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# THE LATEST UPDATE OF LEGAL ISSUES FOR STUDENTS WITH AUTISM: ELIGIBILITY AND METHODOLOGY<sup>a1</sup>

An update of earlier versions,<sup>1</sup> this article is an annotated outline of statutory legal materials concerning the education of children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), with particular attention to the ASD-specific issues of eligibility and methodology issues.<sup>2</sup> More specifically, the first section provides a sampling of secondary sources that have systematically compiled the pertinent case law outcomes. The second section contains relevant IDEA regulations and policy letters. The third section summarizes the § 504 definition of disability. The fourth and largest section provides a trends overview and blurb-type listing of recent court decisions concerning free appropriate public education (FAPE)-related issues for children with ASD.<sup>3</sup> The fifth section presents a checklist for districts derived from the case law, with parent lessons being the obverse side of the same checklist. The final section provides a sampling of state laws focused on ASD interventions.

## \*884 I. Secondary Sources<sup>4</sup>

#### **Overall Case Outcomes:**

Perry Zirkel, Autism and the Law: Rulings and Expert Analysis (2001) (available from LRP Publications):

- 290 published hearing/review officer and court decisions from 1980 to 2000<sup>5</sup>
- completely incidental role of autism in approx. 40% of the cases
- approx. 30% at the preschool level

• sharply rising frequency of cases in recent years but relatively stable outcomes, averaging approx. 4.4 on 1 (parent) to 7 (school) scale

• decisions in the Tenth and Fourth circuits have been the most favorable to school districts, and those in the Third and Eighth circuits have been most favorable to parents.

• primary issues: 1) FAPE: substantive, including placement, and 2) FAPE: procedural

Perry Zirkel, The Autism Case Law: Administrative and Judicial Rulings, 17 Focus on Autism 84 (2002):

• more favorable rulings for districts in court than at the hearing/review officer level but various confounding variables

## Eligibility:<sup>6</sup>

Julie Fogt, David Miller, & Perry Zirkel, *Defining Autism: Professional Best Practices and Published Case Law*, 41 J. Sch. Psych. 201 (2003):

• relatively few cases (n=13 from 1980 to 2002) specific to autism eligibility under the IDEA, almost all at the hearing officer level

· emphasis on legal requirements and standards, not professional best practices

· importance of expert witnesses, including school professional staff

• recognition that DSM-IV is not controlling

Jaclyn R. MacFarlane & Tomoe Kanaya, What Does It Mean to Be Autistic?: Inter-State Variance in Special Education Criteria for Autism Services, 18 J. Fam. Stud. 662 (2009):

\*885 • relatively slow and steady increases in ASD prevalence rates for the period 1991 to 2007 in all regions except for a sudden spike in New England in 2000-2001 attributable to a fivefold increase in Massachusetts at that time

• states with laws that incorporate DSM-IV criteria in their eligibility definition had a moderately higher prevalence rate

#### Frequency:

Perry A. Zirkel, *Autism Litigation under the IDEA: A New Meaning of "Disproportionality"*? 24 J. Special Educ. Leadership 92 (2011):

• for FAPE litigation nationally from 1993 to 2006, the published case law has increased steadily

• the proportion attributable to the autism classification has remained approximately 8-9 times the proportion of these children in the special education population

## Methods - Outcomes:<sup>7</sup>

Mitchell L. Yell & Eric Drasgow, *Litigating a Free Appropriate Public Education: The Lovaas Hearings and Cases*, 33 J. Special Educ. 305 (2000):

• 45 IDELR-published hearing officer and court decisions concerning Lovaas treatment programs from 1993 to 1998

• 76% of the decisions were reportedly in favor of the parents, but limitations in data collection and outcomes analysis

Susan Etscheidt, An Analysis of Legal Hearings and Cases Related to IEPs for Children with Autism, 28 Res. & Prac. for Persons with Severe Disabilities 51 (2003):

- 68 cases from 1997 through 2002, with 60% being hearing/review officer decisions
- outcomes favored districts-57% as compared to parents-43%
- key factors: goals consistent with evaluation, qualified IEP team members, and methodology tailored to goals

Catherine Nelson & Dixie Snow Huefner, Young Children with Autism: Judicial Responses to the Lovaas and Discrete Trial Training Debates, 26 J. Early Intervention 1 (2003):

- limited to Lovaas/DTT court decisions (n=19) from 1997 to 2002
- only 3 Part C cases, all decided in favor of the defendant districts
- parents obtained substantial relief in only 4 of the 19 cases

• districts lost where they provided no support (rationale and evidence) for their proposed program

Claire Choutka, Patricia Doloughty, & Perry Zirkel, *The "Discrete Trials" of ABA for Children with Autism: The Outcome-Related Factors in the Case Law*, 38 J. Special Educ. 95 (2004):

• relatively frequent cases (n=68) from 1980 to 2001, with 65% being hearing/review officer decisions

• two categories of cases: 63% - program selection (e.g., instructional approach) and 37% program implementation (e.g., location, duration, or frequency)

\*886 • 50-50 outcomes (4.0 on a 1-7 scale) in both categories

• key factors in both categories: testimony of witnesses, documentation of progress, and IEP elements

Doris Hill, E. Davis Martin, & Cynthia Nelson-Head, *Examination of Case Law (2007-2008) Regarding Autism Spectrum Disorder and Violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act*, 55 Preventing Sch. Failure 214 (2011):

- 99 court cases in 2007 and 2008
- outcomes based on a 3-category scale: district prevailed-- 54%, tied-- 19%, parent prevailed--27%
- parents did relatively well for claims re parental participation and unqualified personnel

Doris A. Hill & Stephanie J. Hill, Autism Spectrum Disorder, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, and Case Law: Who Really Wins, 56 Preventing Sch. Failure 157 (2012):

• 62 court cases in 2009

• outcomes based on a 3-category scale: district prevailed-- 63%, tied--8%, parent prevailed--29%

• parents did relatively well for unqualified personnel

Janet Decker, A Comprehensive Analysis of Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) Trends for Students with Autism, 274 Educ. L. Rep. 1 (2012):

- limited to ABA published court decisions (n=39) from 1975 to 2009
- districts won 24 (62%), with 5 (13%) inconclusive and with 10 (26%) for parents
- parents did better in recent cases, but pro-district deference remained prevalent

Doris A. Hill & Regina Kearley, *Autism Litigation: Outcomes for 2010, Trends in Decision Making and Changes in Diagnostic Criteria*, 34 Res. in Developmental Disabilities 1843 (2013):

- 68 court cases in 2010
- outcomes based on a 3-category scale: district prevailed-- 60%, tied--4%, parent prevailed--35%
- parents did relatively well for unqualified personnel

Doris A. Hill & Jonte Taylor, *Significant Outcomes in Case Law in the United States: Autism and IDEA in 2013, Transition Issues and Changes in Diagnostic Evaluation Criteria*, 12 J. Am. Acad. Special Educ. Professionals 84 (Winter 2017):

- 85 court cases in 2013
- outcomes based on a 3-category scale: district prevailed-- 65%, tied--9%, parent prevailed--26%
- parents did relatively well for ABA services (46% prevailed)

Bradley S. Stevenson & Vivian I. Correa, *Applied Behavior Analysis, Students with Autism, and the Requirement to Provide a Free Appropriate Public Education,* 29 J. Disability Pol'y Stud. 206 (2019):

- 27 court cases from December 2004 to August 2016 purportedly specific to ABA
- outcomes based on a 2-category scale, with a few cases in both groups, were: in favor of district--67%; in favor of parents--33%

### \*887 II. IDEA Regulations and Policy Letters

## IDEA Definition of Autism<sup>8</sup>

(a) [C]hild with a disability means that a child evaluated in accordance with [the applicable IDEA requirements for eligibility] as having ... autism ... and who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.

(c)(1)(i) *Autism* means a developmental disability significantly affecting verbal and nonverbal communication and social interaction, generally evident before age 3, that adversely affects a child's educational performance. Other characteristics often associated with autism are engagement in repetitive activities and stereotyped movements, resistance to environmental change or change in daily routines, and unusual responses to sensory experiences. The term does not apply if a child's educational performance is adversely affected primarily because the child has an emotional disturbance, as defined in this section.

(ii) A child who manifests the characteristics of "autism" after age 3 could be diagnosed as having "autism" if the criteria in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section are satisfied.

## **IDEA Standard for Procedural FAPE**<sup>9</sup>

In matters alleging a procedural violation, a hearing officer<sup>10</sup> may find that a child did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies--

\*888 (i) Impeded the child's right to a FAPE;

(ii) Significantly impeded the parent's opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the parent's child; or

(iii) Caused a deprivation of educational benefit.

## **OSEP** Policy Letters<sup>11</sup> re Autism Spectrum Disorders<sup>12</sup>

Letter to Coe, 32 IDELR ¶ 204 (OSEP 1999)

• children with pervasive developmental disorder (PDD) and its subcategory autism in DSM-IV<sup>13</sup> are eligible under the IDEA only if they meet the definition of "child with a disability" for the "autism" or other specified category, such as "other health impairment" (OHI)

• states may have criteria for eligibility of children under the disability categories so long those criteria do not conflict with the federal definition

• children with PDD aged 3 through 9 may qualify as developmentally delayed if the state and district utilize that classification and the child meets the state's diagnostic criteria

• IDEA-97 clarifies that "[n]othing in the Act requires that a child be classified by their disability so long as each child who has a disability listed in § 300.7 and who, by reason of that disability, needs special education and related services, is regarded as a child with a disability under Part B of the [IDEA]."

Letter to Williams, 33 IDELR ¶ 249 (OSEP 2000):

• same eligibility clarification for a child diagnosed with Asperger syndrome, except at least partially ducks its role under OHI:

"Regardless of whether Asperger syndrome is identified as a condition that could render a child "other health impaired," we do not believe it would be inconsistent with Part B [of the IDEA] for a State to permit school districts to evaluate children with Asperger syndrome to consider whether they could be other health impaired."

• addresses FAPE questions by clarifying that whether the child, once determined eligible, is entitled to speech pathology, occupational therapy, social skills training, or any other such service depends on whether the IEP team determines that it is required to assist the child to benefit from special education, not on whether the parent requests such service

\*889 • also addresses placement, discipline, and discrimination questions by generally reciting applicable provisions of IDEA (and § 504)

Letter to Autin, 58 IDELR ¶ 51 (OSEP 2011):

• as to the permissibility of state or local education agencies establishing separate schools for students with autism, OSEP opined that placement must be on an individual basis in accordance with the applicable procedures and criteria for LRE

Dear Colleague Letter, 66 IDELR ¶ 21 (OSEP 2015):

• reminder that IEP and IFSP teams, in identifying and addressing individual needs, should avoid using "ABA therapists exclusively without including, or considering input from, speech-language pathologists and other professionals who provide different types of specific therapies that may be appropriate for children with ASD"

#### III. Alternate Source of Coverage: § 504 and the ADA

## § 504 and ADA Definition of "Individual with a Disability"<sup>14</sup>

[A]ny person who

(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities,

(ii) has a record of such an impairment, or

(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, the relevant, essential elements for FAPE eligibility are:

• physical or mental impairment

+

• major life activity

+

substantial

## IV. Court Decisions re Eligibility and methodology<sup>16</sup>

1. P <u>Still v. DeBuono</u>, 101 F.3d 888, 114 Educ. L. Rep. 743 (2d Cir. 1996). <u>But cf. Malktentzos v. DeBuono</u>, 102 F.3d 50, 114 Educ. L. Rep. 786 (2d Cir. 1996) (mootness and lack of irreparable harm) \*890 • ruled under Part C in favor of parents' IFSP for ABA therapy for a three-year-old with autism, including reimbursement - the only issue was whether privately obtained services by personnel who did not meet state qualification standards were reimbursable [M]

2. S Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd. v. Picard, 27 IDELR 824 (E.D. La. 1998)

• upheld "cottage" placement of a 17-year-old student with autism with limited mainstreaming opportunities in a nearby high school, also rejecting parent claims regarding teacher qualifications and lack of BIP in IEP (but mixed results regarding emergency removals and music therapy) [ $\sim$ M]

**3.** *P* <u>T.H.</u> v. <u>Bd. of Educ.</u>, 55 F. Supp. 2d 830, 137 Educ. L. Rep. 555 (N.D. Ill. 1999)

• rejected district's cross-categorical early childhood placement, w/o aide, upholding instead appropriateness of parents' home-based Lovaas placement for autistic five-year-old (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

4. S Renner v. Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 635, 137 Educ. L. Rep. 215 (6th Cir. 1999)

• upheld the appropriateness of the district's IEP for an autistic child even though it did not have the extent of Lovaas-type discrete trial training sought by the parents [M]

