's Education Law Reporter

November 19, 2015

Education Law Into Practice

Perry A. Zirkel, Ph.D., J.D., LL.M. <sup>aa1</sup>

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LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO AUTISM: ELIGIBILITY AND METHODOLOGY <sup>al</sup>

This article is an update of a compilation published in WEST'S EDUCATION LAW REPORTER four years ago. <sup>1</sup> Like its predecessor version, it is an annotated outline of statutory legal materials concerning education of children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), with particular attention to the ASD-specific issues of eligibility and methodology issues. More specifically, the first section provides a sampling of secondary sources that have systematically compiled the pertinent case law outcomes. The second section contains relevant IDEA regulations and policy letters. The third section summarizes the § 504 definition of disability. The fourth and largest section provides recent court decisions concerning free appropriate public education (FAPE)-related issues for children with ASD. <sup>2</sup> The concluding section presents a checklist for districts derived from the case law, with parent lessons being the obverse side of the same checklist.

**I. SECONDARY SOURCES**

**Overall Case Outcomes:**

PERRY ZIRKEL, AUTISM AND THE LAW: RULINGS AND EXPERT ANALYSIS (2001) (available from LRP Publications):

- 290 published hearing/review officer and court decisions from 1980 to 2000 <sup>3</sup>
- \*11 completely incidental role of autism in approx. 40% of the cases
- approx. 30% at the preschool level
- sharply rising frequency of cases in recent years but relatively stable outcomes, averaging approx. 4.4 on 1 (parent) to 7 (school) scale

- decisions in the Tenth and Fourth circuits have been the most favorable to school districts, and those in the Third and Eighth circuits have been most favorable to parents.

- primary issues: (1) FAPE: substantive, including placement, and (2) FAPE: procedural

Perry Zirkel, *The Autism Case Law: Administrative and Judicial Rulings*, 17 FOCUS ON AUTISM 84 (2002):

- more favorable rulings for districts in court than at the hearing/review officer level but various confounding variables

**Eligibility:**

Julie Fogt, David Miller, & Perry Zirkel, *Defining Autism: Professional Best Practices and Published Case Law*, 41 J. SCH. PSYCH. 201 (2003):

- relatively few cases (n=13 from 1980 to 2002), almost all at the hearing officer level
- emphasis on legal requirements and standards, not professional best practices
- importance of expert witnesses, including school professional staff
- recognition that DSM–IV is not controlling

**Methods:**<sup>4</sup>

Susan Etscheidt, *An Analysis of Legal Hearings and Cases Related to IEPs for Children with Autism*, 28 RES. & PRAC. FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE DISABILITIES 51 (2003).

- 68 cases from 1997 through 2002, with 60% being hearing/review officer decisions
- outcomes favored districts—57% as compared to parents—43%
- key factors: goals consistent with evaluation, qualified IEP team members, and methodology tailored to goals

Catherine Nelson & Dixie Snow Huefner, *Young Children with Autism: Judicial Responses to the Lovaas and Discrete Trial Training Debates*, 26 J. EARLY INTERVENTION 1 (2003):

- limited to Lovaas/DTT court decisions (n'19) from 1997 to 2002
- only 3 Part C cases, all decided in favor of the defendant districts
- parents obtained substantial relief in only 4 of the 19 cases
- districts lost where they provided no support (rationale and evidence) for their proposed program

Claire Choutka, Patricia Doloughty, & Perry Zirkel, *The "Discrete Trials" of ABA for Children with Autism: The Outcome-Related Factors in the Case Law*, 38 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 95 (2004):

- **\*12** relatively frequent cases (n=68) from 1980 to 2001, with 65% being hearing/review officer decisions
- two categories of cases: 63%—program selection (e.g., instructional approach) and 37%—program implementation (e.g., location, duration, or frequency)
- 50–50 outcomes (4.0 on a 1–7 scale) in both categories
- key factors in both categories: testimony of witnesses, documentation of progress, and IEP elements

Doris Hill, E. Davis Martin, & Cynthia Nelson–Head, *Examination of Case Law (2007–2008) Regarding Autism Spectrum Disorder and Violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act*, 55 PREVENTING SCHOOL FAILURE 214 (2011).

- 99 court cases in 2007 and 2008
- outcomes based on 5–category scale: district prevailed—54%, tied—19%, parent prevailed—27%
- parents did particularly well for claims re parental participation and unqualified personnel

Janet Decker, *A Comprehensive Analysis of Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) Trends for Students with Autism*, 274 Ed. Law Rep. 1 (2012):

- limited to ABA published court decisions (n=39) from 1975 to 2009
- parents won 10 (26%), with 24 (62%) for the district and 5 (13%) inconclusive
- parents did better in recent cases, but pro–district deference remained prevalent

**Frequency:**

Perry A. Zirkel, *Autism Litigation under the IDEA: A New Meaning of “Disproportionality”?*, 24 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 92 (2011).

- for FAPE litigation nationally from 1993 to 2006, the published case law has increased steadily
- the proportion attributable to the autism classification has remained approximately 8–9 times the proportion of these children in the special education population

## II. IDEA REGULATIONS AND POLICY LETTERS

### *IDEA Definition of Autism*<sup>5</sup>

(a) [C]hild with a disability means that a child evaluated in accordance with [the applicable IDEA requirements for eligibility] as having ... autism ... and who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.

\*13 (c)(1)(i) *Autism* means a developmental disability significantly affecting verbal and nonverbal communication and social interaction, generally evident before age 3, that adversely affects a child's educational performance. Other characteristics often associated with autism are engagement in repetitive activities and stereotyped movements, resistance to environmental change or change in daily routines, and unusual responses to sensory experiences. The term does not apply if a child's educational performance is adversely affected primarily because the child has an emotional disturbance, as defined in this section.

(ii) A child who manifests the characteristics of “autism” after age 3 could be diagnosed as having “autism” if the criteria in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section are satisfied.

### *OSEP Policy Letters*<sup>6</sup> *re Autism Spectrum Disorders*<sup>7</sup>

*Letter to Coe*, 32 IDELR ¶ 204 (OSEP 1999)

- children with pervasive developmental disorder (PDD) and its subcategory autism in DSM-IV<sup>8</sup> are eligible under the IDEA only if they meet the definition of “child with disability” for the “autism” or other specified category, such as “other health impairment” (OHI)
- states may have criteria for eligibility of children under the disability categories so long those criteria do not conflict with the federal definition
- children with PDD aged 3 through 9 may qualify as developmentally delayed if the state and district utilize that classification and the child meets the state's diagnostic criteria
- IDEA-97 clarifies that “[n]othing in the Act requires that a child be classified by their disability so long as each child who has a disability listed in § 300.7 and who, by reason of that disability, needs special \*14 education and related services, is regarded as a child with a disability under Part B of the [IDEA].”

*Letter to Williams*, 33 IDELR ¶ 249 (OSEP 2000):

- same eligibility clarification for child diagnosed with Asperger's Syndrome, except at least partially ducks its role under OHI:

“Regardless of whether Asperger's Syndrome is identified as a condition that could render a child ”other health impaired,“ we do not believe it would be inconsistent with Part B [of the IDEA] for a State to permit school districts to evaluate children with Asperger's Syndrome to consider whether they could be other health impaired.”

- addresses FAPE questions by clarifying that whether the child, once determined eligible, is entitled to speech pathology, occupational therapy, social skills training, or any other such service depends on whether the IEP team determines that it is required to assist the child to benefit from special education, not on whether the parent requests such service
- also addresses placement, discipline, and discrimination questions by generally reciting applicable provisions of IDEA (and Section 504)

*Letter to Autin*, 58 IDELR ¶ 51 (OSEP 2011):

- addresses question as to permissibility of state or local education agencies establishing separate schools for students with autism, OSEP opined that placement must be on an individual basis in accordance with the applicable procedures and criteria for LRE

*Dear Colleague Letter*, 66 IDELR ¶ 21 (OSEP 2015):

- isues reminder that IEP and IFSP teams, in identifying and addressing individual needs, should avoid using “ABA therapists exclusively without including, or considering input from, speech language pathologists and other professionals who provide different types of specific therapies that may be appropriate for children with ASD”

### III. ALTERNATE SOURCE OF COVERAGE: § 504 AND THE ADA

*Sec. 504 and ADA Definition of “Individual with a Disability”*<sup>9</sup>

[A]ny person who

(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities,

(ii) has a record of such an impairment, or

(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.<sup>10</sup>

\* \* \*

\*15 Thus, the relevant, essential elements for FAPE eligibility are:

- physical or mental impairment

+

- major life activity

+

- substantial

#### IV. RECENT COURT DECISIONS RE ELIGIBILITY AND METHODOLOGY <sup>11</sup>

##### *A. Brief Trends Analysis*

The following overview of judicial trends to date is based on the numbered court decisions in the next section of this document. The bulleted conclusions, with the numbered examples, are within the two respective categories of eligibility and methodology. Methodology has two subcategories, pure and marginal. <sup>12</sup>

Eligibility: The court decisions concerning eligibility are infrequent, and the outcomes do not markedly favor either parents or districts.

- The cases specific to eligibility are few and largely focus on the educational performance and/or state criteria rather than on the IDEA criteria for the classification—see nos. 44, 56, 83, 86, 93, 94, 113, 127, and 153.
- Some of these cases used eligibility to determine FAPE—see nos. 33, 55, 66, 70, 83, 86, 109, 116, 128, and 153.

Methodology: The court decisions directly or indirectly concerning methodology are frequent, and the outcomes—which are based on the two-pronged standard for FAPE under the IDEA <sup>13</sup>—markedly favor school districts.

- **\*16** The pure methodology cases favor districts based on the deference doctrine, which is particularly pronounced for academic issues—see nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 13, 20, 24, 31, 32, 42, 48, 51, 63, 72, 75, 81, 82, 89, 107, 112, 118, 122, 144, and 157.
- A modern Sixth Circuit case serves as a qualified reminder that this deference doctrine is not without limits—see no. 38. A few other cases provided at least ancillary support—see no. 29, 50, and 51, 95, 100, and 104.
- Some methodology cases depended on other factors, such as:
  - procedural violations, which only count if prejudicial and, thus, only infrequently result in parent victories—see nos. 17, 18, 38, 41, 66, 117, 134, 139, 142, and 143.

- LRE—see nos. 7, 10, 35, 60, 68, 84, 99, 135, and 141.
  
- other factors—see nos. 11 (burden of proof) and 10, 18, 26, 29, 89, 95, 106, and 119 (staff qualifications).
  
- The newest and most direct but less than potent factor is the IEP provision for peer-reviewed research—see nos. 67, 79, 81, 89, 98, and 107.
  
- Several of the methodology cases were based on the high-stakes remedy of tuition reimbursement—see nos. 1, 3, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 21, 38, 40, 43, 62, 66, 69, 71, 72, 74, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 91, 93, 97, 101, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 116, 117, 118, 121, 124, 125, 128–138, 142–147, 156–159, and 161. A more recently emerging remedy is compensatory education—see nos. 15, 29, 33, 115, 152, and 160.
  
- Increasingly, school districts are including ABA in their methodology—see nos. 74, 75, 78, 79, 81, 84, 90, 97, 104, 108, 110, 118, 143, 145, 150, 151, and 156.
  
- The rest of the cases, designated as “[~M]” put methodology into the background, relying on regular FAPE analysis. Moreover, § 504 looms as a possible alternative avenue, especially for the remedy of money damages—see no. 61.
  
- A complicating but not necessarily a significant factor is state law where its requirements exceed those of the IDEA—see nos. 70, 81, 103, 117, 128, 130, 134, 135, 146, and 155.