**5.** *S* <u>*Wagner v. Short,*</u> 63 *F. Supp.* 2d 672, 139 *Educ. L. Rep.* 232 (D. Md. 1999)<sup>17</sup>

• upheld appropriateness of IFSP proposed for autistic child, despite parents' preference for a particular ABA program [M]

6. P/S Adams v. State of Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 139 Educ. L. Rep. 820 (9th Cir. 1999)

• upheld district's IFSP for a child with autism, rather than intensive Lovaas-type program parent preferred, but rejected district's revised IFSP that reduced weekly service hours, because it "was not linked to [the child's] unique developmental needs" (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

\*891 7. S Dong v. Bd. of Educ., 197 F.3d 793, 140 Educ. L. Rep. 116 (6th Cir. 1999)

• upheld school-based TEACCH program, rather than parents' home-based Lovaas-type program for an autistic child (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

8. S Blackmon v. Springfield R-XII Sch. Dist., 198 F.3d 648, 140 Educ. L. Rep. 519 (8th Cir. 1999)

• upheld reverse mainstreaming classroom placement of TBI/autistic child rather than parent's unilateral homebased early childhood program, concluding that procedural deficiencies were waived and, in any event, nonprejudicial (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

9. P Walker Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Bennett, 203 F.3d 1293, 141 Educ. L. Rep. 1013 (11th Cir. 2000)

• upheld tuition reimbursement for private placement for a student with autism, declining to hear additional evidence and pointing out deficiencies in the proposed IEP, including lack of BIP, OT, and ESY [~M]

10. S Burilovich v. Bd. of Educ., 208 F.3d 560, 143 Educ. L. Rep. 437 (6th Cir. 2000)

• upheld the substantive and procedural appropriateness of the district's mainstreamed IEP for an elementary school student with autism, thereby rejecting reimbursement for "standard" 40-hour in-home program and parents' claim about specialized IEP team and staffing expertise [M]

11. (P) Bd. of Educ. v. Michael M., 95 F. Supp. 2d 600, 144 Educ. L. Rep. 187 (S.D.W.Va. 2000)<sup>18</sup>

• ruled that district did not meet its burden to prove that its program, rather than the parents' in-home Lovaas program, was appropriate (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

12. S Gill v. Columbia #3 Sch. Dist., 217 F.3d 1027, 145 Educ. L. Rep. 894 (8th Cir. 2000)

• upheld the substantive appropriateness of the district's proposed self-contained placement, with 1:1 aide and reverse mainstreaming, for kindergarten child with autism, rather than parents' in-home 40-hour Lovaas program (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

13. P Sackets Harbor Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Munoz, 33 IDELR ¶ 154 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000)

• held that, based on IEP-team voting process and applicable standards, parents were entitled to reimbursement for costs of a home-based ABA program to supplement reduced in-school program for preschool student with autism [~M]

14. S Steinmetz v. Richmond Cmty. Sch. Corp., 33 IDELR ¶ 155 (S.D. Ind. 2000)

• upheld district's proposed preschool program for a child with autism rather than parents' in-home ABA program (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

15. P Sanford Sch. Comm. v. Mr. & Mrs. L., 34 IDELR ¶ 262 (D. Me. 2001)

• upheld hearing officer's stay-put order and compensatory education relief when the district's change for kindergarten child with autism from a half-inclusion, half-ABA program to a self-contained program was based on administrative convenience, not appropriate evaluation [~M]

#### \*892 16. P/S Gonzalez v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Educ., 254 F.3d 350, 155 Educ. L. Rep. 20 (1st Cir. 2001)

• upheld the district's proposed placement of a 17-year-old student with autism in a self-contained class rather than residential placement, but added parent training to manage the child's behavior to the extent it linked to education progress [ $\sim$ M]

17. P Jaynes v. Newport News Sch. Bd., 13 F. App'x 166 (4th Cir. 2001)

• upheld tuition reimbursement for Lovaas program where the district failed to notify the parents of their right to challenge the proposed IEP (via a due process hearing) and the child evidenced progress as a result of the Lovaas therapy  $[\sim M]$ 

18. P/S Pitchford v. Salem-Keizer Sch. Dist. No. 24J, 155 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 156 Educ. L. Rep. 555 (D. Or. 2001)

• upheld appropriateness of a series of IEPs for a child with autism, including TEACCH rather than Lovaas, but found that lack of district (or other child-knowledgeable) member of the IEP team for one year was a prejudicial error (ordering mediation as the first-resort remedy) [M]

**19.** *S* <u>A.B.</u> v. Bd. of Educ., 36 IDELR ¶ 65 (D.S.C. 2001)

• upheld the appropriateness of an inclusion-based ABA program and rejected the appropriateness of a home-based Lovaas program (based on restrictiveness and lack of generalization) for a kindergarten child with autism [~M]

20. S CM v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 184 F. Supp. 2d 466, 162 Educ. L. Rep. 126 (W.D.N.C. 2002)

• upheld the appropriateness of a school-based TEACCH program rather than parents' unilateral home-based Lovaas program for a child with autism [M]

**21.** (*S*) <u>M.E.</u> v. <u>Bd. of Educ. for Buncombe Cty.</u>, 186 F. Supp. 2d 630. 162 Educ. L. Rep. 279 (W.D.N.C. 2002), vacated sub nom. <u>M.E. v. Buncombe Cty. Bd. of Educ.</u>, 72 F. App'x 940, 180 Educ. L. Rep. 580 (4th Cir. 2003)<sup>19</sup>

• rejected tuition reimbursement for in-home Lovaas program where the parents made only technical, unsupported challenges to the district's proposed TEACCH program and they admitted that they would not have accepted the offer in any event - but dismissed on appeal based on lack of jurisdiction [~M]

**22.** *S* <u>Faulders v. Henrico Cty. Sch. Bd.</u>, 190 F. Supp. 2d 849, 163 Educ. L. Rep. 423 (E.D. Va. 2002), <u>vacated</u> <u>sub nom. JH v. Henrico Cty. Sch. Bd.</u>, 326 F.3d 560, 175 Educ. L. Rep. 414 (4th Cir. 2003)<sup>20</sup>

• upheld appropriateness of the district's ESY program for a high-functioning autistic child, with a focus on improving social communication rather than 1:1 services and with the goal of reasonable progress rather than mastery of skills [ $\sim$ M]

23. S Tyler v. Northwest Indep. Sch. Dist., 202 F. Supp. 2d 557, 165 Educ. L. Rep. 572 (N.D. Tex. 2002)

\*893 • upheld procedural and substantive appropriateness of proposed IEP for an autistic preschool child, which included 6 hours of Lovaas in-home training rather than the 25 hours the parents insisted was necessary [M]

24. S J.P. v. W. Clark Cmty. Sch., 230 F. Supp. 2d 910, 172 Educ. L. Rep. 193 (S.D. Ind. 2002)

• upheld appropriateness of the district's eclectic TEACCH/PECS-based program, which included ABA/DTT, for a high school student with autism rather than parents' full-time Lovaas-type program--rejection of parents' cookie-cutter, cost-related arguments [M]

## 25. P Neosho R-C Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2003)

• held that the IEP's failure to include a proper BIP amounted, in this case, to a denial of FAPE in light of the obvious need of the child with autism-Asperger's and SLD for a BIP and unpersuasive evidence of academic progress [~M]

#### 26. S Zasslow v. Menlo Park City Sch. Dist., 60 F. App'x 27, 175 Educ. L. Rep. 31 (9th Cir. 2003)

• brief ruling that despite turnover district provided a qualified speech therapist for a child with autism thus supporting the proposition that parents do not have the right to select a service deliverer  $[\sim M]$ 

#### 27. S Adam J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804, 176 Educ. L. Rep. 83 (5th Cir. 2003)

• upheld substantive appropriateness of proposed IEP for a student with autism (Asperger syndrome), rather than private placement, based on *Cypress-Fairbanks* 4-factor test and upheld procedural appropriateness based on no loss of educational opportunity (or infringement on parental-participation opportunity) [~M]

## 28. (S) Wagner v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cty., 335 F.3d 297, 178 Educ. L. Rep. 694 (4th Cir. 2003)<sup>21</sup>

• held that upon the unavailability of the then-current placement (here due to the only state-approved Lovaas provider ceasing the in-home services under the IEP w/o notice) "stay put" does not require the district to provide a comparable, alternative placement; the parents' only remedies are either to agree with the district to a new placement or seek a preliminary injunction from the trial court changing the child's placement [~M]

#### 29. (P) G v. Fort Bragg Dependent Sch., 343 F.3d 295, 180 Educ. L. Rep. 474 (4th Cir. 2003)

• remanded to determine whether the district's proposed IEP for a four-year-old with autism, which contained Lovaas elements but not a Lovaas-certified consultant, met the <u>Rowley</u> substantive standard and whether the district denied the child FAPE during the previous three years (rejecting parental-objection standard for triggering compensatory education) [M]

**30.** (*P*) <u>Greenwich Bd. of Educ. v. Torok</u>, 40 IDELR ¶ 44 (D. Conn. 2003)

• granted a preliminary injunction to maintain the hearing officer's decision that ordered the district to change the kindergarten child's classification from OHI to autism (based on IEE), reimburse the parents for home therapies, and provide various additional hours of 1:1 therapy at home or school--as the stay-put pending the judicial appeal  $[\sim E, \sim M]$ 

## \*894 31. S T.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80, 186 Educ. L. Rep. 15 (1st Cir. 2004)

• upheld district's proposed placement of autistic kindergarten student in a specialized class that used the TEACCH approach rather than a private school that relied on DTT-- nonprejudicial procedural violations and deferential <u>Rowley</u> standard (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

32. S Johnson v. Olathe Dist. Sch., 316 F. Supp. 2d 960, 188 Educ. L. Rep. 307 (D. Kan. 2003)

• upheld district's proposed IEP for an autistic sixth grader in a life skills class that used ABA and redirection techniques rather than home placement--procedural violations (e.g., IEP team composition) were nonprejudicial and methodology (here, redirection planned ignoring) is within district's discretion [M]

33. P Diatta v. District of Columbia, 319 F. Supp. 2d 57, 189 Educ. L. Rep. 30 (D.D.C. 2004)

• upheld requested compensatory education relief of four years of a 40-hour per week ABA program (including training, consultation, and monitoring) for a student with autism whom the district "repeatedly misdiagnosed and mishandled" [ $\sim$ E,  $\sim$ M]

34. P <u>Bucks Cty. Dep't of MH/MR v. De Mora</u>, 379 F.3d 61, 191Educ. L. Rep. 42 (3d Cir. 2004)<sup>22</sup>

• tuition reimbursement award, at least under IDEA Part C, may include time expended by a parent serving as Lovaas instructor [~M]

35. P L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 191 Educ. L. Rep. 92 (10th Cir. 2004)

• rejected, based on LRE, the district's proposed placement of a preschool child with autism in "hybrid" (approximately 50% nondisabled children) plus 8-15 hours/week of ABA as compared with parents' unilateral placement of the child in a mainstream private preschool with phasing-out aide plus 40 hours/week of ABA, awarding parents equitable reimbursement of ABA program and aide (tuition not requested) [M]

**36.** (*P*) <u>Roe v. State</u>, 332 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 192 Educ. L. Rep. 56 (D. Nev. 2004), <u>partially rev'd on other</u> <u>grounds</u>, 479 F.3d 1175, 217 Educ. L. Rep. 51 (9th Cir. 2007)

• after the hearing officer and review officer both rejected the parents' claims, including that child needed increased home-based Lovaas component upon moving from Part C to Part B, the court allowed appeal based on § 1983 (IDEA) and § 504/ADA, thus opening the possibility of money damages [~M]

37. S Wagner v. Bd. of Educ., 340 F. Supp. 2d 603, 193 Educ. L. Rep. 172 (D. Md. 2004)

• upheld appropriateness of proposed IEP, despite cut-and-pasted goals/objectives from previous IEP, and placement, which was a change from Lovaas to non-Lovaas school, including rejection of procedural violations as nonprejudicial [~M]

**38.** *P* <u>Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 392 F.3d 840, 194 Educ. L. Rep. 88 (6th Cir. 2004)<sup>23</sup>

\*895 • held that parents were entitled to tuition reimbursement based on two independent prejudicial procedural violations (fixed predetermination for TEACCH, not Lovaas, and repeated absence of regular ed teacher on IEP team where integration was at issue) and possible substantive violation of FAPE (remanding for careful determination, with limits on deference re methodology) [M]

**39.** *S* J.K. v. Metrop. Sch. Dist., 42 IDELR ¶ 122 (N.D. Ind. 2005)

• upheld substantive appropriateness, including lack of ABA services, and rejected procedural violations as nonprejudicial, for a preschool child with autism [M]

40.(*P*) <u>Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Z.P.</u>, 399 F.3d 298, 195 Educ. L. Rep. 715 (4th Cir. 2005)<sup>24</sup>

• remanded appropriateness issue to the trial court to reconsider with due deference to the hearing officer's findings that the parent's ABA placement for a preschool student with autism was appropriate and the district's proposed TEACCH placement was not (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

41. P Escambia Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Benton, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (S.D. Ala. 2005)

• ruled that procedural inadequacies in autistic student's IEPs, which related to mastery dates of benchmarks and adequacy of annual goals, but not lack of FBA-BIP, resulted in denial of FAPE to student [ $\sim$ M]

**42.** (S) Brown v. Bartholomew, 43 IDELR ¶ 60 (S.D. Ind. 2005), vacated as moot, 442 F.3d 588, 207 Educ. L. Rep. 601(7th Cir. 2006)

• upheld the district's proposed program for a kindergarten student with autism rather than parents' preferred athome ABA instruction [M]

43. S K.A. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 43 IDELR ¶ 160 (W.D.N.C. 2005)

• rejected tuition reimbursement for 1:1 CARD program based on 1) substantive appropriateness of district's program for a preschool child with autism, 2) nonprejudicial procedural violation of not providing written notice of denial of parents' unilateral placement, and 3) lack of FAPE in the LRE for said placement (e.g., lack of individualization and related services) [~M]

44. S Chisago Lakes Sch. Dist. v. J.D., 43 IDELR ¶ 164 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005)

• upheld the district's determination upon reevaluation that the student no longer met all the required criteria in the state regulations for eligibility under the classification ASD, which is less strict than the classification of autism under the IDEA [E]

45. S Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. v. J.K., 400 F. Supp. 2d 991, 205 Educ. L. Rep. 342 (S.D. Tex. 2005)

• ruled that the reduced number and changed location of parent and in-home training sessions did not deny a child with autism FAPE, thus reversing the hearing officer's award of compensatory education--deferred to the district on methodological considerations and construed causation issues as parents' unproven burden [~M]

#### 46. (P/S) D.F. v. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 430 F.3d 595, 203 Educ. L. Rep. 500 (2d Cir. 2005)

• remanded to determine whether the consideration of post-hearing evidence, which the review officer and district court used to rule that the district must provide at least 10 hours **\*896** of in-home ABA therapy in addition to its self-contained special education program (with OT, PT, SLT, and parent counseling), was an error of law [~M]

47. *S* <u>B.V. v. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1113. 213 Educ. L. Rep. 1073 (D. Haw. 2005)

• rejected tuition reimbursement for a 15-year-old with Asperger syndrome, concluding that the district's program was appropriate despite parents' challenge to the choice of the teacher and skills trainer plus various procedural errors that were not prejudicial [ $\sim$ M]

48. S Michael J. v. Derry Twp. Sch. Dist., 45 IDELR ¶ 36 (E.D. Pa. 2006)

• upheld procedural and substantive appropriateness of IEP and district's proposed placement for an 11-yearold with severe autism in an autistic support class, which was based on ABA principles, rather than the parents' successive in-home ABA and private school ABA programs [M]

49. S Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 443 F.3d 965, 208 Educ. L. Rep. 22 (8th Cir. 2006)

• upheld substantive appropriateness of successive IEPs for a high school student with autism [~M]

50. P S.A. v. Riverside-Delanco Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 45 IDELR ¶ 215 (D.N.J. 2006)

• parents requested a full-day and obtained a half-day preschool program based on ABA-DTT, due to experts' agreement that a child with severe autism needed ABA-DTT and the school district did not have trained personnel to do so, thus entitling parents to attorneys' fees of \$47k [M]

**51.** *P* <u>Cty. Sch Bd. v. R.T.</u>, 433 F. Supp. 2d 657, 210 Educ. L. Rep. 976 (E.D. Va. 2006)<sup>25</sup>

• upheld ABA at-home program as FAPE in the LRE for a four-year-old with autism rather than the district's TEACCH program (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

52. S A.M. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 46 IDELR ¶ 191 (D. Alaska 2006)

• rejected parents' claim of lack of opportunity for meaningful participation in developing IEP for a preschool child with autism and concluded that the IEP met the substantive standard when parents withdrew the child (prematurely) for ABA therapy [~M]

53. S W.S. v. Rye City Sch. Dist., 454 F. Supp. 2d 134, 214 Educ. L. Rep. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)

• upheld appropriateness of proposed 50/50 placement of kindergartner with autism in regular school, concluding that FBA was appropriate and district's failure to send out notices to private schools did not constitute predetermination [tuition reimbursement case] [ $\sim$ M]

54. S Marc V. v. North East Indep. Sch. Dist., 455 F. Supp. 2d 577, 214 Educ. L. Rep. 497 (W.D. Tex. 2006)

• upheld appropriateness of program/placement of a pre-kindergarten child with autism where the district refused to grant parents' medically-based request for homebound instruction (based on a diagnosis of PTSD after the district stopped parent from accompanying the child to class) [~M]

55. S Leticia H. v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 502 F. Supp. 2d 512, 224 Educ. L. Rep. 163 (W.D. Tex. 2006)

\*897 • lack of specific diagnosis of autism and lack of precise goals did not deny this eligible preschool child FAPE [ $\sim$ E/ $\sim$ M]

56. P Mr. I. v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1, 217 Educ. L. Rep. 60 (1st Cir. 2007)

• ruled that the student's Asperger disorder adversely affected educational performance as broadly defined by state law, establishing that student was eligible here, since "need" was not a contested issue [E]

57. *S* O'Dell v. Special Sch. Dist., 503 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 224 Educ. L. Rep. 222 (E.D. Mo. 2007)

• rejected claim of parents of a preschooler with PDD that the district denied them a meaningful opportunity to participate in the IDEA process when it denied their request for in-home ABA therapy [~M]

**58.** *S* <u>San Rafael Elementary Sch. Dist. v. California Special Educ. Hearing Office.</u>, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 219 Educ. L. Rep. 676 (N.D. Cal. 2007)

• upheld district's proposed placement of a 13-year-old with autism in a private day school rather than the parents' requested residential placement, rejecting parents' claim that substantive standard for FAPE extended to generalization of behavioral effects to the home environment [~M]

59. S Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist., 502 F.3d 811, 225 Educ. L. Rep. 136 (9th Cir. 2007)

• rejected FAPE-implementation claim for a student with severe autism, concluding that the standard is whether the district's implementation fell "significantly short of the services required by the child's IEP" (with liberal credit for the district's "corrective actions" in compliance with hearing officer's prospective order, which did not provide compensatory education) [~M]

60. S Hjortness v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 507 F.3d 1060, 227 Educ. L. Rep. 100 (7th Cir. 2007)

• procedural errors, including alleged predetermination in LRE, were not prejudicial and despite the lack of current PELs the proposed IEP for a gifted student with autism, ADHD, and OCD was substantively appropriate in these particular circumstances [~M]

61. S J.D. v. Kanawha Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR ¶ 159 (S.D. W. Va. 2007), aff'd mem., 375 F. App'x 333 (4th Cir. 2009)

• district's choice not to include parent-proposed 1:1 ABA services did not constitute predetermination [~M]

62. (*P*) <u>Mark H. v. LeMahieu</u>, 513 F.3d 922, 229 Educ. L. Rep. 53 (9th Cir. 2008), <u>further proceedings sub</u> nom. Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 1090, 261 Educ. L. Rep. 48 (9th Cir. 2010)<sup>26</sup>

• held that § 504 provides a money damages remedy for failure of a district to provide FAPE to special education students (here two children with autism, for which the district spends approximately \$250k per year as a result of losing the due process hearing) if they **\*898** prove: 1) failure to provide "meaningful access" (i.e., reasonable accommodation/commensurate opportunity); and 2) deliberate indifference on the part of the school authorities [~M]

#### 63. (S) J.P. v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 254, 229 Educ. L. Rep. 391 (4th Cir. 2008)

• remanded for reconsideration of the hearing officer's opinion that the district's IEP for a child with autism was appropriate because although not meeting the aspirational standard for detailed credibility determinations and legal analysis, it merited deference (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

64. S Travis G. v. New Hope-Solebury Sch. Dist., 544 F. Supp. 2d 435, 232 Educ. L. Rep. 165 (E.D. Pa. 2008)

• upheld appropriateness of the district's IEP for a kindergarten child with autism, including reduction of OT and ABA, and the district's proposed ESY placement [M]

#### 65. S Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 236 Educ. L. Rep. 179 (10th Cir. 2008)

• ruled that district did not deny FAPE to a student with autism who made progress under three successive IEPs even though it did not generalize to other settings (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

#### 66. P/S Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20, 538 F.3d 1306, 236 Educ. L. Rep. 94 (10th Cir. 2008)

• upheld appropriateness of the district's eclectic program for a preschool student with autism even though it lacked an in-home component and concluded that failure to provide finalized IEP was a nonprejudicial procedural violation [~M]

#### 67. P/S N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 236 Educ. L. Rep. 603 (9th Cir. 2008)

• upheld tuition reimbursement for IEP where the district did not evaluate the child with speech impairment in all the areas of suspected disability, i.e., autism (treating it as a prejudicial procedural violation), but rejected parents' claim that the child was eligible for ESY, thus ducking the question of FAPE substantive standard for ESY [~E]

68. P Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Douglas L., 51 IDELR ¶ 1 (S.D. Iowa 2008)

• upheld hearing officer's PRR-based decision against the district's behavioral methodology but folded into the *Rowley* substantive standard for FAPE [M]

69. S M.W. v. Clarke Cty. Sch. Dist., 51 IDELR ¶ 63 (M.D. Ga. 2008)

• upheld district's proposed self-contained placement for a 3-year-old child with autism as FAPE in the LRE and rejected appropriateness of parents' unilateral placement in mainstream private school plus ABA as not appropriate, thereby denying tuition reimbursement [ $\sim$ M]

70. S Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 294 F. App'x 997 (6th Cir. 2008)

• rejected parents' claim of denial of FAPE based on delayed OT goals, lack of music therapy, and lack of 1:1 aide (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

71. S JG v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 552 F.3d 786, 240 Educ. L. Rep. 87 (9th Cir. 2008)

• ruled that the district's completion of an evaluation of preschool twins with autism within 38 days was reasonable, which was the 1999 IDEA regulatory standard applicable in this **\*899** case and which controls rather than the state's 45-day deadline, because the district did not have reason to suspect autism upon the parents' request [~E]

72. S A.D. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 51 IDELR ¶ 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)

• upheld hearing and review officer's reduction of after-school ABA services from 25 to 10 hours per week (with 5 rather than 12 monthly hours of supervisory support) for gifted kindergarten child with autism based on the appropriateness (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

## 73. S A.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 240 Educ. L. Rep. 546 (2d Cir. 2009)

• held that IEP for a child with autism developed, in violation of state regulation requiring FBA, was neither procedurally nor substantively deficient--IDEA"s IEP "special consideration" provision, in effect, trumped state reg (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

## 74. S T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 241 Educ. L. Rep. 22 (2d Cir. 2009)

• held that consultant chart's "School Response" that showed the district did not intend to offer more than 10 hours of school-based ABA did not constitute pre-determination of IEP for kindergarten child with autism (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

75. S Parenteau v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist., 51 IDELR ¶ 213 (D. Ariz. 2008)<sup>27</sup>

• upheld procedural and substantive appropriateness of IEP for an eight-year-old with autism, which included the TEACCH method and which did not necessitate an autism consultant on the IEP team, also concluding that the district had provided the parents--in response to their due process hearing complaint--with all that they had requested, including the consultant and 1:1 ABA aide, thus leaving no basis for compensatory education [M]

#### 76. S B.S. v. Placentia-Yorba Linda Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F. App'x 397, 242Educ. L. Rep. 88 (9th Cir. 2009)

• upheld substantive appropriateness and LRE of successive two IEPs (with the second providing for sp. ed. For language arts block) for a child with autism (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

77. *S* <u>Blake C. v. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 241 Educ. L. Rep. 662 (D. Haw. 2009)

• held that district's program for a child with autism did not meet the heightened standard under "meaningful benefit" standard under *Hellgate (supra)*, showing the difficulty of measuring progress and resulting in an award of tuition reimbursement for part of 2007 (\$62k) as compensatory education for violation in 2005-06 [ $\sim$ M]

78. S Hensley v. Colville Sch. Dist., 51 IDELR ¶ 279 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)

• upheld procedural (e.g., parental participation) and substantive appropriateness (e.g., ABA staff training) of IEP that the district offered for a nine-year-old with autism [~M]

79. S G.B. v. Bridgewater-Raritan Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 52 IDELR ¶ 39 (D.N.J. 2009)

\*900 • upheld appropriateness of the district's subsequently revised IEP for a preschool child with autism at public ABA program [ $\sim$ M]

80. S L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 242 Educ. L. Rep. 23 (9th Cir. 2009)

• held that a preschool program for a child with autism was substantively appropriate and that the 20-minute limit on outside evaluators' classroom observations was a procedural flaw that did not deprive the parents of a meaningful opportunity for participation (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