**B. Overview Empirical Analysis**<sup>14</sup>

The next two tables provide an empirical analysis of the frequency<sup>15</sup> and outcomes<sup>16</sup> of the cases listed in the next section.<sup>17</sup> For the frequency table, <sup>17</sup> the columns are five-year periods. The rows are the categories of the cases, as designated in the next section.<sup>18</sup>

**1. Frequency Analysis**

|                            | 1996-2000 | 2001-2005 | 2006-2010 <sup>19</sup> | (2011-2015) <sup>20</sup> |
|----------------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| <i>M</i> Cases<br>(n=53)   | 11        | 12        | 15                      | (15)                      |
| ~ <i>M</i> Cases<br>(n=89) | 3         | 18        | 32                      | (36)                      |
| Other Cases <sup>21</sup>  | 0         | 3         | 8                       | (8)                       |

|        |    |    |    |      |
|--------|----|----|----|------|
| (n=19) |    |    |    |      |
| TOTAL  | 14 | 33 | 55 | (59) |
| (N=61) |    |    |    |      |

[The preceding image contains the references for footnotes <sup>19</sup>, <sup>20</sup>, and <sup>21</sup>.]

This first table shows that the total volume of autism case law concerning eligibility and methodology have an upward trajectory. This ascending slope is not surprising due to the increasing societal awareness and litigious propensity in relation to autism <sup>22</sup> in addition to the overall upward trajectory of special education litigation. <sup>23</sup> The increasingly predominant proportion of “~M” cases is likely due to the traditional judicial deference for pure methodology disputes <sup>24</sup> and the increasing complexity of special education litigation. <sup>25</sup>

**\*18** The next table uses the same categories for the rows, but the columns represent the previously delineated five–category scale. However, this outcomes analysis includes all of the decisions in the list in the next section, including the relatively few cases published thus far for 2015.

**2. Outcomes Analysis <sup>26</sup>**

|                       | <i>P</i> | <i>(P)</i> | <i>PIS</i> <sup>27</sup> | <i>(S)</i> | <i>S</i> |
|-----------------------|----------|------------|--------------------------|------------|----------|
| “M” Cases<br>(n=53)   | 19n=40)  | 9 n=5)     | 6n=3)                    | 0 n=0)     | 66n=35)  |
| “~M” Cases<br>(n=89)  | 25n=22)  | 3 n=3)     | 9n=8)                    | 5 n=4)     | 59n=52)  |
| Other Cases<br>(n=19) | 16n=3)   | 5 n=1)     | 5n=1)                    | 0 n=0)     | 74n=14)  |
| TOTAL<br>(n=161)      | 22n=35)  | 5 n=9)     | 7n=12)                   | 3 n=4)     | 63n=101) |

[The preceding image contains the reference for footnote <sup>27</sup>.]

This second table shows that, for each category and overall, the distribution of outcomes clearly favors the defendant districts, although—depending on how they are interpreted <sup>28</sup>—the intermediate categories may partially mitigate the extent of this skew. Comparison of the first and second rows does not reveal a more pronounced pro–district deference for the “M” cases, but the limitations include not only the relatively small cell sizes and the inexact categories but also the imprecise unit of analysis. <sup>29</sup> Even more strongly, the small numbers and heterogeneous contents of the cases in the “Other” category serve as clear cautions against generalizing any comparison with the other categories. In any event, the predominating balance in the districts' favor is not surprising in light of the overall recent trend in K–12 student litigation generally <sup>30</sup> and its broad special education subset, <sup>31</sup> especially in light of the methodology–oriented emphasis of the case selection.

**\*19** Although this brief empirical overview does not address the rather complex issues of special education litigation, it provides a supplementary dimension for the trends analysis as well as a springboard for further, more in–depth study of the legal issues in the education of children with autism. The increasing frequency of special education litigation and, in particular, the cases concerning students with autism, warrants more scholarly attention.

**C. Case Citations and Blurbs <sup>32</sup>**

1. *P Still v. DeBuono*, 108 F.3d 888 (2d Cir. 1996). *But cf. Malktentzos v. DeBuono*, 102 F.3d 50, 114 Ed.Law Rep. 786 (2d Cir. 1996) (mootness and lack of irreparable harm)

- ruled under Part C in favor of parents' IFSP for ABA therapy for three year old with autism, including reimbursement—only issue was whether privately obtained services by personnel who did not meet state qualification standards were reimbursable [M]

2. *S Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd. v. Picard*, 27 IDELR 824 (E.D. La. 1998)

- upheld “cottage” placement of 17-year old student with autism with limited mainstreaming opportunities in nearby high school, also rejecting parent claims regarding teacher qualifications and lack of BIP in IEP (but mixed results regarding emergency removals and music therapy) [~M]

\*20 3. *P T.H. v. Bd. of Educ.*, 55 F.Supp.2d 830 137 Ed.Law Rep. 555 (N.D. Ill. 1999)

- rejected district's cross-categorical early childhood placement, w/o aide, upholding instead appropriateness of parents' home-based Lovaas placement for autistic five-year-old (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

4. *S Renner v. Bd. of Educ.*, 185 F.3d 635, 137 Ed.Law Rep. 215 (6th Cir. 1999)

- upheld the appropriateness of the district's IEP for an autistic child even though it did not have the extent of Lovaas-type discrete trial training sought by the parents [M]

5. *S Wagner v. Short*, 63 F.Supp.2d 672, 139 Ed.Law Rep. 232 (D. Md. 1999)<sup>33</sup>

- upheld appropriateness of IFSP proposed for autistic child, despite parents' preference for a particular ABA program [M]

6. *PIS Adams v. State of Oregon*, 195 F.3d 1141, 139 Ed.Law Rep. 820 (9th Cir. 1999)

- upheld district's IFSP for child with autism, rather than intensive Lovaas-type program parent preferred, but rejected district's revised IFSP that reduced weekly service hours, because it “was not linked to [the child's] unique developmental needs” (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

7. *S Blackmon v. Springfield R–XII Sch. Dist.*, 198 F.3d 648, 140 Ed.Law Rep. 519 (8th Cir. 1999)

- upheld reverse mainstreaming classroom placement of TBI/autistic child rather than parent's unilateral home-based early childhood program, concluding that procedural deficiencies were waived and, in any event, nonprejudicial (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**8. *S Dong v. Bd. of Educ.*, 197 F.3d 793, 140 Ed.Law Rep. 116 (6th Cir. 1999)**

- upheld school-based TEACCH program, rather than parents' home-based Lovaas-type program for autistic child (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**9. *P Walker County Sch. Dist. v. Bennett*, 203 F.2d 1293, 141 Ed.Law Rep. 1013 (11th Cir. 2000)**

- upheld tuition reimbursement for private placement for student with autism, declining to hear additional evidence and pointing out deficiencies in the proposed IEP, including lack of BIP, OT, and ESY [~M]

**10. *S Burilovich v. Bd. of Educ.*, 208 F.3d 560, 143 Ed.Law Rep. 437 (6th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 531 U.S. 957, 121 S.Ct. 380, 148 L.Ed.2d 293 (2000)**

- upheld the substantive and procedural appropriateness of district's mainstreamed IEP for elementary school student with autism, thereby rejecting reimbursement for "standard" 40-hour in-home program and parents' claim about specialized IEP team and staffing expertise [M]

**\*21 11. (*P*) *Bd. of Educ. v. Michael M.*, 95 F.Supp.2d 600, 144 Ed.Law Rep. 187 (S.D. W.Va. 2000)<sup>34</sup>**

- ruled that district did not meet its burden to prove that its program, rather than the parents' in-home Lovaas program, was appropriate (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**12. *S Gill v. Columbia #3 Sch. Dist.*, 217 F.3d 1027, 145 Ed.Law Rep. 894 (8th Cir. 2000)**

- upheld the substantive appropriateness of the district's proposed self-contained placement, with 1:1 aide and reverse mainstreaming, for kindergarten child with autism, rather than parents' in-home 40-hour Lovaas program (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**13. *S Steinmetz v. Richmond Cmty. Sch. Corp.*, 33 IDELR ¶ 155 (S.D. Ind. 2000)**

- upheld district's proposed preschool program for child with autism rather than parents in-home ABA program (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**14. *P Sackets Harbor Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Munoz*, 33 IDELR ¶ 154 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000)**

- held that, based on IEP–team voting process and applicable standards, parents were entitled to reimbursement for costs of home–based ABA program to supplement reduced in–school program for preschool student with autism [~M]

**15. P Sanford Sch. Comm. v. Mr. & Mrs. L., 34 IDELR ¶ 262 (D. Me. 2001)**

- upheld hearing officer's stay–put order and compensatory education relief when district's change for kindergarten child with autism from half–inclusion, half–ABA program to self–contained program was based on administrative convenience, not appropriate evaluation [~M]

**16. PIS Gonzalez v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Educ., 254 F.3d 350, 155 Ed.Law Rep. 20 (1st Cir. 2001)**

- upheld district's proposed placement of 17–year–old student with autism in self–contained class rather than residential placement, but added parent training to manage the child's behavior to the extent it linked to education progress [~M]

**17. P Jaynes v. Newport News Sch. Bd., 13 Fed.Appx. 166 (4th Cir. 2001)**

- upheld tuition reimbursement for Lovaas program where the district failed to notify the parents of their right to challenge the proposed IEP (via a due process hearing) and the child evidenced progress as a result of the Lovaas therapy [~M]

**18. PIS Pitchford v. Salem–Keizer Sch. Dist. No. 24J, 155 F.Supp.2d 1213, 156 Ed.Law Rep. 555 (D. Or. 2001)**

- upheld appropriateness of a series of IEPs for a child with autism, including TEACCH rather than Lovaas, but found that lack of district \*22 (or other child–knowledgeable) member of IEP team for one year was a prejudicial error (ordering mediation as the first–resort remedy) [M]

**19. S A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 36 IDELR ¶ 65 (D.S.C. 2001)**

- upheld appropriateness of inclusion–based ABA program and rejected appropriateness of home–based Lovaas program (based on restrictiveness and lack of generalization) for kindergarten child with autism [~M]

**20. S CM v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 184 F.Supp.2d 466, 162 Ed.Law Rep. 126 (W.D.N.C. 2002)**

- upheld appropriateness of school–based TEACCH program rather than parents' unilateral home–based Lovaas program for child with autism [M]

21. (S) *M.E. v. Bd. of Educ. for Buncombe County*, 186 F.Supp.2d 630, 162 Ed.Law Rep. 279 (W.D.N.C. 2002), *vacated sub nom M.E. v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ.*, 72 Fed.Appx. 940, 180 Ed.Law Rep. 580 (4th Cir. 2003)<sup>35</sup>

- rejected tuition reimbursement for in-home Lovaas program where the parents made only technical, unsupported challenges to the district's proposed TEACCH program and they admitted that they would not have accepted the offer in any event—but dismissed on appeal based on lack of jurisdiction [~M]

22. *S Faulders v. Henrico County Sch. Bd.*, 190 F.Supp.2d 849, 163 Ed.Law Rep. 423 (E.D. Va. 2002)

- upheld appropriateness of district's ESY program for high functioning autistic child, with focus on improving social communication rather than 1:1 services and with goal of reasonable progress rather than mastery of skills [~M]

23. *S Tyler v. Northwest Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 202 F.Supp.2d 557, 165 Ed.Law Rep. 572 (N.D. Tex. 2002)

- upheld procedural and substantive appropriateness of proposed IEP for autistic preschool child, which included 6 hours of Lovaas in-home training rather than the 25 hours the parents insisted was necessary [M]

24. *S J.P. v. W. Clark Cmty. Sch.*, 230 F.Supp.2d 910, 172 Ed.Law Rep. 193 (S.D. Ind. 2002)