81. S Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 319 F. App'x 692, 245 Educ. L. Rep. 669 (9th Cir. 2009)

• upheld the appropriateness of IEP for a student with autism concluding that its eclectic program met the substantive standard and that failure to provide services based on PRR automatically means a denial of FAPE [M]

82. S <u>A.G. v. Frieden</u>, 52 IDELR ¶ 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

• held that IFSP that proposed 20 hours of ABA therapy per week was appropriate, rejecting parents' request for at least 30 hours of this service and their pre-determination claim [M]

83. S J.A. v. E. Ramapo Sch. Dist., 603 F. Supp. 2d 684, 243 Educ. L. Rep. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

• upheld appropriateness of IEP for a five-year-old child with pervasive developmental disorder, rejecting claims that 1) classification under OHI rather than autism was a substantive flaw, 2) IEP should have included 10 more

hours per week of 1:1 behavior therapy, and 3) district should have done an FBA, as required by state law (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ E,  $\sim$ M]

84. S E.G. v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 606 F. Supp. 2d 384, 244 Educ. L. Rep. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

• rejected parents' pre-determination claim and ruled that the district's proposed IEP, which included 10 hours of at-home behavior therapy and 5 half days of regular education was FAPE in the LRE (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

85. (S) Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z., 580 F.3d 286, 249 Educ. L. Rep. 34 (5th Cir. 2009)

• ruled that the district's IEP was not substantively appropriate due to the child's pattern of regression and IEP's insufficient services but remanded to apply this test for private residential placement: 1) whether it is essential in order for the disabled child to receive a meaningful educational benefit, and, if so, 2) whether it is primarily oriented toward enabling the child to obtain an education (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

86. S Pohorecki v. Anthony Wayne Local Sch. Dist., 637 F. Supp. 2d 547, 248 Educ. L. Rep. 690 (N.D. Ohio 2009)

• upheld, as not a denial of FAPE, the district's determination that the district properly classified the child, who had previous diagnoses of ADHD, "absence seizures" and--most recently--Asperger disorder, as ED rather than the parent's proposed classifications of autism or OHI [E]

## 87. S T.Y. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 249 Educ. L. Rep. 742 (2d Cir. 2009)

\*901 • upheld substantive appropriateness of IEP, despite deficiencies regarding parent counseling and speech/ language services and with 1:1 aide rather than FBA-BIP, and rejected procedural claim that the IEP did not specify a school site for the educational placement<sup>28</sup> (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

88. S E.H. v. Bd. of Educ., 361 F. App'x 156, 256 Educ. L. Rep. 562 (2d Cir. 2009)

• rejected parent's claims that IEP was deficient for lack of parental participation, class size of 12:1 rather than 6:1, and failure to include BIP [ $\sim$ M]

89. S <u>Huffman v. N. Lyon Cty. Sch. Dist.</u>, 53 IDELR ¶ 147 (D. Kan. 2009)

• rejected parent's various procedural challenges, including lack of autism-specific testing and personnel, and substantive challenges, including applicable standard (in the Tenth Circuit) and scientifically-based methodology [M]

90. S Seladoki v. Bellaire Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 53 IDELR ¶ 153 (S.D. Ohio 2009)

• rejected parent's claim that children with autism needed 30-40 hours of ABA services each week, ruling that district's offer of 30 hours subject to further evaluation information, was appropriate [M]

91. S J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 252 Educ. L. Rep. 591 (9th Cir. 2009)

• upheld appropriateness of IEP for a child with autism, rejecting the lower court's ruling that IDEA '97 raised the <u>Rowley</u> substantive standard and concluding that various asserted procedural violations, such as failure to include methodology in the IEP, were a denial of FAPE (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**92.** *S* <u>K.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist.</u>, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2009), <u>aff'd</u>, 426 F. App'x 536, 270 Educ. L. Rep. 555 (9th Cir. 2011)

• upheld appropriateness of successive, similar IEPs with which the child made slow progress--expected rate based on the severity of the disability, and the parent did not sustain burden to show that the child needed 30 hours of ABA per week to receive FAPE [M]

93. S A.J. v. Bd. of Educ., 679 F. Supp. 2d 299, 254 Educ. L. Rep. 826 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)

• ruled that child with Asperger disorder who was performing at average to above average levels in the classroom and was progressing academically did not meet the criterion on adversely affecting educational performance--no qualifier on adversely affecting but educational performance in Second Circuit means academic performance [E]

94. S Maus v. Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 688 F. Supp. 2d 282, 256 Educ. L. Rep. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

• ruled that child with various diagnoses, including Asperger disorder, ADHD, and dysgraphia, was not eligible as OHI or ED based on a narrow, academic view of adverse affect on "educational performance" (tuition reimbursement case) [E]

95. P/S Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. D.S., 688 F. Supp. 2d 883, 256 Educ. L. Rep. 298 (D. Alaska 2010)

\*902 • ruled that three consecutive IEPs failed to provide FAPE to a child with autism based on prejudicial procedural violations, including lack of accurate and timely evaluation--upholding tuition reimbursement for ABA home program despite lack of special education certification but reversing the hearing officer's order to replace IEP team with a private company that implements the program [M]

96. S Smith v. James C. Hormel Sch. of Virginia Inst. of Autism, 54 IDELR ¶ 75 (W.D. Va. 2010)

• ruled that the district's offer of homebound placement, while finding and arranging for residential placement, was not a denial of FAPE to a child with autism whose private school, which offered ABA programming, expelled for life-threatening behavior [~M]

97. S M.N. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 700 F. Supp. 2d 356, 258 Educ. L. Rep. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

• held that procedural violations (e.g., lack of FBA) did not deny FAPE and that the IEP for a five-year-old at a public charter school for children with autism (per ABA model) met the substantive standard w/o the parents' additionally sought itinerant services (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

98. S Doe v. Hampden-Wilbraham Reg'l Sch. Dist., 715 F. Supp. 2d 185, 251 Educ. L. Rep. 134 (D. Mass. 2010)

• ruled that 1) failure to have IEP in place at start of school year for child with autism could be attributed to parents (deference to hearing officer's finding); 2) parent's approval of previous IEPs did not waive FAPE implementation claim; 3) parent did not meet their burden of providing district did not implement expired IEP; and 4) the new IEP met the substantive standard for FAPE (including PRR) (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

99. *P* <u>M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 712 F. Supp. 2d 125, 260 Educ. L. Rep. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), <u>aff'd</u>, 685 F.3d 217, 282 Educ. L. Rep. 37 (2d Cir. 2012)

• upheld \$80,000 tuition reimbursement for a kindergarten child with autism based on finding that child needed extensive 1:1 discrete-trial ABA services, which the district's proposed 6:1 placement did not provide and which conformed to LRE consideration for the parent's unilateral private placement [M]

## 100. S Lathrop R-II Sch. Dist. v. Gray, 611 F.3d 419, 258 Educ. L. Rep. 983 (8th Cir. 2010)

• ruled that lack of baseline data, behavioral goal, and full parental notice did not amount to a denial of FAPE where the district made a good faith effort and reasonably met the individual needs of a student with autism [~M]

**101.** *S* <u>M.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 734 F. Supp. 2d 271, 263 Educ. L. Rep. 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), <u>aff'd sub</u> <u>nom M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 685 F.3d 217, 282 Educ. L. Rep. 37 (2d Cir. 2012)

• upheld substantive appropriateness of IEP for a child with autism, including transition provision to return the child from private school and use of shorthand descriptors in BIP (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

102. S C.G. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 752 F. Supp. 2d 355, 265 Educ. L. Rep. 984 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

• ruled that child with autism was no longer entitled to after-school 1:1 ABA program (and parent training) where the private placement's program met the substantive standard for FAPE based on the child's progress [~M]

\*903 103. *S* <u>E.Z.--L v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 763 F. Supp. 2d 584, 267 Educ. L. Rep. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd sub nom R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 284 Educ. L. Rep. 620 (2d Cir. 2012)

• omission of parent training and counseling in IEP for a child with autism, contrary to state law requirement, did not constitute a denial of FAPE where the district provided such services as needed--same for lack of transition plan under IDEA where the court found that the school would have offered services to meet the child's transition needs [~M]

**104.** *P* <u>W. Windsor-Plainsboro Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. M.F.</u>, 56 IDELR ¶ 106 (D.N.J. 2011)

• ruled that parent was entitled to reimbursement for the home ABA program where the district's proposed eclectic program for a child with autism was not reasonably calculated for the meaningful benefit [M]

#### 105. P Sumter Cty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan, 642 F.3d 478, 268 Educ. L. Rep. 668 (4th Cir. 2011)

• held that the child's gains and the district's rectifying measures were insufficient to avoid the denial of FAPE from the district's failure to implement a material portion of the IEP of a child with autism, which was 15 hours/week of ABA therapy, and that the parent's unilateral home placement was appropriate (with LRE not applying) [~M]

106. S S.M. v. State of Haw. Dep't of Educ., 808 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 276 Educ. L. Rep. 153 (D. Haw. 2011)

• ruling that IEP for a student with autism did not have to specify the qualifications of the service provider or the methodology and that the subsequent changes, including adding a transition plan and autism consultant teacher services, did not render the original version defective because they promptly resulted from information that the parent disclosed only belatedly (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**107.** *S* <u>Bd. of Educ. v. J.A.</u>, 56 IDELR ¶ 209 (N.D. W. Va. 2011)

• upheld appropriateness of SCERTS methodology for a preschool child with autism rather than his previous ABA/DTT methodology--relaxed view of PRR (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**108.** *P* <u>R.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 56 IDELR ¶ 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), <u>further proceedings</u>, 56 IDELR ¶ 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), <u>aff'd sub nom R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 694 F.3d 167, 284 Educ. L. Rep. 629 (2d Cir. 2012)

• ruled in favor of tuition reimbursement for a student with autism, where the district's program was deficient in several substantive respects, including lack of FBA-BIP and more intensive ABA services (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

109. S Fort Osage R-1 Sch. Dist. v. Sims, 641 F.3d 996, 268 Educ. L. Rep. 78 (8th Cir. 2011)

• ruled that the district's failure to diagnose the child's autism did not amount to a denial of FAPE where the district's IEP met the substantive standard for FAPE, including addressing his unique needs, and the parents failed to prove their pre-determination claim (tuition reimbursement case)  $[E/\sim M]$ 

110. P New Milford Bd. of Educ. v. C.R., 431 F. App'x 157, 271 Educ. L. Rep. 829 (3d Cir. 2011)

• upheld a ruling that the district's private school program for a child with autism did not provide for a meaningful benefit because he additionally required an after-school ABA program (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

\*904 111. P N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ. v. V.S., 57 IDELR ¶ 77 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)

• based in part on evidence that the TEACCH method would not be effective for this child with autism, upheld tuition reimbursement at a private school that provided relationship-based methodology [M]

112. *P* <u>P.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 819 F. Supp. 2d 90, 277 Educ. L. Rep. 941 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), <u>aff'd</u>, 526 F. App'x 135, 297 Educ. L. Rep. 726 (2d Cir. 2013)

• upheld direct retroactive payment of tuition after finding that the proposed IEP for a preschool child with autism lacked sufficient specially designed instruction (1:1 ABA) and related services (speech therapy and parent training per state regulation) and that the parent's unilateral placement was appropriate [ $\sim$ M]

113. S Aaron P. v. Dep't of Educ. of Haw., 57 IDELR ¶ 251 (D. Haw. 2011)

• upheld the appropriateness of the ABA/DTT services in the IEP of a preschool child with autism based on <u>Rowley</u> reasonableness standard and ruled that lack of sufficient evaluation did not result in substantive loss, although remanding the case for other issues<sup>29</sup> (tuition reimbursement case) [E/M]

114. S T.M. v. Gwinnett Cty. Sch. Dist., 447 F. App'x 128 (11th Cir. 2011)

• summarily affirmed unpublished trial court decision that rejected parents' insistence on the continuation of 1:1 Lindamood Bell services, finding that the new IEP met the substantive standard and that the district had not denied the parents the opportunity for meaningful participation [M]

115. S G.D. v. Torrance Unified Sch. Dist., 857 F. Supp. 2d 953, 284 Educ. L. Rep. 180 (C.D. Cal. 2012)

• reduction of behavioral support services for a six-year-old with autistic-like behaviors was not a denial of FAPE where classroom observations revealed reduced need [~M]

116. S Nalu Y. v. Dep't of Educ., State of Haw., 858 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 284 Educ. L. Rep. 325 (D. Haw. 2012)

• upheld the district's evaluation that a student did not qualify under autism (though did qualify under SLI and OHI) [E]

#### 117. P/S Woods v. Northport Pub. Sch., 487 F. App'x 968, 287 Educ. L. Rep. 746 (6th Cir. 2012)

• upheld, for a child with autism and cerebral palsy, the rulings that 1) the second-grade IEP amounted to a substantive denial of FAPE due to a substantial lack of implementation plus lack of meaningful benefit in relation to the child's potential; 2) the third-grade IEP represented a procedural denial of meaningful parental participation due to a) failure to provide access to test protocols to parents' expert and b) development of goals/objectives outside of parents' presence plus substantive denial of FAPE due to reduction of services resulting in lack of meaningful benefit

• upheld 758-hour compensatory education award for a two-year denial of FAPE for the child to "reasonably recover" in light of potentially closing window of opportunity, plus upheld requirement that the delivery be via a teacher with autism certification due to this provision in the IEP

\*905 • mixed outcome for IHO's conditioning of prospective relief on parents' re-enrollment of the child (whom the parents had removed for private schooling): no for the ordered evaluations and amended IEP but yes for the implementation of the IEP (which was half mainstreamed and half 1:1 autism services)

• upheld limiting the award to pre-settlement hours amounting to \$25k in attorneys' fees. [~M]

118. P Orange Unified Sch. Dist. v. C.K., 59 IDELR ¶ 74 (C.D. Cal. 2012)

• ruled that the district denied FAPE to a six-year-old who had IEP for speech/language impairment by not providing an evaluation for autism upon reasonable suspicion, with the court clarifying that "the inquiry is not whether the student actually qualifies for special education services, but whether the student should be referred for an evaluation" (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ E]

119. P R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 284 Educ. L. Rep. 629 (2d Cir. 2012)

• adopting the snapshot approach but not strict four-corners rule and differentiating between serious (FBA) and minor (parent counseling) procedural violations based on state standards for FAPE analysis, reached mixed outcomes in three consolidated cases concerning students with autism (two for district and one in favor of the parent, including tuition reimbursement) [~M]

**120.** *S* <u>F.L. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 60 IDELR ¶ 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)

• upheld proposed placement for a child with autism that used TEACCH rather than the sole ABA method (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

## 121. S Ramirez-Ortiz v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Educ., 60 IDELR ¶ 132 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)

• ruled that the hearing officer's order for payment and reimbursement of "psychological therapy services," which was ABA for a child with autism, was not enforceable as applied to a provider who did not meet the state standards, i.e., a licensed psychologist [M]

122. (P) Young v. Ohio, 60 IDELR ¶ 134 (S.D. Ohio 2013)

• granted preliminary injunction under Part C, concluding that parents of a two-year-old with autism were likely to succeed on their claim that the state's decision not to provide ABA therapy or approve ABA providers constituted predetermination [ $\sim$ M]

## 123. S M.N. v. State of Haw. Dep't of Educ., 509 F. App'x 640 (9th Cir. 2013)

•• upheld the denial of tuition reimbursement for a child with autism who received a "meager" educational benefit after a year in a private ABA-based program [M]

124. S B.M. v. Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 60 IDELR ¶ 188 (S.D. Cal. 2013)

• upheld hearing officer's decision in favor of the district's segregated school-based placement, rather than parents' home-based ABA placement, for a preschool child with autism who was highly distractible but with strong nonverbal skills and his need to develop language and interpersonal skills-- "the testimony of district personnel,

who had daily or regularly scheduled time with [the student], was more persuasive than that of [the parent's] witnesses, whose opinions were largely based on file reviews" [M]

125. S Shafer v. Whitehall Dist. Sch., 61 IDELR ¶ 20 (W.D. Mich. 2013)

\*906 • ruled that predetermination that a child's classification was primarily SLD and secondarily OHI and SLI rather than autism was a harmless error where the IEP met the substantive standard for FAPE in relation to the child's individual needs [E]

126. P D.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 950 F. Supp. 2d 494, 299 Educ. L. Rep. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)

• ruled that 1) district's proposed placement was not substantively appropriate where the evidence that it would provide a seafood-free environment to a 10-year-old with autism and seafood allergy were *R.E.*-excluded statements of school officials after the parent's unilateral placement decision; 2) the private placement was appropriate despite teacher's lack of certification in the school's methodology; and 3) the equities supported (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

127. S K.L. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 530 F. App'x 81, 298 Educ. L. Rep. 692 (2d Cir. 2013)

• upheld substantive appropriateness of proposed IEP for a child with autism, concluding that BIP's mention of "behavior intervention strategies" and IEP's provision of evaluative measures rather than methods was sufficient (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

128. S P.C. v. Harding Twp. Bd. of Educ., 61 IDELR ¶ 223 (D.N.J. 2013)

• ruled that the district's proposed program for a 3-year-old with autism was appropriate (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**129.** (*P*) <u>Y.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 62 IDELR ¶ (S.D.N.Y. 2013)

• based on a teacher's testimony opening the door to the methodology issue, remanded to the IHO to determine whether TEACCH meets the individual needs of a 5-year-old child with PDD [M]

#### 130. S M.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 296 Educ. L. Rep. 57 (2d Cir. 2013)

• upheld procedural and substantive appropriateness of the district's proposed IEP for a nine-year-old with autism, ADHD, and Tourette syndrome, including lack of FBA and parental counseling in violation of state law (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

131. S R.C. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. 2d 718, 301 Educ. L. Rep. 212 (N.D. Tex. 2013)

• ruled that IEP was substantively appropriate based on ED where additional classification of autism was not clear or necessary (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ E]

132. S T.G. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 973 F. Supp. 2d 320, 303 Educ. L. Rep. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)

• rejected claims of procedural inappropriateness (e.g., lack of FBA per state law and failure to discuss nonpublic placements) and substantive inappropriateness (e.g., teacher-student ratio) of proposed IEP for a student with autism (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

133. P F.O. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 976 F. Supp. 2d 499, 304 Educ. L. Rep. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)

• ruled that proposed IEP for a child with autism and other disabilities was not reasonably calculated for benefit--insufficient attention to a physician's testimony that autism was the child's primary area of need (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

#### 134. P C.L. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 552 F. App'x 81 (2d Cir. 2014)

\*907 • short opinion deferring to IHO's--more well-reasoned than the review officer's--conclusion that the district did not meet its burden to prove that the proposed 6:1:1 program would enable the child to learn new material (tuition reimbursement case--appropriateness of private placement not at issue) [~M]

135. P C.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 746 F.3d 68, 302 Educ. L. Rep. 901 (2d Cir. 2014)

• ruled that the procedural violations in the proposed IEP, based on state law, of failing to provide for parent training and counseling and in producing an inappropriately vague BIP in the absence of an FBA combined with

its substantive inadequacy of providing for a 6:1 student/teacher ratio, where a child with autism clearly needed a 1:1 ratio, amounted to a denial of FAPE (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

136. *P/S* <u>S.A. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 63 IDELR ¶ 73 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)

• ruled that failure to accommodate parents' schedule for provision of parent training per state law, in this case, resulted in a requisite loss to an eighth grader with autism, entitling the student to in-home services as compensatory education, although failure to provide the details in the IEP and other alleged procedural and substantive violations were not denials of FAPE [~M]

#### 137. P/S T.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2014)

• ruled the IDEA's LRE requirement applies to ESY placements just as it does to school-year placements but that the lack of an FBA-BIP and parent training/counseling (both per state law) for a child with autism were procedural violations that did not result in a substantive loss of education (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

138. S B.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 12 F. Supp. 3d 343 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)

• ruled that the proposed IEP for an eight-year-old with autism was substantively appropriate and rejected the various procedural challenges as either unproven (e.g., predetermination and FBA/BIP) or nonprejudicial (lack of parent training/counseling (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**139.** *S* <u>R.B.</u> v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 15 F. Supp. 3d 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)<sup>30</sup>

• ruled that procedural violations (e.g., lack of vocational assessment, parent training/counseling, and measurable goals) were not a denial of FAPE in individual circumstances of this case and the 6:1:1 placement for this child with autism was substantively appropriate (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

140. P V.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 25 F. Supp. 3d 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)

• ruled that district's "bait and switch" re-proposed site for IEP for a student with autism was a denial of FAPE in terms of parental opportunity for meaningful participation (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

#### 141. S C.B. v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 575 F. App'x 796 (9th Cir. 2014)

• rejected procedural challenges to IEP (e.g., absence of certain goals and accommodations section) and upheld substantive appropriateness of interim small-group placement of a child with autism who previously received 1:1 services [~M]

142. S K.S. v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 63 IDELR ¶ 125 (N.D. Ohio 2014)

\*908 • ruled that IEP for a student with autism that provided for occasional sensory breaks in a glass enclosure within the general education classroom constituted FAPE in the LRE [ $\sim$ M]

143. P C.U. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 23 F. Supp. 3d 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)

• ruled that the district's failure to provide parents of a 15-year-old with autism with a meaningful opportunity for participation by not providing parents with 1) a copy of the IEP in a timely manner and 2) relevant information (e.g., resources adequate to implement the IEP) about the school placement (i.e., process, not necessarily site, of school selection), although rejecting other procedural challenges and substantive (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

144. *P* Millburn Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. J.S.O., 63 IDELR ¶ 229 (D.N.J. 2014)

• ruled that the district did not evaluate a preschool special education child in all areas of suspected disability when she showed clear signs of autism and that the resulting IEPs, which placed her in an inclusion class, did not meet her needs, whereas an ABA program did (tuition reimbursement case)<sup>31</sup> [E/M]

145. P Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Bowens, 762 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2014)

• upheld ruling, in the case of a child with autism upon transitioning from Part C (early intervention), that district offered "inadequate option[s] and [attempted to] wash its hands of its obligations" by acquiescing to the private placement (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

146. S A.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 573 F. App'x 63 (2d Cir. 2014)

• upheld procedural and substantive appropriateness of proposed IEP, including the TEACCH methodology, for a child with autism despite parents' preference for an ABA-based program (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

## 147. S R.K. v. Clifton Bd. of Educ., 587 F. App'x 17 (3d Cir. 2014)

• ruled that even if the district's refusal to provide parents with a copy of a consultant's report evaluating the system's ABA program and to allow their expert to observe the child's class were procedural violations, neither refusal deprived them of their opportunity for meaningful participation in the IEP and IHO process [~M]

## 148. P P.L. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 56 F. Supp. 3d 147 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)

• ruled that lack of transition assessment, FBA, and parent training/counseling per state law did not rise to the level of denial of FAPE for a child with autism, but the proposed 6:1:1 placement was not reasonably calculated to provide benefit due to the child's proven needs for 1:1 instruction (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

## 149. *S* <u>R.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 589 F. App'x 572 (2d Cir. 2014)

• rejected procedural challenge (less than full reevaluation after one year, mixed procedural-substantive challenge (omission of parents' choice of methodology) challenges to the proposed IEP and upheld substantive appropriateness of 6:1:1 placement to return middle school child with autism from a specialized private school (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

#### 150. S E.L. v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 773 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 2014)

• ruled that the district's embedded implementation, including supervised SLT interns, rather than the one-onone approach that was the preference of the resigned SL therapist **\*909** and that was the parents' interpretation, fulfilled IEP provision for four hours per week of SLT in the "total school environment" of eight-year-old with autism [ $\sim$ M]

## 151. S F.K. v. Dep't of Educ., Haw., 585 F. App'x 710 (9th Cir. 2014)

• ruled that the district's placement for a middle-school student with autism met the substantive and implementation standards for appropriateness  $[\sim M]$ 

#### 152. S M.A. v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 592 F. App'x 124 (3d Cir. 2014)

• upheld the changed placement of a child with autism from a private ABA school to a less intensive ABA program within the district based on the child's progress, ruling that the failure of the notice to specify the school did not deny the parents' meaningful opportunity for participation in this case [ $\sim M$ ]

## 153. P/S Cupertino Union Sch. Dist. v. K.A., 75 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2014)

• reversed the IHO's ruling that the district had engaged in predetermination for IEP of a child with autism and seizure disorder, concluding instead that--distinguishable from <u>Doug C</u>.--the continuation of the IEP meeting without the parent did not violate the opportunity for meaningful participation in the specific circumstances of this case, but upheld the IHOs ruling that the district failed to implement the IEP at a material level for a three-month period (compensatory education case) [~M]

#### 154. S Morgan M. v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 64 IDELR ¶ 309 (E.D. Pa. 2015)

• ruled that IEP for a student with epilepsy, pervasive development disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder who may have had ASD was appropriate despite lack of "autistic support" because the IEP provided for the services addressing the individual needs of the student regardless of the label [ $\sim E/\sim M$ ]

## 155. S J.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 95 F. Supp. 3d 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

• ruled that parents of a child with autism sufficiently had raised methodology issue in their complaint but, even assuming arguendo that the ABA methodology was inconsistent with the success of the child's IEP, they failed to prove that the proposed public school was incapable of implementing the IEP (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

156. S M.L. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 65 IDELR ¶ 96 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)