- upheld appropriateness of district's eclectic TEACCH/PECS-based program, which included ABA/DTT, for high school student with autism rather than parents' full-time Lovaas-type program—rejection of parents' cookie-cutter, cost-related arguments [M]

25. *P Neosho R-C Sch. Dist. v. Clark*, 315 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2003)

- held that the IEP's failure to include a proper BIP amounted, in this case, to a denial of FAPE in light of the obvious need of the child with autism-Asperger's and SLD for a BIP and unpersuasive evidence of academic progress [~M]

\*23 26. *S Zasslow v. Menlo Park City Sch. Dist.*, 60 Fed.Appx. 27, 175 Ed.Law Rep. 31 (9th Cir. 2003)

- brief ruling that despite turnover district provided qualified speech therapist for child with autism thus supporting proposition that parents do not have the right to select service deliverer [~M]

27. *S Adam J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 328 F.3d 804, 176 Ed.Law Rep. 83 (5th Cir. 2003)

- upheld substantive appropriateness of proposed IEP for student with autism (Asperger's Syndrome), rather than private placement, based on Cypress-Fairbanks 4-factor test and upheld procedural

appropriateness based on no loss of educational opportunity (or infringement on parental-participation opportunity) [~M]

**28. (S) *Wagner v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County*, 335 F.3d 297, 178 Ed.Law Rep. 694 (4th Cir. 2003)**<sup>36</sup>

- held that upon the unavailability of the then-current placement (here due to the only state-approved Lovaas provider ceasing the in-home services under the IEP w/o notice) “stay put” does not require the district to provide a comparable, alternative placement; the parents' only remedies are either to agree with the district to a new placement or seek a preliminary injunction from the trial court changing the child's placement [~M]

**29. (P) *G v. Fort Bragg Dependent Sch.*, 343 F.3d 295, 180 Ed.Law Rep. 474 (4th Cir. 2003)**

- remanded to determine whether the district's proposed IEP for four-year-old with autism, which contained Lovaas elements but not a Lovaas-certified consultant, met the Rowley substantive standard and whether the district denied the child FAPE during the previous three years (rejecting parental-objection standard for triggering compensatory education) [M]

**30. (P) *Greenwich Bd. of Educ. v. Torok*, 40 IDELR ¶ 44 (D. Conn. 2003)**

- granted preliminary injunction to maintain the hearing officer's decision that ordered the district to change the kindergarten child's classification from OHI to autism (based on IEE), reimburse the parents for home therapies, and provide various additional hours of 1:1 therapy at home or school—as the stay-put pending the judicial appeal [?E, ~M]

**31. *S.T.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm.*, 361 F.3d 80, 186 Ed.Law Rep. 15 (1st Cir. 2004)**

- upheld district's proposed placement of autistic kindergarten student in a specialized class that used the TEACCH approach rather than private school that relied on DTT-nonprejudicial procedural violations and deferential Rowley standard (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**\*24 32. *S Johnson v. Olathe Dist. Sch.*, 316 F.Supp.2d 960, 188 Ed.Law Rep. 307 (D. Kan. 2003)**

- upheld district's proposed IEP for an autistic sixth grader in a life skills class that used ABA and redirection techniques rather than home placement-procedural violations (e.g., IEP team composition) were nonprejudicial and methodology (here, redirection ?? planned ignoring) is within district's discretion [M]

**33. *P Diatta v. Dist. of Columbia*, 319 F.Supp.2d 57, 189 Ed.Law Rep. 130 (D.D.C. 2004)**

- upheld requested compensatory education relief of four years of 40-hour per week ABA program (including training, consultation, and monitoring) for student with autism whom the district “repeatedly mis-diagnosed and mishandled” [?E, ~M]

**34. *P Bucks County Dep't of MHIMR v. De Mora*, 379 F.3d 61, 191 Ed.Law Rep. 41 (3d Cir. 2004)**<sup>37</sup>

- tuition reimbursement award, at least under IDEA Part C, may include time expended by parent serving as Lovaas instructor [~M]

**35. *P L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist.*, 379 F.3d 966, 191 Ed.Law Rep. 92 (10th Cir. 2004)**

- rejected, based on LRE, district's proposed placement of preschool child with autism in “hybrid” (approximately 50% nondisabled children) plus 8–15 hours/week of ABA as compared with parents' unilateral placement of the child in a mainstream private preschool with phasing-out aide plus 40 hours/week of ABA, awarding parents equitable reimbursement of ABA program and aide (tuition not requested) [M]

**36. (*P*) *Roe v. State*, 332 F.Supp.2d 1331, 192 Ed.Law Rep. 156 (D. Nev. 2004)**

- after hearing officer and review officer both rejected parents claims, including that child needed increased home-based Lovaas component upon moving from Part C to Part B, court allowed appeal based on § 1983 (IDEA) and § 504/ADA, thus opening possibility of money damages [~M]

**37. *S Wagner v. Bd. of Educ.*, 340 F.Supp.2d 603, 193 Ed.Law Rep. 172 (D. Md. 2004)**

- upheld appropriateness of proposed IEP, despite cut-and-pasted goals/objectives from previous IEP, and placement, which was change from Lovaas to non-Lovaas school, including rejection of procedural violations as nonprejudicial [~M]

**38. *P Deal v. Hamilton County Dep't of Educ.*, 392 F.3d 840, 194 Ed.Law Rep. 88 (6th Cir. 2004)**<sup>38</sup>

- \*25 held that parents were entitled to tuition reimbursement based on two independent prejudicial procedural violations (fixed predetermination for TEACCH, not Lovaas, and repeated absence of regular ed teacher on IEP team where integration was at issue) and possible substantive violation of FAPE (remanding for careful determination, with limits on deference re methodology) [M]

**39. *S J.K. v. Metrop. Sch. Dist.*, 42 IDELR ¶ 122 (N.D. Ind. 2005)**

- upheld substantive appropriateness, including lack of ABA services, and rejected procedural violations as nonprejudicial, for preschool child with autism [M]

**40. (P) County Sch. Bd. v. Z.P., 399 F.3d 298, 195 Ed.Law Rep. 715 (4th Cir. 2005)**<sup>39</sup>

- remanded appropriateness issue to trial court to reconsider with due deference to the hearing officer's findings that the parent's ABA placement for preschool student with autism was appropriate and the district's proposed TEACCH placement was not (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**41. P Escambia County Bd. of Educ. v. Benton, 406 F.Supp.2d 1248 (S.D. Ala. 2005)**

- ruled that procedural inadequacies in autistic student's IEPs, which related to mastery dates of benchmarks and adequacy of annual goals, but not lack of FBA–BIP, resulted in denial of FAPE to student [~M]

**42. S Brown v. Bartholomew, 43 IDELR ¶ 60 (S.D. Ind. 2005), vacated as moot, 442 F.3d 588, 207 Ed.Law Rep. 601 (7th Cir. 2006)**

- upheld district's proposed program for kindergarten student with autism rather than parents' preferred at-home ABA instruction [M]

**43. S K.A. v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 43 IDELR ¶ 160 (W.D.N.C. 2005)**

- rejected tuition reimbursement for 1:1 CARD program based on (1) substantive appropriateness of district's program for preschool child with autism, (2) nonprejudicial procedural violation of not providing written notice of denial of parents' unilateral placement, and (3) lack of FAPE in the LRE for said placement (e.g., lack of individualization and related services) [~M]

**44. S Chisago Lakes Sch. Dist. v. J.D., 43 IDELR ¶ 164 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005)**

- upheld district's determination upon reevaluation that the student no longer met the all the required criteria in the state regulations for eligibility under the classification ASD, which is less strict than the classification of autism under the IDEA [E]

**\*26 45. S Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. v. J.K., 400 F.Supp.2d 991, 205 Ed.Law Rep. 342 (S.D. Tex. 2005)**

- ruled that reduced number and changed location of parent and in-home training sessions did not deny child with autism FAPE, thus reversing hearing officer's award of compensatory education—deferred to district on methodological considerations and construed causation issues as parents' unproven burden [~M]

**46. (PIS) D.F. v. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 430 F.3d 595, 203 Ed.Law Rep. 500 (2d Cir. 2005)**

- remanded to determine whether the consideration of post-hearing evidence, which the review officer and district court used to rule that the district must provide at least 10 hours of in-home ABA therapy in addition to its self-contained special education program (with OT, PT, SLT, and parent counseling), was an error of law [~M]

**47. *S B.V. v. Dep't of Educ.*, 451 F.Supp.2d 1113, 213 Ed.Law Rep. 1073 (D. Haw. 2005)**

- rejected tuition reimbursement for 15-year-old with Asperger Syndrome, concluding that district's program was appropriate despite parents' challenge to the choice of the teacher and skills trainer plus various procedural errors that were not prejudicial [~M]

**48. *S Michael J. v. Derry Township Sch. Dist.*, 45 IDELR ¶ 36 (E.D. Pa. 2006)**

- upheld procedural and substantive appropriateness of IEP and district's proposed placement for 11-year-old with severe autism in autistic support class, which was based on ABA principles, rather than the parents' successive in-home ABA and private school ABA programs [M]

**49. *S Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ.*, 443 F.3d 965, 208 Ed.Law Rep. 22 (8th Cir. 2006)**

- upheld substantive appropriateness of successive IEPs for high school student with autism [~M]

**50. *P S.A. v. Riverside-Delanco Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.*, 45 IDELR ¶ 215 (D.N.J. 2006)**

- parents requested full-day and obtained half-day preschool program based on ABA-DTT, due to experts' agreement that child with severe autism needed ABA-DTT and school district did not have trained personnel to do so, thus entitling parents to attorneys' fees of \$47k [M]

**51. *P County Sch Bd. v. R.T.*, 433 F.Supp.2d 657, 210 Ed.Law Rep. 976 (E.D. Va. 2006)<sup>40</sup>**

- upheld ABA at-home program as FAPE in the LRE for four-year-old with autism rather than district's TEACCH program (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**52. *S A.M. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist.*, 46 IDELR ¶ 191 (D. Alaska 2006)**

- \*27 rejected parents' claim of lack of opportunity for meaningful participation in developing IEP for preschool child with autism and concluded that the IEP met the substantive standard when parents' withdrew the child (prematurely) for ABA therapy [~M]

53. *S W.S. v. Rye City Sch. Dist.*, 454 F.Supp.2d 134, 214 Ed.Law Rep. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)

- upheld appropriateness of proposed 50/50 placement of kindergartner with autism in regular school, concluding that FBA was appropriate and district's failure to send out notices to private schools did not constitute pre-determination [tuition reimbursement case] [~M]

54. *S Marc V. v. North East Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 455 F.Supp.2d 577, 214 Ed.Law Rep. 597 (W.D. Tex. 2006)

- upheld appropriateness of program/placement of pre-kindergarten child with autism where district refused to grant parents' medically-based request for homebound instruction (based on diagnosis of PTSD after district stopped parent from accompanying child to class) [~M]

55. *S Leticia H. v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 502 F.Supp.2d 512, 224 Ed.Law Rep. 163 (W.D. Tex. 2007)

- lack of specific diagnosis of autism and lack of precise goals did not deny this eligible preschool child FAPE [?E/~M]

56. *P Mr. I. v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55*, 480 F.3d 1, 217 Ed.Law Rep. 60 (1st Cir. 2007)

- ruled that student's Asperger Disorder adversely affected educational performance as broadly defined by state law, establishing that student was eligible here, since "need" was not a contested issue [E]

57. *S Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist.*, 502 F.3d 811, 225 Ed.Law Rep. 136 (9th Cir. 2007)