• ruled that the district's proposed IEP that provided a 12-month month placement with a 6:1+1 student:staff ratio in a district special school with TEACCH methodology met standards of appropriateness--"The district was not required to consider any particular teaching methodology in the development of [the child's] IEP, and [the] IEP does not specify one [citing *F.L.*]" (tuition reimbursement case) [M] 157. P K.R. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 107 F. Supp. 3d 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

• ruled that the exclusion of parents from the IEP process and, separately, the inability of the proposed district placement to meet the child's sensory needs were a denial of FAPE (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

158. (P) E.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 611 F. App'x 728 (2d Cir. 2015)

• rejected parent's procedural and substantive challenges to the BIP for their child with autism and their claim regarding the proposed classroom capacity, but remanded for determination of whether the IEP's adoption of the private school's goals without its DIR/Floortime method resulted in a substantive denial of FAPE (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

\*910 159. P/S E.F. v. Newport Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 65 IDELR ¶ 265 (E.D. Cal. 2015)

• rejected various other claims of the parents of a kindergartner with autism, including alleged inadequacy of FBA/ BIP but upheld denial of FAPE and corresponding compensatory education for a one-year delay in conducting an AT assessment upon learning of his success at home with iPod for communication [M]

160. S D.A. v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 618 F. App'x 891 (9th Cir. 2015)

• upheld district's determination of non-eligibility for a high-functioning high school student with ASD who excelled in his academic classes but not, due to his social and pragmatic difficulties, in his other classes, where he did as well as his nondisabled peers [E]

161. S G.K. v. Montgomery Cnty. Intermediate Unit, 65 IDELR ¶ 288 (E.D. Pa. 2015)

• upheld IHO's decision for limited reimbursement to the parent of a preschool child with autism for Lovaas services, ruling that the parents' unreasonable conduct factored into the district's incomplete implementation of the child's IFSP and IEP [ $\sim$ M]

162. P Sch. Bd. of Suffolk v. Rose, 133 F. Supp. 3d 803 (E.D. Va. 2015)

• ruled that identification of a student, who undisputedly was also OHI (based on ADHD) and SLD (in written expression), as ED rather than primarily qualifying with autism, and the failure to address autism in his IEP was a substantive denial of FAPE (tuition reimbursement case) [E/~M]

## 163. S Z.R. v. Oak Park Unified Sch. Dist., 622 F. App'x 630 (9th Cir. 2015)

• summarily affirmed decision ruling that the proposed IEP of a student with autism was appropriate, rejecting procedural challenges based on the goals and the IEP team composition (specifically, the assistant principal who taught one course qualified as a regular education teacher member) (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

## 164. S Q.W. v. Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cnty., 630 F. App'x 580 (6th Cir. 2015)

• ruled that a student who no longer exhibited notable academic, behavioral, or social difficulties in school was no longer eligible as a student with autism despite his at-home problems [E]

## 165. S D.A.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 630 F. App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2015)

• rejected claims of procedural inappropriateness (e.g., goals that were insufficiently measurable) and substantive inappropriateness (e.g., teacher-student ratio) of proposed IEP for a student with autism (tuition reimbursement case)  $[\sim M]$ 

166. P Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Williams, 66 IDELR ¶ 15 (E.D. Pa. 2015)

• ruled that the district's failure to implement tablet provision in IEP for a high school student with autism met the requisite "substantial or significant" implementation standard (compensatory education case) [~M]

167. P M.S. v. Lake Elsinore Unified Sch. Dist., 66 IDELR ¶ 17 (C.D. Cal. 2015)

• ruled that the district's failed to properly assess the behavior of a 13-year-old with autism by not using a variety of assessment tools/strategies and by using a behavior aide to conduct an FBA [ $\sim E/\sim M$ ]

168. P GB v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 145 F. Supp. 3d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

\*911 • ruled that the district denied FAPE for a child with autism by failing to sufficiently address his medical needs in his IEP, although rejecting various FAPE procedural claims (e.g., predetermination) and "substantive" claims (e.g., present levels, goals, and sensory needs) (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

169. P Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Kirsch, 66 IDELR ¶ 247 (E.D. Pa. 2015), aff'd, 722 F. App'x 215 (3d Cir. 2018)

• ruled that the district's failure to have proposed IEPs for twins with autism completed on a timely basis for the start of kindergarten was a procedural violation that significantly impeded the parents' opportunity for participation in the IEP process (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

170. S J.M. v. Kingston City Sch. Dist., 66 IDELR ¶ 251 (N.D.N.Y. 2015)

• rejected claim of parents of a child with autism that the district denied them a meaningful opportunity to participate in the IEP process (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

171. P McKay v. Sch. Bd. of Avoyelles Parish, 66 IDELR ¶ 283 (W.D. La. 2015)

• ruled that the district's failure to implement an IEP-specified log for toileting skills of a 9-year-old with autism did not amount to a denial of FAPE where the student made progress in various other specified areas (compensatory education case) [ $\sim$ M]

## 172. S B.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 634 F. App'x 845 (2d Cir. 2015)

• ruled that the district's evidence was sufficient to prove that despite its social worker's misstatement, the proposed placement was able to implement the IEP of the child with autism (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

173. S N.M. v. Foose, 165 F. Supp. 3d 365 (D. Md. 2015)

• ruled that proposed partially mainstreamed placement for a student with autism met substantive the standard for FAPE (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

#### 174. S A.R. v. Santa Monica Malibu Sch. Dist., 636 F. App'x 385 (9th Cir. 2016)

• upheld, in a brief opinion, that the proposed collaborative preschool classroom was FAPE in the LRE for a preschool child with autism (tuition reimbursement case)  $[\sim M]$ 

175. (P) M.G. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 3d 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

• certified, for class action purposes, a class of students with autism who sufficiently alleged the district's blanket policy of denying them 1:1 instruction, ABA services, and services outside of the regular school day<sup>32</sup> [M]

**176.** *P* <u>**T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.**</u>, 810 F.3d 869 (2d Cir. 2016)<sup>33</sup>

• ruled that the district's refusal to discuss bullying upon parents' reasonable belief that it interfered with the student's ability to receive meaningful educational benefits significantly impeded their right to participate in the development of the IEP, thus constituting a procedural denial of FAPE---"not only potentially impaired the substance of the IEP but also prevented them from assessing the adequacy of their child's IEP" (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

\*912 177. S Reyes v. Manor Indep. Sch. Dist., 67 IDELR ¶ 33 (W.D. Tex. 2016)

• ruled that the district's priority on behavioral interventions for a 19-year-old with autism who exhibited selfinjurious and aggressive behaviors met the substantive standard for FAPE despite negligible academic progress (compensatory education case) [ $\sim$ M]

178. S M.P. v. Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist., 67 IDELR ¶ 35 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

• ruled that the proposed IEP for a student with autism met the substantive standard for FAPE based on reasonably calculated goals and services for emotional and social, as well as academic, support (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

179. S M.P. v. Aransas Pass Indep. Sch. Dist., 67 IDELR ¶ 58 (S.D. Tex. 2016)

• upheld the district's determination that a child with a previous diagnosis of autism (Asperger disorder) and subsequent private diagnoses of ADHD, mood disorder, and ED did not qualify under the IDEA despite behavioral difficulties due to parents' failure to prove he had a resulting need for special education [E]

# 180. *P* Norristown Area Sch. Dist. v. F.C., 636 F. App'x 857 (3d Cir. 2016)

• upheld a ruling that the district's second-grade IEP and, after unilateral placement, third-grade proposed IEP for a student with autism were both not substantively appropriate due to lack of 1:1 aide (compensatory education and tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

## **181.** *P* <u>W.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 160 F. Supp. 3d 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

• ruled, in this "expanding, but still opaque, subject-matter area," that parents of a child with autism may prospectively challenge a proposed placement school's capacity to implement an IEP w/o first enrolling their child in that school and that the district has, and in this case failed to fulfill, the burden to prove this capacity (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

182. P E.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 164 F. Supp. 3d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

• ruled that the proposed IEP's inclusion of expired goals based on DLR/Floortime in private school for students with autism was not likely to produce progress in proposed placement in public school (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

183. S M.T. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 165 F. Supp. 3d 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

• rejected parents' procedural claims of insufficient evaluative materials and lack of opportunity for meaningful participation and upheld substantive appropriateness of proposed placement for the student, including lack of ABA methodology (because IEP only mentioned it as one of previous successful methods for the student) (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

184. S J.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 643 F. App'x 31 (2d Cir. 2016)

• ruled that procedural violations (lack of parent counseling and FBA-BIP) were not prejudicial and that the proposed IEP met the substantive standard for the child with autism, also rejecting the speculative inability of the school to implement the IEP (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

185. *P* <u>I.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 67 IDELR ¶ 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

• ruled that the proposed IEP for a student with autism was not substantively appropriate due to his need for individualized services and a twelve-month program (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

**186.** *S* <u>D.M.</u> v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 170 F. Supp. 3d 1328 (W.D. Wash. 2016)

\*913 • upheld procedural appropriateness, including the lack of pre-teaching and BCBA; substantive appropriateness, under snapshot rule; and LRE, including potential harm to the child, of IEP for a child with autism [ $\sim$ M]

**187.** *S* J.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 171 F. Supp. 3d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

• rejected procedural challenge (specifically, lack of complete transition plan) as not prejudicial and substantive challenge to the capability of the proposed placement of a student with autism (e.g., size and noise) as impermissibly speculative based on *R.E.* (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

188. P S.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 174 F. Supp. 3d 798 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

• ruled that the proposed 6:1:1 placement for a student was substantively inappropriate due to his need for 1:1 instruction although the various alleged procedural violations were either not required (ABA instruction), not proven (parental participation), or not prejudicial (e.g., lack of FBA-BIP) (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

189. P Oskowis v. Sedona-Oak Creek Unified Sch. Dist., 67 IDELR ¶ 150 (D. Ariz. 2016)

- ruled that the district's delays in advancing a student with autism on his goals entitled him to 212 hours of compensatory education [ $\sim$ M]

190. S T.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 67 IDELR ¶ 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

• rejected various procedural and substantive challenges to the district's proposed IEP for a child with autism, including ruling that failure to specify the parents' chosen methodology did not amount to a denial of FAPE where the parents did not prove that it was necessary for the child to receive a benefit (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

191. S M.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 67 IDELR ¶ 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

• rejected parent's "prospective" challenge to the proposed placement of her child with autism at either of two district schools was speculative, i.e., not reasonably apparent, and he made sufficient progress (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

192. S Moradnejad v. District of Columbia, 177 F. Supp. 3d 260 (D.D.C. 2016)

• ruled that IEPs for a first grader with autism that moved from self-contained to partially mainstreamed placement met the substantive standard for FAPE, with due deference to the IHO and to the LRE presumption [~M]

193. S R.E. v. Brewster Cent. Sch. Dist., 180 F. Supp. 3d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

• upheld two successive IEPs for a sixth grader with autism with regard to implementation and substantive appropriateness, respectively (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

194. P L.O. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 822 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2016)

• ruled that combination of serious procedural violations--failure to consider recent evaluative data, lack of FBAs-BIPs (under state law), insufficient S/L services (under state law for students with autism)--along with more minor procedural violations (e.g., parent training/counseling per same state autism law) amounted to a denial of FAPE for three successive IEPs, remanding for compensatory education [~M]

195. P Timothy O. v. Paso Robles Unified Sch. Dist., 822 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2016)

• ruled that failure to evaluate a preschool child with SLI for autism was a procedural violation that deprived him of critical educational opportunities and substantially impaired his parents' ability to fully participate in the

collaborative IEP process--the district's informal observation does not trump clear notice from IEE and student's behavior [ $\sim$ E/ $\sim$  M]

\*914 196. S N.T. v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 67 IDELR ¶ 229 (C.D. Cal. 2016)

• upheld substantive appropriateness of proposed day class for a student with autism, thus declining reimbursement for at-home ABA program [M]

197. P W.S. v. City Sch. Dist. of N.Y.C., 188 F. Supp. 3d 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

• ruled that the proposed 6:1:1 placement for a child with autism was not individualized in terms of the child's needs and did not address her documented necessity for 1:1 ABA therapy (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

198. S Doe v. Richmond Consol. Sch. Dist., 67 IDELR ¶ 264 (D. Mass. 2016)

• upheld, based on the snapshot approach, substantive appropriateness of proposed IEP for a student with autism (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

199. (P) F.L. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 67 IDELR ¶ 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

• remanded issue of whether a high school student with autism needed 1:1 instruction beyond that the paraprofessional provided (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

200. S Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 826 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016)

• upheld the substantive appropriateness of the proposed IEP of a high school student with autism in a selfcontained class, also rejecting the "laundry list" of procedural violations and the LRE claim of a guardian who had challenged several consecutive prior IEPs (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

201. S N.T. v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 67 IDELR ¶ 229 (C.D. Cal. 2016)

• ruled that special education class for a seven-year-old with autism, which provided him with small-group (e.g., DTT social skills) and individual services, met the substantive standard for FAPE, contrary to the parents' insistence on a 40-hour at-home ABA program [M]

**202.** *P* J.L. v. Manteca Unified Sch. Dist., 68 IDELR ¶ 17 (E.D. Cal. 2016)

• ruled that consultative, rather than direct, SLT services constituted a denial of FAPE based on its necessity in light of the severity of the communication needs of this elementary school child with autism [M]

**203**. *S* <u>Ruhl v. Ohio Dep't of Health</u>, 68 IDELR ¶ 73 (N.D. Ohio 2016), further proceedings, 69 IDELR ¶ 278 (N.D. Ohio 2017), **aff'd on other grounds**, 725 F. App'x 324 (6th Cir. 2018) (no violation of IDEA where parents only belatedly provided proof of qualifying criterion)

• ruled that denial of Part C funding for ABA therapy for IFSP of a child with autism did not violate § 504 or the ADA due to failure to show that the reason was the child's disability and that subsequent delay of six months after the parents qualified was not remediable under the IDEA for money damages [M]

204. P A.U. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 68 IDELR ¶ 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

• ruled that the proposed school was not capable of providing FAPE to a child with autism because it did not offer a sufficiently small teacher:aide:student ratio and needed interaction with verbal peers (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

**205.** (*P*) <u>T.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 68 IDELR ¶ 137 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

• remanded issue of the school's capability to implement IEP of a child with autism who had been in a private school that uses DIR/Floortime to determine whether the goals required this particular methodology [M]

\*915 206. P T.Y. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 116 LRP 37325, adopted, 213 F. Supp. 3d 446 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)

• ruled that, despite various procedural nonprejudicial challenges, the proposed IEP was not substantively appropriate child with autism, who was in a private placement that successfully used DIR/Floortime, for failing

to meet his need for such a relationship-based instructional program or to provide SLT), awarding tuition reimbursement [M]

**207.** *P* <u>Z.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 222 F. Supp. 3d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

• upheld substantive appropriateness of proposed IEP and capability of proposed placement for a student with autism (tuition reimbursement case)  $[\sim M]$ 

208. S Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. Student, 665 F. App'x 612 (9th Cir. 2016)<sup>34</sup>

• ruled that district did not deny FAPE to a high school student with autism and ADHD when its IEP team refused to require the parents' preferred instructional method, which was based on the English teacher's instructional approach [M]

209. P A.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 845 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 2017)

• rejected procedural FAPE challenges (e.g., FBA-BIP and transition services) but ruled in favor of the parent of a child with autism for substantive FAPE because the proposed IEP's failure to provide 1:1 ABA therapy was contrary to "a clear consensus" of the evaluative info at the IEP meeting (tuition reimbursement case--remanded for remaining steps) [M]

210. S Joanna S. v. S. Kingston Pub. Sch. Dist., 69 IDELR ¶ 179 (D.R.I. 2017)

• upheld district's determination that the child's primary disability was ED--no harm and no clear expert support for autism as the key diagnosis (here, they agreed on anxiety) [E]

211. S M.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 69 IDELR ¶ 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)

• upheld a limited compensatory award for ABA services upon the parent's appellate challenge, seeking a more extensive award and § 504 relief [ $\sim$ M]

212. (P) Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386 (2017)<sup>35</sup>

• ruled that the general substantive standard under the IDEA is whether the IEP is "reasonably calculated to enable [the] child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances," remanding for application to this student with autism in a self-contained class (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

**213.** *P/S* Brandywine Heights Area Sch. Dist. v. B.M., 248 F. Supp. 3d 618 (E.D. Pa. 2017)

• upheld IHO's decision that the district failed to provide FAPE based on delayed and faulty evaluation of a child with autism upon transitioning with behavioral problems from the IU program to district kindergarten, but that district met the substantive standard for FAPE (under PRR and *Endrew F.*) w/o verbal method after the effects of the revised BIP (compensatory education case) [M]

214. S K.M. v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 69 IDELR ¶ 241 (E.D. Cal. 2017)

• upheld substantive appropriateness of IEP for a student with autism under *Endrew F*. standard, concluding that goals need not be aligned 1:1 to needs if addressed overall (compensatory education case) [ $\sim$ M]

\*916 215. S T.M. v. Quakertown Cmty. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 792 (E.D. Pa. 2017)

• upheld substantive appropriateness of IEP for fourth grader with autism and ID, concluding that the evaluation, progress measurement, and ABA-basis met the *Endrew F*. standard even if not the "gold standard" and 20 hours of 1:1 strict ABA that the parent's BCBA recommended [M]

**216.** *S* <u>Z.F. v. Ripon Unified Sch. Dist.</u>, 70 IDELR ¶ 19 (E.D. Cal. 2017)

• rejected, due to lack of deliberate indifference, § 504 challenge to alleged wrongful denial of ABA services via alleged discriminatory eligibility criteria [M]

**217.** *S* <u>Smith v. Cheyenne Mountain Sch. Dist.</u>, 2017 WL 2791415, *adopted*, 2017 WL 2778556 (D. Colo. June 26, 2017)

• ruled that district did not have reason to suspect autism at the time of the reevaluation [~E]

218. S Lauren C. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 IDELR ¶ 63 (N.D. Tex. 2017)

• upheld appropriateness of IEP, including provision for ABA services, concluding that the IEP team's various evaluative rejections of autism despite a physician's diagnosis did not violate child find or FAPE [ $\sim$ E/ $\sim$ M]

219. S C.G. v. Waller Indep. Sch. Dist., 697 F. App'x 816 (5th Cir. 2017)

• upheld substantive appropriateness of proposed IEP for a student with autism under Endrew F. standard despite its failure to provide the ABA services in the prior district's IEP (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

#### 220. S R.A. v. W. Contra Costa Unified Sch. Dist., 696 F. App'x 171 (9th Cir. 2017)

• brief affirmance of ruling that parent's unreasonable pre-condition of fully observing (i.e., seeing and hearing) the reevaluation amounted to a withdrawal of consent, thus defeating the FAPE claim based on the failure to complete the reevaluation [ $\sim$ E]

221. P/S Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Post, 262 F. Supp. 3d 178 (E.D. Pa. 2017)

• upheld denial of FAPE for first grader with autism based on LRE and parentally prejudicial procedural violations of automatically assuming autistic support rather than general ed alternative; IHO's award of compensatory education; and denial of § 504 retaliation claims [~M]

222. P S.H. v. Mt. Diablo Unified Sch. Dist., 70 IDELR ¶ 98 (N.D. Cal. 2017)

• ruled, in relevant part, that the written offer of 40 minutes of SLT per week for a high school student with autism, without specification of individual or group setting was a prejudicial procedural violation in terms of parental participation that did not impede the district's methodological discretion [ $\sim M$ ]

223. S Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Schs. v. Maez, 70 IDELR ¶ 157 (D.N.M. 2017)

• ruled, under <u>Endrew F.</u> and PRR, that district's IEP for a child with autism, which included ABA, provided FAPE despite not being a strict ABA program that his parents sought [M]

**224.** *P* <u>Richardson v. District of Columbia</u>, 273 F. Supp. 3d 94 (D.D.C. 2017)

• ruled that the initial evaluation that child was not eligible under autism or developmental delay (DD) was appropriate, despite the district's subsequent determination after IEE that the child was eligible as DD, concluding that even if the alleged deficiencies (e.g., use of \*917 outdated testing data) constituted procedural violations, the parents failed to meet their burden of proof that the child, if the procedural violations were cured, would have been eligible at the time [~E]

## 225. S N.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 711 F. App'x 29 (2d Cir. 2017)

• upheld the substantive appropriateness under <u>Endrew F.</u> of the district's proposed IEP for a child with autism, concluding with deference to the review officer that the IEP's failure to mandate DIR/Floortime method was not a denial of FAPE and that the parents did not prove that the school was not capable of implementing the IEP (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

226. P) R.S. v. Bd. of Educ. Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist., 71 IDELR ¶ 85 (N.D.N.Y. 2017)

• denied dismissal of IDEA claims challenging SEA policies that did not require ABA methodology in IEPs (although dismissing the alternative § 504 claims for lack of gross misjudgment/bad faith) [M]

## 227. S L.M.P. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 879 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2018)

• affirmed that the parents of triplets with autism lacked standing to challenge, as a procedural violation of predetermination, the alleged district policy of not including ABA services in IEPs because their children's IEPs provided for PECS, an ABA-based intervention [M]

228. S M.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 71 IDELR ¶ 125 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)

• rejected parents' claim that a proposed public school placement did not have the capability to meet the sensory needs of their five-year-old child with autism [ $\sim$ M]

229. S Pavelko v. District of Columbia, 288 F. Supp. 3d 301 (D.D.C. 2018)

• upheld appropriateness of the first proposed IEP of a child with autism and ADHD, including the conclusion that the parent had not proven the need at that time for ABA therapy or particular sensory equipment [M]

230. P Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 290 F. Supp. 3d 1175 (D. Colo. 2018)<sup>36</sup>

• ruled, on remand, from Supreme Court<sup>37</sup> that proposed IEP did not meet the new substantive standard for FAPE, concluding that the fourth grader with autism made minimal progress largely attributable to "the District's lack of success in providing a program that would address Petitioner's maladaptive behaviors" [~M]

231. (P) Lawrence Sch. Dist. v. McDaniel, 72 IDELR ¶ 8 (E.D. Ark. 2018)

• upheld IHO's ruling that the district did not provide a comprehensive evaluation of a gifted fifth grader with ASD and ADD, without determining whether the student was eligible under the IDEA [ $\sim$ E]

232. S Greene v. E. Poinsett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 72 IDELR ¶ 34 (E.D. Ark. 2018)

• ruled that district-proposed ABA therapy for a nine-year-old with autism at a private clinic was LRE compared to part-time placement in home instruction [~M]

233. (P) K.M. v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 72 IDELR ¶ 63 (E.D. Cal. 2018)

\*918 • denied dismissal of parent's § 504/ADA claim that providing access to insurance-funded ABA therapist for a nine-year-old with autism was reasonable accommodation analogous to service animal [~M]

234. S J.M. v. Matayoshi, 729 F. App'x 585 (9th Cir. 2018)

• ruled that the proposed IEP for a student with autism met the *Endrew F*. standard with regard to bullying although not entirely complying with the U.S. Department of Education's Dear Colleague Letter (2014) [~M]

**235.** *S* E.S. v. Smith, 72 IDELR ¶ 184 (D. Md. 2018)

• upheld substantive appropriateness of proposed IEP for a student with autism and SLD under <u>Endrew F.</u> standard (and rejected predetermination claim) (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

#### 236. S Parrish v. Bentonville Sch. Dist., 896 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2018)

• upheld substantive appropriateness of IEPs for two elementary school students with autism, with deferential "good faith" standard under the IDEA and § 504 for the IEP's behavior strategies, including restraints [~M]

237. S E.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 73 IDELR ¶ 9 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)

• rejected claims that IEP should have included DIR methodology and that proposed in-district placement of a child with autism in a private school was not capable of implementing FAPE because the sensory equipment was not specified in the student's IEP and, in any event, could have feasibly been in place at the start of the school year [~M]

238. S M.G. v. N. Hunterdon-Vorhees Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 73 IDELR ¶ 46 (D.N.J. 2018), aff'd, 778 F. App'x 107 (3d Cir. 2019)

• upheld district's proposed placement in a specialized in-district class for a student with autism rather than continuing the student's out-of-district placement, finding that the 1:1 aide sufficiently mitigated the safety risk of elopement--affirmance, with deference to IHO's credibility determination, that the IEP provided "significant learning and meaningful educational benefits in light of [the child with autism's] individual needs and potential" standard [~M]

**239**. (*P*) <u>L.T. v. N. Penn. Sch. Dist.</u>, 342 F. Supp. 3d 610 (E.D. Pa. 2018)

• ruled that IDEA requires proposing FAPE (via a contingent IEP) for a student with disabilities (here autism) enrolled in a residential treatment facility in another district [~M?]