- rejected FAPE-implementation claim for student with severe autism, concluding that the standard is whether district's implementation fell "significantly short of the services required by the child's IEP" (with liberal credit for the district's "corrective actions" in compliance with hearing officer's prospective order, which did not provide compensatory education) [~M]

58. *S O'Dell v. Special Sch. Dist.*, 503 F.Supp.2d 1206, 224 Ed.Law Rep. 222 (E.D. Mo. 2007)

- rejected claim of parents of preschooler with PDD that the district denied them a meaningful opportunity to participate in the IDEA process when it denied their request for in-home ABA therapy [~M]

59. *S San Rafael Elementary Sch. Dist. v. California Special Educ. Hearing Office.*, 482 F.Supp.2d 1152, 219 Ed.Law Rep. 676 (N.D. Cal. 2007)

- upheld district's proposed placement of 13-year-old with autism in private day school rather than parents' requested residential placement, rejecting parents' claim that substantive standard for FAPE extended to generalization of behavioral effects to the home environment [~M]

**60. S Hjortness v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 507 F.3d 1060, 227 Ed.Law Rep. 100 (7th Cir. 2007)**

- \*28 procedural errors, including alleged predetermination in LRE, were not prejudicial and despite lack of current PELs the proposed IEP for gifted student with autism, ADHD, and OCD was substantively appropriate in these particular circumstances [~M]

**61. S J.D. v. Kanawha Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR ¶ 159 (S.D. W. Va. 2007), *aff'd mem.*, 375 Fed.Appx. 333 (4th Cir. 2009), *cert. denied*, 562 U.S. 851, 131 S.Ct. 107, 178 L.Ed.2d 65 (2010)**

- district's choice not to include parent-proposed 1:1 ABA services did not constitute predetermination [~M]

**62. (P) Mark H. v. LeMahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 229 Ed.Law Rep. 53 (9th Cir. 2008), *further proceedings sub nom. Mark H. v. Hamamoto*, 620 F.3d 1090, 261 Ed.Law Rep. 48 (9th Cir. 2010)<sup>41</sup>**

- held that § 504 provides a money damages remedy for failure of a district to provide FAPE to special education students (here two children with autism, for which the district spends approximately \$250k per year as a result of losing the due process hearing) if they prove if they prove: (1) failure to provide "meaningful access" (i.e., reasonable accommodation/commensurate opportunity); and (2) deliberate indifference on the part of the school authorities [~M]

**63. (S) J.P. v. County Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 254, 229 Ed.Law Rep. 391 (4th Cir. 2008)**

- remanded for reconsideration of hearing officer's opinion that district's IEP for child with autism was appropriate because although not meeting the aspirational standard for detailed credibility determinations and legal analysis, it merited deference (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**64. S Travis G. v. New Hope-Solebury Sch. Dist., 544 F.Supp.2d 435, 232 Ed.Law Rep. 165 (E.D. Pa. 2008)**

- upheld appropriateness of district's IEP for kindergarten child with autism, including reduction of OT and ABA, and the district's proposed ESY placement [M]

**65. S Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 236 Ed.Law Rep. 179 (10th Cir. 2008), *cert. denied*, 555 U.S. 1173, 129 S.Ct. 1356, 173 L.Ed.2d 590 (2009)**

- ruled that district did not deny FAPE to student with autism who made progress under three successive IEPs even though it did not generalize to other settings (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**66. PIS *Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20*, 538 F.3d 1306, 236 Ed.Law Rep. 94 (10th Cir. 2008)**

- upheld appropriateness of district's eclectic program for preschool student with autism even though it lacked an in-home component and \*29 concluded that failure to provide finalized IEP was nonprejudicial procedural violation [~M]

**67. PIS *N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist.*, 541 F.3d 1202, 236 Ed.Law Rep. 603 (9th Cir. 2008)**

- upheld tuition reimbursement for IEP where district did not evaluate the child with speech impairment in all the areas of suspected disability, i.e., autism (treating it as prejudicial procedural violation), but rejected parents' claim that the child was eligible for ESY, thus ducking question of FAPE substantive standard for ESY [?E]

**68. P *Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Douglas L.*, 51 IDELR ¶ 1 (S.D. Iowa 2008)**

- upheld hearing officer's PRR-based decision against district's behavioral methodology but folded into the Rowley substantive standard for FAPE [M]

**69. S *M.W. v. Clarke County Sch. Dist.*, 51 IDELR ¶ 63 (M.D. Ga. 2008)**

- upheld district's proposed self-contained placement for 3-year-old child with autism as FAPE in the LRE and rejected appropriateness of parents' unilateral placement in mainstream private school plus ABA as not appropriate, thereby denying tuition reimbursement [~M]

**70. S *Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist.*, 294 Fed.Appx. 997 (6th Cir. 2008), *cert. denied*, 557 U.S. 946, 129 S.Ct. 2862, 174 L.Ed.2d 595 (2009)**

- rejected parents' claim of denial of FAPE based on delayed OT goals, lack of music therapy, and lack of 1:1 aide (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**71. S *JG v. Douglas County Sch. Dist.*, 552 F.3d 786, 240 Ed.Law Rep. 87 (9th Cir. 2008)**

- ruled that district's completion of an evaluation of preschool twins with autism within 38 days was reasonable, which was the 1999 IDEA regulatory standard applicable in this case and which controls rather than the state's 45-day deadline, because the district did not have reason to suspect autism upon the parents' request [?E]

**72. *S A.D. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 51 IDELR ¶ 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)**

- upheld hearing and review officer's reduction of after-school ABA services from 25 to 10 hours per week (with 5 rather than 12 monthly hours of supervisory support) for gifted kindergarten child with autism based on appropriateness (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**73. *S A.C. v. Bd. of Educ.*, 553 F.3d 165, 240 Ed.Law Rep. 546 (2d Cir. 2009)<sup>42</sup>**

- held that IEP for child with autism developed, in violation of state regulation requiring FBA, was neither procedurally nor substantively deficient—IDEA's IEP “special consideration” provision, in effect, trumped state reg (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**\*30 74. *S T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist.*, 554 F.3d 247, 241 Ed.Law Rep. 22 (2d Cir. 2009)**

- held that consultant chart's “School Response” that showed district did not intend to offer more than 10 hours of school-based ABA did not constitute pre-determination of IEP for kindergarten child with autism (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**75. *S Parenteau v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist.*, 51 IDELR ¶ 213 (D. Ariz. 2009)<sup>43</sup>**

- upheld procedural and substantive appropriateness of IEP for eight-year-old with autism, which included TEACCH method and which did not necessitate an autism consultant on the IEP team, also concluding that the district had provided the parents—in response to their due process hearing complaint—with all that they had requested, including the consultant and 1:1 ABA aide, thus leaving no basis for compensatory education [M]

**76. *S B.S. v. Placentia-Yorba Linda Unified Sch. Dist.*, 306 Fed.Appx. 397, 242 Ed.Law Rep. 88 (9th Cir. 2009)**

- upheld substantive appropriateness and LRE of successive two IEPs (with second providing for sp. ed. for language arts block) for child with autism (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**77. *S Blake C. v. Dep't of Educ.*, 593 F.Supp.2d 1199, 241 Ed.Law Rep. 662 (D. Haw. 2009)**

- held that district's program for child with autism did not meet the heightened standard under “meaningful benefit” standard under *Hellgate* (supra), showing difficulty of measuring progress and resulting in award of tuition reimbursement for part of 2007 (\$62k) as compensatory education for violation in 2005–06 [~M]

**78. *S Hensley v. Colville Sch. Dist.*, 51 IDELR ¶ 279 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)**

- upheld procedural (e.g., parental participation) and substantive appropriateness (e.g., ABA staff training) of IEP that district offered for nine-year-old with autism [~M]

79. *S G.B. v. Bridgewater-Raritan Reg'l Bd. of Educ.*, 52 IDELR ¶ 39 (D.N.J. 2009)

- upheld appropriateness of district's subsequently revised IEP for preschool child with autism at public ABA program [~M]

80. *S L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist.*, 566 F.3d 900, 242 Ed.Law Rep. 23 (9th 2009), *further proceedings*, 462 Fed.Appx. 745, 279 Ed.Law Rep. 105 (9th Cir. 2011)

- held that preschool program for a child with autism was substantively appropriate and that the 20-minute limit on outside evaluators' classroom observations was procedural flaw that did not deprive the parents \*31 of meaningful opportunity for participation (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

81. *S Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist.*, 319 Fed.Appx. 692, 245 Ed.Law Rep. 669 (9th Cir. 2009)

- upheld appropriateness of IEP for student with autism concluding that its eclectic program met substantive standard and that failure to provide services based on PRR automatically means a denial of FAPE [M]

82. *S A.G. v. Frieden*, 52 IDELR ¶ 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

- held that IFSP that proposed 20 hours of ABA therapy per week was appropriate, rejecting parents' request for at least 30 hours of this service and their pre-determination claim [M]

83. *S J.A. v. E. Ramapo Sch. Dist.*, 603 F.Supp.2d 684, 243 Ed.Law Rep. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

- upheld appropriateness of IEP for five-year-old child with pervasive developmental disorder, rejecting claims that (1) classification under OHI rather than autism was substantive flaw, (2) IEP should have included 10 more hours per week of 1:1 behavior therapy, and (3) district should have done an FBA, as required by state law (tuition reimbursement case) [?E, ~M]

84. *S E.G. v. City Sch. Dist.*, 606 F.Supp.2d 384, 244 Ed.Law Rep. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

- rejected parents' pre-determination claim and ruled that the district's proposed IEP, which included 10 hours of at-home behavior therapy and 5 half days of regular education was FAPE in the LRE (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

85. (S) *Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z.*, 580 F.3d 286, 249 Ed.Law Rep. 34 (5th Cir. 2009)

- ruled that district's IEP was not substantively appropriate due to child's pattern of regression and IEP's insufficient services but remanded to apply this test for private residential placement: (1) whether it is essential in order for the disabled child to receive a meaningful educational benefit, and, if so, (2) whether it is primarily oriented toward enabling the child to obtain an education (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**86. *S Pohorecki v. Anthony Wayne Local Sch. Dist.*, 637 F.Supp.2d 547, 248 Ed.Law Rep. 690 (N.D. Ohio 2009)**

- upheld, as not a denial of FAPE, district's determination that district properly classified child, who had previous diagnoses of ADHD, "absence seizures" and—most recently—Asperger Disorder, as ED rather than parent's proposed classifications of autism or OHI [E]

**87. *S T.Y. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 584 F.3d 412, 249 Ed.Law Rep. 742 (2d Cir. 2009)**

- upheld substantive appropriateness of IEP, despite deficiencies regarding parent counseling and speech/language services and with 1:1 aide rather than FBA–BIP, and rejected procedural claim that the IEP did not specify a school site for the educational placement<sup>44</sup> (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**\*32 88. *S E.H. v. Bd. of Educ.*, 361 Fed.Appx. 156, 256 Ed.Law Rep. 562 (2d Cir. 2009)**

- rejected parent's claims that IEP was deficient for lack of parental participation, class size of 12:1 rather than 6:1, and failure to include BIP [~M]

**89. *S Huffman v. N. Lyon County Sch. Dist.*, 53 IDELR ¶ 147 (D. Kan. 2009)**

- rejected parent's various procedural challenges, including lack of autism–specific testing and personnel, and substantive challenges, including applicable standard (in the Tenth Circuit) and scientifically–based methodology [M]

**90. *S Seladoki v. Bellaire Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.*, 53 IDELR ¶ 153 (S.D. Ohio 2009)**

- rejected parent's claim that children with autism needed 30–40 hours of ABA services each week, ruling that district's offer of 30 hours subject to further evaluation information, was appropriate [M]

**91. *S J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist.*, 592 F.3d 938, 252 Ed.Law Rep. 591 (9th Cir. 2009)**

- upheld appropriateness of IEP for child with autism, rejecting lower court's ruling that IDEA '97 raised the Rowley substantive standard and concluding that various asserted procedural violations, such as failure to include methodology in the IEP, were a denial of FAPE (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

92. *S K.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist.*, 679 F.Supp.2d 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2009), *aff'd*, 426 Fed.Appx. 536, 270 Ed.Law Rep. 555 (9th Cir. 2011)

- upheld appropriateness of successive, similar IEPs with which the child made slow progress—expected rate based on the severity of the disability, and parent did not sustain burden to show that the child needed 30 hours of ABA per week to receive FAPE [M]

93. *S A.J. v. Bd. of Educ.*, 679 F.Supp.2d 299, 254 Ed.Law Rep. 826 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)

- ruled that child with Asperger Disorder who was performing at average to above average levels in the classroom and was progressing academically did not meet the criterion on adversely affecting educational performance—no qualifier on adversely affecting but educational performance in Second Circuit means academic performance [E]

94. *S Maus v. Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist.*, 688 F.Supp.2d 282, 256 Ed.Law Rep. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

- ruled that child with various diagnoses, including Asperger Disorder, ADHD, and dysgraphia, was not eligible as OHI or ED based on narrow, academic view of adverse affect on “educational performance” (tuition reimbursement case) [E]

95. *PIS Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. D.S.*, 688 F.Supp.2d 883, 256 Ed.Law Rep. 298 (D. Alaska 2010)

- \*33 ruled that three consecutive IEPs failed to provide FAPE to child with autism based on prejudicial procedural violations, including lack of accurate and timely evaluation—upholding tuition reimbursement for ABA home program despite lack of special education certification but reversing hearing officer's order to replace IEP team with private company that implements the program [M]

96. *S Smith v. James C. Hormel Sch. of Virginia Inst. of Autism*, 54 IDELR ¶ 75 (W.D. Va. 2010)

- ruled that district's offer of homebound placement, while finding and arranging for residential placement, was not denial of FAPE to child with autism who private school, which offered ABA programming, expelled for life-threatening behavior [~M]

97. *S M.N. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 700 F.Supp.2d 356, 258 Ed.Law Rep. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

- held that procedural violations (e.g., lack of FBA) did not deny FAPE and that the IEP for five-year-old at public charter school for children with autism (per ABA model) met the substantive standard w/o the parents' additionally sought itinerant services (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

98. *S Doe v. Hampden-Wilbraham Reg'l Sch. Dist.*, 715 F.Supp.2d 185, 261 Ed.Law Rep. 134 (D. Mass. 2010)

- ruled that (1) failure to have IEP in place at start of school year for child with autism could be attributed to parents (deference to hearing officer's finding); (2) parent's approval of previous IEPs did not waive FAPE implementation claim; (3) parent did not meet their burden of providing district did not implement expired IEP; and (4) the new IEP met the substantive standard for FAPE (including PRR) (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**99. *P.M.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 712 F.Supp.2d 125, 260 Ed.Law Rep. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), *aff'd*, 685 F.3d 217, 282 Ed.Law Rep. 37 (2d Cir. 2012)**

- upheld \$80,000 tuition reimbursement for kindergarten child with autism based on finding that child needed extensive 1:1 discrete-trial ABA services, which district's proposed 6:1 placement did not provide and which conformed to LRE consideration for the parent's unilateral private placement [M]

**100. *S Lathrop R-II Sch. Dist. v. Gray*, 611 F.3d 419, 258 Ed.Law Rep. 983 (8th Cir. 2010)**

- ruled that lack of baseline data, behavioral goal, and full parental notice did not amount to denial of FAPE where district made good faith effort and reasonably met individual needs of student with autism [~M]

**101. *S.M.S. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 734 F.Supp.2d 271, 263 Ed.Law Rep. 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), *aff'd sub nom M.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 685 F.3d 217, 282 Ed.Law Rep. 37 (2d Cir. 2012)**

- upheld substantive appropriateness of IEP for child with autism, including transition provision to return the child from private school and \*34 use of shorthand descriptors in BIP (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**102. *S.C.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 752 F.Supp.2d 355, 265 Ed.Law Rep. 984 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)**

- ruled that child with autism was no longer entitled to after-school 1:1 ABA program (and parent training) where the private placement's program met the substantive standard for FAPE based on the child's progress [~M]

**103. *S.E.Z.-L v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 763 F.Supp.2d 584, 267 Ed.Law Rep. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), *aff'd sub nom R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 694 F.3d 167, 284 Ed.Law Rep. 629 (2d Cir. 2012)**

- omission of parent training and counseling in IEP for child with autism, contrary to state law requirement, did not constitute denial of FAPE where the district provided such services as needed—same for lack of transition plan under IDEA where court found that the school would have offered services to meet the child's transition needs [~M]

**104. *P.W. Windsor-Plainsboro Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. M.F.*, 56 IDELR ¶ 106 (D.N.J. 2011)**

- ruled that parent was entitled to reimbursement for the home ABA program where the district's proposed eclectic program for child with autism was not reasonably calculated for meaningful benefit [M]

**105. P *Sumter County Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan*, 642 F.3d 478, 268 Ed.Law Rep. 668 (4th Cir. 2011)**

- held that the child's gains and district's rectifying measures were insufficient to avoid the denial of FAPE from the district's failure to implement a material portion of the IEP of a child with autism, which was 15 hours/week of ABA therapy, and that the parent's unilateral home placement was appropriate (with LRE not applying) [~M]

**106. S *S.M. v. State of Hawaii Dep't of Educ.*, 808 F.Supp.2d 1269, 276 Ed.Law Rep. 153 (D. Haw. 2011)**

- ruling that IEP for student with autism did not have to specify the qualifications of the service provider or the methodology and that the subsequent changes, including adding a transition plan and autism consultant teacher services, did not render the original version defective because they promptly resulted from information that the parent disclosed only belatedly (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**107. S *Bd. of Educ. v. J.A.*, 56 IDELR ¶ 209 (N.D. W. Va. 2011)**

- upheld appropriateness of SCERTS methodology for preschool child with autism rather than his previous ABA/DTT methodology—relaxed view of PRR (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**108. P *R.K. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 56 IDELR ¶ 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), *further proceedings*, 56 IDELR ¶ 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), *aff'd sub nom R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 694 F.3d 167, 284 Ed.Law Rep. 629 (2d Cir. 2012)**

- ruled in favor of tuition reimbursement for student with autism, where district's program was deficient in several substantive respects, including lack of FBA–BIP and more intensive ABA services (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**\*35 109. S *Fort Osage R–1 Sch. Dist. v. Sims*, 641 F.3d 996, 268 Ed.Law Rep. 78 (8th Cir. 2011)**

- ruled that district's failure to diagnose the child's autism did not amount to a denial of FAPE where the district's IEP met the substantive standard for FAPE, including addressing his unique needs, and the parents failed to prove their pre–determination claim (tuition reimbursement case) [E/~M]

**110. P *New Milford Bd. of Educ. v. C.R.*, 431 Fed.Appx. 157, 271 Ed.Law Rep. 820 (3d Cir. 2011)**

- upheld ruling that district's private school program for child with autism did not provide for a meaningful benefit, because he additionally required an after-school ABA program (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**111. P** *New York City Dep't of Educ. v. V.S.*, 57 IDELR ¶ 877 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)

- based in part on evidence that TEACCH method would not be effective for this child with autism, upheld tuition reimbursement at private school that provided relationship-based methodology [M]

**112. S T.M. v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist.**, 447 Fed.Appx. 128 (11th Cir. 2011)

- summarily affirmed unpublished trial court decision<sup>45</sup> that rejected parents' insistence on continuation of 1:1 Lindamood Bell services, finding that the new IEP met the substantive standard and that the district had not denied the parents the opportunity for meaningful participation [M]

**113. S** *Nalu Y. v. Dep't of Educ., State of Hawaii*, 858 F.Supp.2d 1127, 284 Ed.Law Rep. 325 (D. Haw. 2012)

- upheld district's evaluation that student did not qualify under autism (though did qualify under SLI and OHI) [E]

**114. S** *G.D. v. Torrance Unified Sch. Dist.*, 857 F.Supp.2d 953, 284 Ed.Law Rep. 180 (C.D. Cal. 2012)

- reduction of behavioral support services for six-year-old with autistic-like behaviors was not denial of FAPE where classroom observations revealed reduced need [~M]

**115. P/S** *Woods v. Northport Pub. Sch.*, 487 Fed.Appx. 968, 287 Ed.Law Rep. 746 (6th Cir. 2012)

- after a 32-day IHO proceedings with more than 7,000 pages of testimony concerning the IEPs in grades 1–3 for a child with autism and cerebral palsy, upheld the rulings that (1) the second-grade IEP amounted to a substantive denial of FAPE due to substantial lack of implementation plus lack of meaningful benefit in relation to child's potential; (2) the third-grade IEP represented procedural denial of meaningful parental participation due to (a) failure to provide access to test protocols to parents' expert and (b) development of goals/objectives outside of parents' presence plus substantive denial of FAPE due to reduction of services resulting in lack of meaningful benefit

- \*36 upheld 758-hour compensatory education award for two-year denial of FAPE (12 hours for each of 64 weeks of denial) for the child to “reasonably recover” in light of potentially closing window of opportunity, plus upheld requirement that the delivery be via a teacher with autism certification due to this provision in the IEP

- mixed outcome for IHO's conditioning of prospective relief on parents' re-enrollment of the child (whom the parents had removed for private schooling): no for the ordered evaluations and amended IEP but yes for the implementation of the IEP (which was half mainstreamed and half 1:1 autism services in regular school setting)

- upheld limiting award to pre-settlement hours amounting to \$25k in attorneys' fees because although the parents were substantially justified in rejecting the settlement due to its failure to include attorneys' fees, the limitation was reasonable in light of the parents' limited success of the overly long and contentious administrative proceeding [~M]

**116. P** *Orange Unified Sch. Dist. v. C.K.*, 59 IDELR ¶ 74 (C.D. Cal. 2012)

- ruled that district denied FAPE to six-year-old who had IEP for speech/language impairment by not providing evaluation for autism upon reasonable suspicion, with the court clarifying that “the inquiry is not whether the student actually qualifies for special education services, but whether the student should be referred for an evaluation” (tuition reimbursement case) [?E]

**117. P** *R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 694 F.3d 167, 284 Ed.Law Rep. 629 (6th Cir. 2012)

- adopting the snapshot approach but not strict four-corners rule and differentiating between serious (FBA) and minor (parent counseling) procedural violations based on state standards for FAPE analysis, reached mixed outcomes in three consolidated cases concerning students with autism (two for district supra and one in favor of the parent, including tuition reimbursement) [~M]

**118. S** *F.L. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 60 IDELR ¶ 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)

- upheld proposed placement for child with autism that used TEACCH rather than sole ABA method (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**119. S** *Ramirez-Ortiz v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Educ.*, 60 IDELR ¶ 132 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)

- ruled that the hearing officer's order for payment and reimbursement of “psychological therapy services,” which was ABA for a child with autism, was not enforceable as applied to a provider who did not meet the state standards, i.e., a licensed psychologist [M]

**120. (P)** *Young v. Ohio*, 60 IDELR ¶ 134 (S.D. Ohio 2013)

- granted preliminary injunction under Part C, concluding that parents of two-year-old with autism were likely to succeed on their claim that the state's decision not to provide ABA therapy or approve ABA providers constituted predetermination [~M]

**121. S M.N. v. State of Hawaii Dep't of Educ., 509 Fed.Appx. 640 (9th Cir. 2013)**

- \*37 upheld denial of tuition reimbursement for child with autism who received a “meager” educational benefit after a year in a private ABA-based program [M]

**122. S B.M. v. Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 60 IDELR ¶ 188 (S.D. Cal. 2013)**

- upheld hearing officer's decision in favor of district's segregated school-based placement, rather than parents' home-based ABA placement, for preschool child with autism who was highly distractible but with strong nonverbal skills and his need to develop language and interpersonal skills—“the testimony of district personnel, who had daily or regularly scheduled time with [the student], was more persuasive than that of [the parent's] witnesses, whose opinions were largely based on file reviews” [M]

**123. S Shafer v. Whitehall Dist. Sch., 61 IDELR ¶ 20 (W.D. Mich. 2013)**

- ruled that predetermination that child's classification was primarily SLD and secondarily OHI and SLI rather than autism was harmless error where the IEP met the substantive standard for FAPE in relation to the child's individual needs [E]

**124. P D.C. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 950 F.Supp.2d 494, 299 Ed.Law Rep. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)**

- ruled that (1) district's proposed placement was not substantively appropriate where the evidence that it would provide a seafood-free environment to 10-year-old with autism and seafood allergy were *R.E.*-excluded statements of school officials after the parent's unilateral placement decision; (2) the private placement was appropriate despite teacher's lack of certification in the school's methodology; and (3) the equities supported (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**125. S P.C. v. Harding Twp. Bd. of Educ., 61 IDELR ¶ 223 (D.N.J. 2013)**

- ruled that district's proposed program for 3-year-old with autism was appropriate (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**126. (P) Y.S. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 62 IDELR ¶ (S.D.N.Y. 2013)**

- based on teacher's testimony opening the door to the methodology issue, remanded to the IHO to determine whether TEACCH meets the individual needs of 5-year-old child with PDD [M]

127. *S D.A. v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2*, 62 IDELR ¶ 205 (D. Idaho 2014)

- upheld district's determination of non-eligibility for high-functioning H.S. student with ASD who excelled in his academic classes but not, due to his social and pragmatic difficulties, in his other classes, where he did as well as his nondisabled peers [E]

128. *S M.W. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 725 F.3d 131, 296 Ed.Law Rep. 57 (2d Cir. 2013)

- upheld procedural and substantive appropriateness of district's proposed IEP for nine-year-old with autism, ADHD, and Tourette \*38 syndrome, including lack of FBA and parental counseling in violation of state law (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

129. *S R.C. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 958 F.Supp.2d 718, 301 Ed.Law Rep. 212 (N.D. Tex. 2013)

- ruled that IEP was substantively appropriate based on ED where additional classification of autism was not clear or necessary (tuition reimbursement case) [?E]

130. *S T.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 973 F.Supp.2d 320, 303 Ed.Law Rep. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)

- rejected claims of procedural inappropriateness (e.g., lack of FBA per state law and failure to discuss nonpublic placements) and substantive inappropriateness (e.g., teacher-student ratio) of proposed IEP for student with autism (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

131. *S D.A.B. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 973 F Supp.2d 344, 303 Ed.Law Rep. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)

- rejected claims of procedural inappropriateness (e.g., goals that were insufficiently measurable) and substantive inappropriateness (e.g., teacher-student ratio) of proposed IEP for student with autism (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

132. *P F.O. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 976 F.Supp.2d 499, 304 Ed.Law Rep. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)

- ruled that proposed IEP for child with autism and other disabilities was not reasonably calculated for benefit—insufficient attention to physician's testimony that autism was the child's primary area of need (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

133. *P C.L. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 552 Fed.Appx. 81 (2d Cir. 2014)

- short opinion deferring to IHO's—more well reasoned than the review officer's—conclusion that district did not meet its burden to prove that the proposed 6:1:1 program would enable the child to learn new material (tuition reimbursement case—appropriateness of private placement not at issue) [~M]

**134. *P C.F. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 746 F.3d 68, 302 Ed.Law Rep. 901 (2d Cir. 2014)**

- ruled that that the procedural violations in the proposed IEP, based on state law, of failing to provide for parent training and counseling and in producing an inappropriately vague BIP in the absence of an FBA combined with its substantive inadequacy of providing for a 6:1 student/teacher ratio, where child with autism clearly needed a 1:1 ratio, amounted to a denial of FAPE (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**135. *P/S T.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist.*, 752 F.3d 145, 305 Ed.Law Rep. 29 (2d Cir. 2014)**

- ruled the IDEA's LRE requirement applies to ESY placements just as it does to school-year placements but that the lack of an FBA-BIP and parent counseling training (both per state law) for child with autism were procedural violations that did not result in a substantive loss of education (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**\*39 136. *S B.K. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 12 F.Supp.3d 343, 309 Ed.Law Rep. 977 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)**

- ruled that the proposed IEP for eight-year old with autism substantively appropriate and rejected the various procedural challenges as either unproven (e.g., predetermination and FBA/BIP) or nonprejudicial (lack of parent counseling/training (tuition reimbursement case)) [~M]

**137. *P V.S. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 25 F.Supp.3d 295, 311 Ed.Law Rep. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)**

- ruled that district's “bait and switch” re proposed site for IEP for student with autism was a denial of FAPE in terms of parental opportunity for meaningful participation (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**138. *S R.B. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 15 F.Supp.3d 421, 310 Ed.Law Rep. 191 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)<sup>46</sup>**

- ruled that procedural violations (e.g., lack of vocational assessment, parent training/counseling, and measurable goals) were not a denial of FAPE in individual circumstances of this case and the 6:1:1 placement for this child with autism was substantively appropriate (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**139. *P V.S. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 25 F.Supp.3d 295, 311 Ed.Law Rep. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)**

- ruled that district's "bait and switch" re proposed site for IEP for student with autism was a denial of FAPE in terms of parental opportunity for meaningful participation (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**140. *S C.B. v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist.*, 575 Fed.Appx. 796, 309 Ed.Law Rep. 194 (9th Cir. 2014)**

- rejected procedural challenges to IEP (e.g., absence of certain goals and of accommodations section) and upheld substantive appropriateness of interim small-group placement of child with autism who previously received 1:1 services [~M]

**141. *S K.S. v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist.*, 63 IDELR ¶ 125 (N.D. Ohio 2014)**

- ruled that IEP for student with autism that provided for occasional sensory breaks in a glass enclosure within the general education classroom constituted FAPE in the LRE [~M]

**142. *P C.U. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 23 F.Supp.3d 210, 311 Ed.Law Rep. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)**

- ruled that district's failure to provide parents of 15-year-old with autism with meaningful opportunity for participation by not providing parents with (1) copy of IEP in timely manner and (2) relevant information (e.g., resources adequate to implement the IEP) about the school placement (i.e., process, not necessarily site, of school selection), although rejecting other procedural challenges and substantive (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**\*40 143. *P Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Bowens*, 762 F.3d 1242, 308 Ed.Law Rep. 609 (11th Cir. 2014)**

- upheld ruling, in case of child with autism upon transitioning from Part C (early intervention), that district offered "inadequate option[s] and [attempted to] wash its hands of its obligations" by acquiescing to the private placement (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**144. *S A.S. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 573 Fed.Appx. 63 (2d Cir. 2014)**

- upheld procedural and substantive appropriateness of proposed IEP, including the TEACCH methodology, for child with autism despite parents' preference for ABA-based program (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**145. *P T.K. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 32 F.Supp.3d 405, 312 Ed.Law Rep. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)**

- ruled that district denied FAPE by being deliberately indifferent or failing to take reasonable steps to prevent bullying that substantially restricted the child in her educational opportunities, more specifically identifying these three IEP team failures: (1) upon a legitimate concern that bullying will severely restrict a disabled student's educational opportunities, failing to consider bullying in the development of the IEP

parents, (2) upon a substantial probability that bullying will severely restrict a disabled student's educational opportunities, failing to provide an anti-bullying program in the IEP, and/or (3) upon addressing bullying in the IEP, failing to do so comprehensibly to lay parents so that they have a meaningful opportunity for participation (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**146. S R.K. v. Clifton Bd. of Educ., 587 Fed.Appx. 17, 312 Ed.Law Rep. 65 (3d Cir. 2014)**

- ruled that even if the district's refusal to provide parents with copy of consultant's report evaluating the system's ABA program and to allow their expert to observe the child's class were procedural violations, neither refusal deprived them of their opportunity for meaningful participation in the IEP and IHO process [~M]

**147. P P.L. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 56 F.Supp.3d 147, 316 Ed.Law Rep. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)**

- ruled that lack of transition assessment, FBA, and parent counseling/training per state law did not rise to the level of denial of FAPE for child with autism, but the proposed 6:1:1 placement was not reasonably calculated to provide benefit due to the child's proven needs for 1:1 instruction (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**148. S R.B. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 589 Fed.Appx. 572, 313 Ed.Law Rep. 28 (2d Cir. 2014)**

- rejected procedural challenge (less than full reevaluation after one year, mixed procedural-substantive challenge (omission of parents' choice of methodology) challenges to the proposed IEP and upheld substantive appropriateness of 6:1:1 placement to return middle school child with autism from specialized private school (tuition reimbursement case)) [~M]

**\*41 149. S E.L. v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 773 F.3d 509, 312 Ed.Law Rep. 539 (4th Cir. 2014)**

- ruled that district's embedded implementation, including supervised SLT interns, rather than the one-on-one approach that was the preference of the resigned SL therapist and that was the parents' interpretation, fulfilled IEP provision for four hours per week of SLT in the "total school environment" of eight-year-old with autism [~M]

**150. S F.K. v. Dep't of Educ., State of Hawaii, 585 Fed.Appx. 710 (9th Cir. 2014)**

- ruled that the district's placement for middle-school student with autism met the substantive and implementation standards for appropriateness [~M]

**151. S M.A. v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 592 Fed.Appx. 124, 314 Ed.Law Rep. 85 (3d Cir. 2014)**

- upheld changed placement of child with autism from private ABA school to less intensive ABA program within the district based on the child's progress, ruling that the failure of the notice to specify the school did not deny the parents' meaningful opportunity for participation in this case [~M]

**152.** [P/S Cupertino Union Sch. Dist. v. K.A.](#), 75 F.Supp.3d 1088, 319 Ed.Law Rep. 352 (N.D. Cal. 2014)

- reversed the IHO's ruling that the district had engaged in predetermination for IEP of child with autism and seizure disorder, concluding instead that—distinguishable from *Doug C.*—the continuation of the IEP meeting without the parent did not violate the opportunity for meaningful participation in the specific circumstances of this case, but upheld the IHO's ruling that the district failed to implement the IEP at a material level for three-month period (compensatory education case) [~M]

**153.** [S Q.W. v. Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cnty.](#), 64 IDELR ¶ 308 (E.D. Ky. 2015)

- ruled that student who no longer exhibited notable academic, behavioral, or social difficulties in school was no longer eligible as student with autism, reasoning that “ ‘educational performance’ may extend beyond grades to the classroom experience as a whole, [but] not include behaviors exhibited solely in the home” [E]

**154.** [S Morgan M. v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist.](#), 64 IDELR ¶ 309 (E.D. Pa. 2015)

- ruled that IEP for student with epilepsy, pervasive development disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder who may have had ASD was appropriate despite lack of “autistic support” because the IEP provided for the services addressing the individual needs of the student regardless of the label [?E]

**155.** [S L.O. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.](#), 94 F.Supp.3d 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

- upheld appropriateness of successive IEPs for child with autism despite violations of state law for students with autism with regard to SL services, FBA–BIP, and parent counseling/training [~M]

**\*42 156.** [S J.W. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.](#), 95 F.Supp.3d 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

- ruled that parents of child with autism sufficiently had raised methodology issue in their complaint but, even assuming arguendo that the ABA methodology was inconsistent with the success of the child's IEP, they failed to prove that the proposed public school was incapable of implementing the IEP (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**157.** [S M.L. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.](#), 65 IDELR ¶ 96 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)

- ruled that district's proposed IEP that provided a 12-month placement with 6:1+1 student:staff ratio in a district special school with TEACCH methodology met standards of appropriateness—“The

district was not required to consider any particular teaching methodology in the development of [the child's] IEP, and [the] IEP does not specify one [citing F.L.]” (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**158. P K.R. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., \_\_\_ F.Supp.3d \_\_\_ (S.D.N.Y. 2015)**

- ruled that exclusion of parents from the IEP process and, separately, inability of the proposed district placement to meet the child's sensory needs constituted a denial of FAPE (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**159. (P) E.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., \_\_\_ Fed.Appx. \_\_\_ (2d Cir. 2015)**

- rejected parent's procedural and substantive challenges to the BIP for their child with autism and their claim regarding the proposed classroom capacity, but remanded for determination of whether the IEP's adoption of the private school's goals without its DIR/Floortime method resulted in a substantive denial of FAPE (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**160. P/S E.F. v. Newport Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 65 IDELR ¶ 265 (E.D. Cal. 2015)**

- rejected various other claims of parents' of kindergartner with autism, including alleged inadequacy of FBA/ABA, but upheld denial of FAPE and corresponding compensatory education for one-year delay in conducting an AT assessment upon learning of his success at home with iPod for communication [~M]

**161. P/S G.K. v. Montgomery Cnty. Intermediate Unit, 65 IDELR ¶ 288 (E.D. Pa. 2015)**

- upheld IHO's decision for limited reimbursement to parent of preschool child with autism for Lovaas services, ruling that the parents' unreasonable conduct factored into the district's incomplete implementation of the child's IFSP and IEP (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

## V. A DISTRICT CHECKLIST OF WINNING–LOSING FACTORS IN AUTISM METHODOLOGY CASES

### A. Your procedures:

- A.1 Has your district committed procedural violations, especially those that are prejudicial (i.e., amount to a denial of FAPE)?

### \*43 B. Your program:

- B.1 Is your IEP sufficiently specific to autistic students in general and this student specifically?
- B.2 Does your program/placement include any ABA or Lovaas component?
- B.3 Are the specially designed instruction and related services in the IEP based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable?
- B.4 Do the following have sufficient specialized expertise:

- (a) evaluator(s)
  
- (b) IEP team
  
- (c) teacher(s) and related service providers

C. Your witnesses:

- C.1 Are your expert witnesses credible and convincing:

- (a) child's teacher(s)?
  
- (b) other district personnel?
  
- (c) outside specialists?

- C.2 Do they have specific data concerning the child's progress?

D. Other factors:

- D.1 Is your attorney sufficiently specialized in terms of the world of special education? What about the parents' advocate or attorney?
- D.2. If the case is at the judicial stage, did you win at the due process and/or review officer levels, particularly at the highest level in two-tier states?

## VI. STATE LAWS

Some states have added requirements, via legislation or regulations (or guidelines, which do not have the force of law) that effectively add to the foundations established by the IDEA.<sup>47</sup> Here are two examples:<sup>48</sup>

- \*44 *Connecticut*<sup>49</sup>:

Effective July 1, 2012, school districts must provide ABA services to any child with ASD if the student's IEP or 594 plan requires these services. The service provider must be either (A) licensed by the Department of Public Health or certified by the State Department of Education, with such services are within the scope of practice of such license or certificate, or (B) certified by the Behavior Analyst Certification Board as a behavior analyst or, if working under the supervision of a certified behavior analyst, an assistant behavior analyst, the child's teacher, or the child's paraprofessional.

- *Texas*<sup>50</sup>:

For each child eligible under the classification of autism, the IEP team must “consider, based on peer-reviewed, research-based educational programming practices to the extent practicable and, when needed” the following 11 IEP components (with examples not summarized here):

(1) extended day or ESY programming

(2) daily schedules reflecting minimal unstructured time and active engagement in learning activities

(3) in-home and community-based training or viable alternatives that assist the student with acquisition of social/behavioral skills

(4) positive behavior support strategies based on relevant information (e.g., a BIP based on a FBA)

(5) futures planning (at any age) for integrated living, work, community, and educational environments that considers skills necessary to function in current and post-secondary environments

(6) parent/family training and support, provided by qualified personnel with experience in ASD

(7) suitable staff-to-student ratio appropriate to identified activities and as needed to achieve social/behavioral progress based on the child's developmental and learning level (acquisition, fluency, maintenance, generalization) that encourages work towards individual independence

(8) communication interventions, including language forms and functions that enhance effective communication across settings

(9) social skills supports and strategies based on social skills assessment/curriculum and across settings

(10) professional educator/staff support

(11) teaching strategies based on peer reviewed, research-based practices for students with ASD

#### Footnotes

<sup>a1</sup> *Education Law Into Practice* is a special section of the EDUCATION LAW REPORTER sponsored by the Education Law Association. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the publisher or the Education Law Association. Cite as 322 Ed.Law Rep. [10] (November 19, 2015).

<sup>aa1</sup> Perry Zirkel is University Professor of Education and Law, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA. He is a Past President of the Education Law Association.

<sup>1</sup> Perry Zirkel, *The Case Law for Students with Autism: An Update*, 262 Ed. Law Rep. 23 (2011). The scope of this document does not extend to ASD methodology cases in other contexts. See, e.g., *K.G. v. Dudek*, 864 F.Supp.2d 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (granting permanent injunction for Medicaid coverage of ABA therapy for children with ASD).

<sup>2</sup> The compilation is limited to cases concerning eligibility and FAPE, because autism is not particularly linked to the other categories of the case law, which tend to be generic across the various classifications of disability under the IDEA. For a limited exception, see *P.V. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia*, 289 F.R.D. 227, 291 Ed.Law Rep. 771 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (ruled that automatic transfer of 1600+ children with autism between centralized grade-level programs at different schools constituted change in placement due to typical difficulties with transitions and changes in routine).

<sup>3</sup> More recently, a study reported that there had been 354 IDELR-published hearing/review officer and court decisions from 1990 through 2002, but it did not provide enough information to explain the disparity with this total. Mitchell Yell et al., *Developing Legally Correct and Educationally Appropriate Programs for Students with Autism Spectrum Disorders*, 18 FOCUS ON AUTISM AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 182 (2003).

<sup>4</sup> The Choutka et al. article reviews earlier research studies in this category. For an early sampling of case law in various broader categories, see Lyman Boomer & Linda Garrison-Harrell, *Legal Issues Concerning Children with Autism and Pervasive Developmental Disabilities*, 21 BEHAVIOR DISORDERS 553 (1995).

<sup>5</sup> 34 C.F.R. § 300.8. The IDEA legislation, as of the 1990 Amendments, specifies autism as one of the 13 recognized classifications but does not specifically define it. Rather, the definition appears in the IDEA regulations, which also define two other separate, but related classifications:

(b) *Children aged 3 through 9 experiencing developmental delays*. The term *child with a disability* for children aged 3 through 9 may, at the discretion of the State and [school district] and in accordance with [the FAPE regulation], include a child—  
 (1) Who is experiencing developmental delays as defined by appropriate diagnostic instruments and procedures, in one or more of the following areas: physical development, cognitive development, communication development, social or emotional development, or adaptive development; and (2) Who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.

(c)(9) *Other health impairment* means having limited strength, vitality or alertness, ... that results in limited alertness with respect to the educational environment, that (i) Is due to chronic or acute health problems ... and (ii) Adversely affects a child's educational performance.

*Id.* The OSEP policy letters on the following pages clarify the possible connections to developmental delay and other health impairment.

6 “OSEP” refers to the Office of Special Education Programs, which is the agency within the U.S. Department of Education that administers the IDEA. Courts accord deference to the policy letters of such agencies within prescribed limits. Perry Zirkel, *Do OSEP policy letters have legal weight?*, 171 Ed. Law Rep. 391 (2003).

7 The rare other published pertinent OSEP interpretations do not provide sufficiently specific and significant information to warrant republication here. *See, e.g.*, Letter to Anonymous, 60 IDELR ¶ 47 (OSEP 2012); Letter to Anonymous, 55 IDELR ¶ 72 (OSEP 2010); Letter to Anonymous, 30 IDELR 705 (OSEP 1998); Letter to VanWart, 20 IDELR 1217 (OSEP 1993). The scope of pertinence here does not extend to issue related but not particular to autism, such as when must the IEP include methodology. *See, e.g.*, Letter to Anonymous, 49 IDELR 258 (OSEP 2007); Letter to Wilson, 37 IDELR ¶ 96 (OSEP 2002).

8 The recently issued DSM–V collapses the separate diagnoses of autistic disorder, Asperger's disorder, childhood integrative disorder, pervasive developmental disorder NOS into one umbrella classification of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and requires showing of symptoms in early childhood even if not recognized until later.

9 20 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j). For a two–volume comprehensive reference, see PERRY ZIRKEL, SECTION 504, THE ADA AND THE SCHOOLS (2004) (available from LRP Publications). The ADA Amendments, which are effective January 1, 2009, effectively reverse a decade of court decisions that have taken a “demanding” and, thus, narrowing interpretation of this definition, particularly the second two elements. *See, e.g.*, Perry A. Zirkel, *New Section 504 Student Eligibility Standards*, 41 TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 68 (2009). Of additional significance for high–functioning students with Asperger disorder, a recent unpublished Third Circuit decision recognized social interaction as a major life activity. Although the student in this case did not meet the rigorous interpretation of substantial, the ADAAA would seem to suggest the possibility of the opposite outcome. *Weidow v. Scranton Sch. Dist.*, 460 Fed.Appx. 181, 278 Ed.Law Rep. 879 (3d Cir. 2012).

10 The second and third “prongs” (i.e., subsections “ii” and “iii”) of this definition cannot be the basis for FAPE. *See* Senior Staff Memorandum, 19 IDELR 894 (OCR 1992).

11 For a free download of a much more comprehensive compilation, including but not limited to various other decisions concerning students with autism, see Perry A. Zirkel's *A National Update of Case Law under the IDEA and § 504/ADA*, available in the “Publications” section at [www.nasdse.org](http://www.nasdse.org).

12 The two designations are abbreviated as follows: M ' methodology; ~ M ' marginally methodology. The dividing lines between these two categories are far from bright. Moreover, although the boundary is similarly blurred, the coverage here does not extend to cases based primarily on procedural violations, LRE, or teacher–student ratio. *See, e.g.*, *L.G. v. Fair Lawn Sch. Dist.*, 486 Fed.Appx. 967, 287 Ed.Law Rep. 691 (3d Cir. 2012) (procedural violation and LRE); *Yu v. Hillsborough Elementary Sch. Dist.*, 59 IDELR ¶ 276 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (1:1 instruction).

13 The substantive prong, based on *Board of Educ. v. Rowley*, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690, 5 Ed.Law Rep. 34 (1982), is whether the IEP is reasonably calculated to yield educational benefit. For the procedural prong, the 2004 amendments of the IDEA codified the following formulation:

In matters alleging a procedural violation, a hearing officer may find that a child did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies—

- (i) Impeded the child's right to a FAPE;
- (ii) Significantly impeded the parent's opportunity to participate in the decision–making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the parent's child; or
- (iii) Caused a deprivation of educational benefit.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2).

- 14 The categories for the cases are abbreviated as follows: M = methodology; ~M = marginally methodology; and Other = eligibility or combinations of other categories.
- 15 “Frequency” in this context refers simply to the number, or volume, of these court decisions per the designated time periods and subject categories. For other frequency studies, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Karen Gischlar, *Due Process Hearings under the IDEA: A Longitudinal Frequency Analysis*, 21 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEAD. 22 (2008); Perry A. Zirkel, *The “Explosion” in Education Litigation: An Update*, 114 Ed. Law Rep. 341 (1997).
- 16 “Outcomes” in this context refers to a tabulation of which party in whose favor the court, illustrated by the coding in the case list. See *infra* note 29. The tabulation is based on a categorical scale, which preferably differentiates one or more intermediate points between the polar opposites of wins and losses. Moreover, the differentiation may differ depending on the unit of analysis, i.e., the whole case or specific issues in the case. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Cathy A. Skidmore, *National Trends in the Frequency and Outcomes of Hearing and Review Officer Decisions under the IDEA*, 29 OHIO ST. J. DISPU. RESOL'N 525 (2014) (five–category scale for issue category rulings conflated to two categories for case outcomes); William Lupini & Perry A. Zirkel, *An Outcomes Analysis of Education Litigation*, 17 EDUC. POL'Y 257 (2003) (seven–category scale for overall case outcomes); Youssef Chouhoud & Perry A. Zirkel, *The Goss Progeny: An Empirical Analysis*, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 353 (2008) (five–category scale for specific issue rulings).
- 17 The list is limited to published court decisions. “Published” has new and varied meanings in light of electronic databases and specialized reporter series. Representing an intermediate interpretation, “published” in this context extends to court decisions in Fed.Appx. and IDELR, but not those otherwise provided in Westlaw.
- 18 See *infra* note 29.
- 19 The period 2006–10 should be complete.
- 20 Because the cases were compiled as of June 2015 and there is a delay from issuance to publication of the decisions, this column includes only an estimated 85% of this five–year period.
- 21 “Other” refers to the relatively few cases concerning eligibility alone or in combination with one of the other two categories. *Id.*
- 22 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, *Autism Litigation under the IDEA: A New Meaning of “Disproportionality”?*, 24 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 92 (2011).
- 23 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Brent L. Johnson, *The “Explosion” in Education Litigation: An Updated Analysis*, 265 Ed. Law Rep. 1 (2011).
- 24 See, e.g., Tessie Rose & Perry A. Zirkel, *Orton–Gillingham Methodology for Students with Reading Disabilities*, 41 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 171 (2007); Perry A. Zirkel, *Do School Districts Typically Win Methodology Cases?*, 13 THE SPECIAL EDUCATOR 11 (issue 3, 1997).
- 25 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha & Anastasia D'Angelo, *Creeping Judicialization of Special Education Hearings: An Exploratory Study*, 27 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27 (2007).
- 26 The outcomes scale is as follows: *P* = conclusively for the parents; (*P*) = inconclusively for parents (e.g., denial of district's motion for dismissal or summary judgment); *P/S* = mixed (i.e., partly for each side); (*S*) = inconclusively for school district; *S* = conclusively for school district.
- 27 The entries in this column include the single “(*P/S*)” case.
- 28 For example, from a district perspective or in terms of the judicial analysis for attorneys' fees, the intermediate categories may be seen as parental victories along with the complete conclusive rulings in favor of parents.
- 29 The measurement of outcomes with the entire case as the unit of analysis has evolved to provide more precision. Compare, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Anastasia D'Angelo, *Special Education Case Law: An Empirical Trends Analysis*, 161 Ed. Law Rep. 531 (2002) (using seven–category scale), with Anastasia D'Angelo & Perry A. Zirkel, *An Outcomes Analysis of Student–Initiated Litigation*, 226 Ed. Law Rep. 539 (2008) (employing three–category scale). However, using individual issue rulings as the unit

of analysis may present a more promising alternative. *See, e.g.,* Youssef Chouhoud & Perry A. Zirkel, *The Goss Progeny: An Empirical Analysis*, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 353 (2008).

30 *See, e.g.,* Zirkel & D'Angelo 2008, *supra* note 29.

31 *Id.*

32 Coverage starts in 1998 with the exception of any *Part C* (formerly *Part H*) cases, which are cited in italics. **Court decisions from the federal appeals courts are cited in bold typeface.** The judicial outcomes are coded to the left of each case citation as follows:

**P** = parent won

**S** = school district won

( ) = inconclusive victory

Those concerning eligibility and methodology are respectively designated after the citation with “[E]” and “[M].” Those cases that only partially or marginally concern methodology are marked with a “[~M].” Court decisions that are not specific to autism, much less the identified issues, are not included. For a more comprehensive listing, including other issues, earlier cases, and hearing/review officer decisions, see, e.g., PERRY A. ZIRKEL, *AUTISM AND THE LAW: RULINGS AND EXPERT ANALYSIS* (2001). For an alternate source specific to methodology case law, see ELENA GALLEGOS & JILL SCHALLENBERGER, *AUTISM METHODOLOGIES TO LIVE BY: LEGAL GUIDANCE FOR PRACTICAL PROGRAM STRATEGIES* (2011). For significant court decisions concerning children with autism but not specific to this disability category, see, e.g., *Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist.*, 550 U.S. 516, 127 S.Ct. 1994, 167 L.Ed.2d 904, 219 Ed.Law Rep. 39 (2007) (ruling that parents have enforceable rights under the IDEA for proceeding pro se); *Vives v. Fajardo*, 472 F.3d 19, 215 Ed.Law Rep. 247 (1st Cir. 2007) (rejecting parent's § 504/ADA retaliation claim for lack of requisite proof); *Pachl v. Seagren*, 453 F.3d 1064, 210 Ed.Law Rep. 940 (8th Cir. 2006) (upheld 70% segregated placement rather than parents' proposed fully inclusionary placement). The acronyms in the case blurbs include: ABA = applied behavior analysis; ADA = Americans with Disabilities Act; ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AT = assistive technology; BIP = behavior intervention plan; ESY = extended school year; FAPE = free appropriate public education; FBA = functional behavioral analysis; IFSP = individual family services plan; IHO = impartial hearing officer; LRE = least restrictive environment; OT = occupational therapy; OCR = obsessive compulsive disorder; PDD = pervasive developmental disorder; PRR = peer-reviewed research; SLD = specific learning disabilities; SLT = speech/language therapy; and TBI = traumatic brain injury.

33 For subsequent separate litigation involving the same child under Part B, see *infra* the Fourth Circuit's 2003 decision and the federal district court's 2004 decision (case nos. 28 and 38).

34 The court subsequently upheld the appropriateness of the parents' program and ordered tuition reimbursement. *Board of Educ. v. Michael M.*, 33 IDELR ¶ 185 (S.D. W.Va. 2000).

35 The appellate court dismissed the case without prejudice because the hearing officer had not issued a final decision.

36 For the final decision on remand, see *infra* the district court's 2004 *Wagner* decision (case no. 37).

37 For an earlier decision in this case, where the state appellate court concluded that the IFSP failed to provide meaningful progress toward more than one of its goals, see *De Mora v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare*, 768 A.2d 904, 151 Ed.Law Rep. 976 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). For a related decision, in which the court concluded that attorneys' fees are not available under Part C, see *Bucks County Dep't of MH/MR v. De Mora*, 38 IDELR ¶ 2 (E.D. Pa. 2002).

38 For a concise account of this case, see Perry Zirkel, *Deal Right?*, 86 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 799 (2005). For the remanded decision, which was in the district's favor, see *Deal v. Hamilton County Dep't of Educ.*, 46 IDELR ¶ 45 (E.D. Tenn. 2006). In another unpublished decision, however, the court ruled that, based on the overall outcome of the case, the parents were entitled to 50% reimbursement. *Deal v. Hamilton County Dep't of Educ.*, 258 Fed.Appx. 863, 231 Ed.Law Rep. 48 (6th Cir. 2008).

39 In an unpublished decision, the district prevailed on remand. *County Sch. Bd. v. Z.P.*, 45 IDELR ¶ 96 (E.D. Va. 2005).

40 For the court's subsequent ruling that rejected the district's stay-put claims, see *County Sch. Bd. v. RT*, 433 F.Supp.2d 692, 210 Ed.Law Rep. 1011 (E.D. Va. 2006).

41 On remand, the district court denied the plaintiff-parents' motion for summary judgment, preserving for further proceedings whether the district engaged in deliberate indifference. *Mark H. v. Hamamoto*, 849 F.Supp.2d 990, 282 Ed.Law Rep. 913

(D. Haw. 2012), *reconsideration denied*, 58 IDELR ¶ 222 (D. Haw. 2012). Subsequently, the state reportedly agreed to a \$4.4 million settlement subject to approval by its legislature. Mary Vorsino, *State to Pay 4.4 Million in Landmark Settlement*, HONOLULU STAR ADVERTISER, Aug. 29, 2012, <http://www.staradvertiser.com/s?action=login&f=y&id=167809065>.

42 For an earlier unpublished decision that went in the opposite direction, see *Danielle G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.*, 50 IDELR ¶ 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).

43 In a subsequent decision, the district awarded the defendant–district \$141k in attorneys' fees and court costs, jointly payable by the parents and their attorney, but the Ninth Circuit reversed this award. *Parenteau v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist.*, 53 IDELR ¶ 333 (D. Ariz. 2009), *rev'd sub nom R.P. v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist.*, 631 F.3d 1117, 264 Ed.Law Rep. 618 (9th Cir. 2011).

44 For another case concerning a student with ASD in which a federal appeals court ruled the opposite on this issue, see *A.K. v. Alexandria City Sch. Bd.*, 484 F.3d 672, 219 Ed.Law Rep. 398 (4th Cir. 2007), *cert. denied*, 552 U.S. 1170, 228 Ed.Law Rep. 631 (2008), *on remand*, 544 F.Supp.2d 487, 232 Ed.Law Rep. 190 (E.D. Va. 2008).

45 *T.M. v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist.*, 111 LRP 73091 (N.D. Ga. 2010).

46 This case concerns the IEP for the year after the one ultimately addressed in the Second Circuit appeal *infra*.

47 For other recent state laws, which provide for (a) task forces (e.g., Arkansas, California, and Rhode Island); (b) professional training (e.g., New York and Oklahoma); (c) vouchers (Ohio); (d) pilot programs (Illinois and Maryland); and resource centers (e.g., Alabama and New Jersey), see Emily Workman, *State Responses to the Increasing Prevalence of Autism Spectrum Disorders* (Nov. 2011), [www.ecs.org/html/Document.asp?chouseid=9951](http://www.ecs.org/html/Document.asp?chouseid=9951). Additionally, state laws concerning the coverage of private health insurance can play a significant role. *See, e.g.*, 40 PA. STAT. § 764h (amendment, called Act 62, requires specified private health insurers to pay up to \$36k for the diagnosis and treatment of covered individuals under age 21 with ASD).

48 In contrast, the following part of the Pennsylvania regulations' definition of “autistic support” does not seem to add substantive requirements: “The IEP for [students with autism] *must* address needs as identified by the team which *may* include, as appropriate, the verbal and nonverbal communication needs of the child; social interaction skills and proficiencies; the child's response to sensory experiences and changes in the environment, daily routine and schedules; and, the need for positive behavior supports or behavioral interventions.” 22 PA. CODE § 14.131(a)(1)(1) (emphasis supplied).

49 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10–76ii (2013). This legislation defines ABA as “the design, implementation and evaluation of environmental modifications, using behavioral stimuli and consequences, including the use of direct observation, measurement and functional analysis of the relationship between the environment and behavior, to produce socially significant improvement in human behavior.” *Id.*

50 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1055(e) (2007).

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