240. S D.S. v. Parsippany Troy Hills Bd. of Educ., 73 IDELR ¶ 143 (D.N.J. 2018)

• upheld appropriateness of IEP for a child with autism as providing ABA although not at the intensity that the parents obtained in their unilateral placement, and concluded that any lack of autism-knowledgeable IEP member was a harmless procedural error in this case (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

241. S Nathan M. v. Harrison Sch. Dist. No. 2, 73 IDELR ¶ 148 (D. Colo. 2018), vacated as moot, 942 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir 2019)

• ruled that the transition plan for a student with autism from private to public placement met  $\underline{Endrew F}$  standard for FAPE [~M]

242. S J.M. v. Tenn. Dep't of Educ., 73 IDELR ¶ 150 (M.D. Tenn. 2018)

\*919 • ruled that the dramatic progress of a student with autism after SEA provided guidance to LEA under state seclusion/restraint law mooted FAPE claim against SEA and disproved the claim against LEA [ $\sim$ M]

243. S Renee J. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 913 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2019)

• upheld appropriateness of IEP for a high school student with autism, ID, and ADD, including transition plan and school refusal/bullying, and rejected predetermination claim regarding ABA [M]

**244.** *S* Bentonville Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 73 IDELR ¶ 203 (E.D. Ark. 2019), partially vacated as moot, 795 F. App'x 992 (8th Cir. 2020)

• ruled that reevaluation, IEP contents, and BIP implementation upon changing a fifth grader's primary classification from autism to ED did not amount to a denial of FAPE [ $\sim$ E/ $\sim$ M]

**245.** *S* <u>A.H. v. Smith</u>, 367 F. Supp. 3d 387 (D. Md. 2019)

• upheld substantive appropriateness, per <u>Endrew F.</u>, of the proposed IEP for a middle-school student with autism as well as the proposed placement's capacity to implement IEP's ABA provisions (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

#### 246. S E.M. v. Lewisville Indep Sch. Dist., 763 F. App'x 361 (5th Cir. 2019)

• brief affirmance of district court decision that upheld the appropriateness of an IEP for a third grader with autism and other disabilities under <u>Michael F.</u> four-factor test, with no mention of <u>Endrew F.</u> and relaxed, similarly subsumed treatment of PRR [ $\sim$ M]

247. S Ascent v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 74 IDELR ¶ 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

• ruled that parents of students attending private ABA schools lacked standing to sue SEA under IDEA and dismissed parents' IDEA and § 504/ADA claims as speculative at this point with regard to new state policy requiring ABA schools to offer related services, not just ABA, to students who need them [M]

248. P/S Dep't of Educ., Haw. v. L.S., 74 IDELR ¶ 71 (D. Haw. 2019)

• ruled that parents of a student with autism were entitled to tuition reimbursement of private school costs because the district's BIP for the student was not part of the IEP and, thus, deprived the parents of their participatory role but reduced award by 25% based on equities, including excessive costs [ $\sim$ M]

249. S/(P) E.P. v. N. Arlington Bd. of Educ., 74 IDELR ¶ 80 (D.N.J. 2019)

• ruled that IEP for a preschool child in an autism classroom was appropriate and subsequent exiting was justifiable based on lack of continued need for special education but remanded for possible compensatory education for violation of LRE  $[E/\sim M]$ 

250. P K.N. v. Gloucester City Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 3d 334 (D.N.J. 2019)

• ruled that the district after-school program's failure to continue providing a trained aide supervised by a special ed teacher for an elementary school student with autism was a violation of § 504/ADA (meaningful access-reasonableness and necessity criteria), reserving the issue of remedies for subsequent decision [~M]

251. S R.E.B. v. Dep't of Educ., Haw., 770 F. App'x 796 (9th Cir. 2019)

• ruled that district 1) sufficiently addressed the transition of the student with autism from private school although not specified in the IEP, 2) sufficiently specified the student's LRE; **\*920** 3) was not required to specify the qualifications of the aide in the IEP; and 4) also was not required to specify the ABA methodology in the IEP [M]

## 252. S Albright v. Mountain Home Sch. Dist., 926 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2019)

• upheld substantive appropriateness of IEP, including its use of sensory integration, for a child with multiple disabilities, including autism, in accordance with PRR and <u>Endrew F.</u>, and rejected parental participation challenge in a case of "a profoundly toxic lack of trust" [M]

# 253. S L.J. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 927 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2019)

• adopted the <u>Van Duyn</u> materiality standard for failure-to-implement claims and applied it in favor of the district for the stay-put IEP of a child with autism, distinguishing <u>Endrew F.</u> as applying to "content" FAPE claims [~M]

# 254. *S* J.G. v. Dep't of Educ., Haw., 772 F. App'x 567 (9th Cir. 2019)

• ruled, in a brief decision, that the district's proposed change in the placement of a middle schooler with autism from a private school to its autism center, including the use of an LRE checklist, was not predetermination and met Endrew F. standard [ $\sim$ M]

## 255. S R.H. v. Bd. of Educ. Saugerties Cent. Sch. Dist., 776 F. App'x 719 (2d Cir. 2019)

• rejected appropriateness of private school for grade 7 student with autism and anxiety disorder due to its failure to offer services designed to meet his unique needs despite limited evidence of social, emotional, and attendance improvement [ $\sim$ M]

256. S Walsh v. Silver Lake Reg'l Sch. Dist., 2020 WL 767392 (D. Mass. Jan. 21, 2020)

• upheld appropriateness of specialized days school placement for a student with autism that provided ABA therapy, concluding that an ABA residential placement was not necessary [~M]

257. S Coleman v. Wake Cnty. Pub. Schs., 76 IDELR ¶ 5 (E.D.N.C. 2020)

• upheld substantive appropriateness and adequate implementation of IEP for elementary school student with autism, attributing any shortfall in academic or behavioral progress to the parent's willful failure to have the student present for core special ed class (parent brought him to school after this class due to purported anxiety, but BIP, which had the input of parent's expert, addressed his anxiety) [~M]

## 258. P D.L. v. St. Louis City Pub. Sch. Dist., 950 F.3d 1057 (8th Cir. 2020)

• ruled that IEP for a fourth grader with ED that reduced his sensory therapies in contradiction of his repeated, cogent concurrent medical diagnosis of autism and provided for placement in a school for correction of purely voluntary behaviors failed to meet the Endrew E standard for FAPE (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ E/M]

259. P Dep't of Educ., Haw. v. Acen T., 76 IDELR ¶ 121 (D. Haw. 2020)

• reversed IEP team's exiting student with autism as no longer eligible, ruling that "[a] student does not become ineligible because he or she is performing at a satisfactory level with the aid of special education services" (emphasis added) [E]

260. S Butte Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. C.S., 817 F. App'x 321 (9th Cir. 2020)

• rejected FAPE claim of a student with autism and ED based on lack of FBA-BIP, concluding that the student lacked an entitlement to it and, in any event, the IEP reasonably addressed the student's behavioral issues [~M]

\*921 261. S G.R. v. Del Mar Union Sch. Dist., 76 IDELR ¶ 152 (S.D. Cal. 2020)

• upheld district's proposed IEP for placement of a child with autism and severe anxiety in a therapeutic public school rather than a private residential center--including increased services though not cognitive or experiential therapy (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

262. S A.W. v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 810 F. App'x 588 (9th Cir. 2020)

• brief affirmance of ruling that parent of a nine-year-old with autism and ADHD did not meet the burden of proof that the district's failure to provide the requested BCBA supervision (2 hrs./wk.) for the ABA-trained aide amounted to a denial of FAPE under Endrew F. [M]

263. P Wetherald v. Carmel Clay Sch. Corp., 76 IDELR ¶ 251 (S.D. Ind. 2020)

• ruled that district's residential placement, which merely "parked" the student, did not meet the Endrew F. standard, entitling the parent to wide-ranging relief [ $\sim$ M]

264. P Enterprise City Bd. of Educ. v. S.S., 76 IDELR ¶ 295 (M.D. Ala. 2020)

• ruled that the district committed not only multiple procedural violations but also failed to meet the <u>Endrew F.</u> substantive standard for middle school student with multiple disabilities, including autism, by not systematically addressing his escalating problematic behaviors--also upheld remedy of a BCBA, BIP, behavioral aide, a counselor, and reimbursement for transportation mileage (while also agreeing with IHO that the student needed "intervention, not isolation," thus rejecting parents' request for residential placement) [~M]

265. S C.M. v. Mt. Vernon City Sch. Dist., 76 IDELR ¶ 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)

• ruled that the district's proposed program was capable of implementing the grades 4 and 5 IEPs for a child with autism, including the provisions for DTT and those specific to his sensory needs (although parents prevailed re stay-put for ESY services) [M]

266. S Oskowis v. Ariz. Dep't of Educ., 76 IDELR ¶ 292 (D. Ariz. 2020)

• ruled that the district's use of a paraprofessional, under the supervision of a special education teacher, did not result in requisite substantial failure to implement the IEP of a student with autism [ $\sim$ M]

## 267. S McKnight v. Lyon Cnty. Sch. Dist., 812 F. App'x 455 (9th Cir. 2020)

• upheld a ruling that mainstreamed placement was FAPE for a child with autism who was obtaining passing grades per Endrew F., rejecting the parents' claim that a 1:1 aide was necessary [~M]

268. P/S L.V. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 76 IDELR ¶ 279, adopted, 77 IDELR ¶ 13 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)

• granted, in the wake of continued noncompliance, a preliminary injunction to enforce stay-put for various services, including 1:1 ABA therapy, and assistive technology evaluation, on an in-person basis to the extent they can be performed safely, although not granting parent's request for escrow fund for this purpose [ $\sim$ M]

269. S Wishard v. Waynesboro Area Sch. Dist., 77 IDELR ¶ 65 (M.D. Pa. 2020)

 $\cdot$  deferred to the district's choice of whole-to-part method rather than the one recommended by the parents' expert for a student with autism [M]

270. *P/S* <u>Marrero v. P.R.</u>, 77 IDELR ¶ 70 (D.P.R. 2020)

\*922 • granted a limited award of compensatory education and tuition reimbursement for a period that the district failed to provide the court-ordered ABA-based IEP but ruled that the belated IEP met the Endrew F. substantive standard, thus denying the requested private placement for the period after the issuance of said IEP [M]

271. P Madison Bd. of Educ. v. S.S., 77 IDELR ¶ 99 (D.N.J. 2020)

• granted tuition reimbursement (and requested \$127K for attorneys' fees) for a private placement of a preschool child with autism in an at-home ABA program despite not being a school and lack of notice (where the district did not fulfill its opportunity to propose FAPE) [~M]

272. P/S S.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of Harford Cnty., 498 F. Supp. 3d 761 (M.D. Md. 2020)

• ruled, for the three years at issue, that the first IEP was appropriate, including the IEP team's decision in April to conduct an FBA-BIP after serious behavioral issues of a student with autism, but the next two IEPs were (a) procedurally inappropriate due to nine-month delay in implementing the FBA-BIP and (b) substantively inappropriate, including lack of 12-month program with BCBA (Endrew F.)--awarding tuition reimbursement at private school with year-round ABA services [~M]

273. P Montgomery Cnty. Intermediate Unit No. 23 v. A.F., 506 F. Supp. 3d 293 (E.D. Pa. 2020)

• ruled that drastic deletion of BCBA and other behavioral services of a preschool child with autism w/o meaningful explanation denied FAPE both in terms of parental participation and snapshot standard (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

274. S Glass v. District of Columbia, 77 IDELR ¶ 246 (D.D.C. 2020)

• upheld IHO's ruling that the district's change in classification from autism to ED did not result in inappropriate IEP [~E]

## 275. S Elizabeth B. v. El Paso Cnty. Sch. Dist. 11, 841 F. App'x 40 (10th Cir. 2020)

• rejected FAPE challenges on behalf of the IEP of a child with autism and epilepsy including its failure to specify ABA methodology, the failure to provide it in its narrow sense (as compared with reinforcement according to ABA principles), and the lack of a FBA-BIP [M]

276. S/P Dervishi v. Dep't of Special Educ., 653 F. App'x 55 (2d Cir. 2021)

• interpreted settlement agreement for district's reimbursement of ABA services by a qualified provider to apply only to services provided by BCBA, not those by the parents (7,000 hours=\$400,000) or the YMCA [M]

277. P E.G. v. Anchorage Indep. Sch. Bd., 78 IDELR ¶ 70 (W.D. Ky. 2021)

• ruled that the district denied FAPE to a 20-year-old with autism with regard to (a) inappropriate transition services, and (b) the proposed placement, due to its physical setting and the student's significant sensory needs, not being capable of implementing the otherwise appropriate IEP (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

278. S J.B. v. Frisco Indep. Sch. Dist., 528 F. Supp. 3d 614 (E.D. Tex. 2021)

• ruled that IEP for a third grader with autism and OHI (ADHD) provided FAPE in the LRE, per Fifth Circuit's four-factor analysis, despite belated FBA-BIP (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

279. S JKG v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 78 IDELR ¶ 158 (E.D. Pa. 2021)

\*923 • ruled that the district's failure to provide FBA for a third grader with autism prior to IEP, if a procedural violation, did not result in requisite loss to the child or parents  $[\sim M]$ 

280. S B.B. v. Dep't of Educ., Haw., 78 IDELR ¶ 249 (D. Haw. 2021)

• ruled that the district's proposed placement of a second grader with autism and other disabilities at a separate facility where he had limited interaction with students and faculty due to his aggressive and maladaptive behaviors was FAPE (Endrew F.) in the LRE (multi-factor test) and parent failed to show that her on-line home program (reportedly costing up to \$16k per mo.) was appropriate (tuition reimbursement case)

281. P Wake Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. S.K., 78 IDELR ¶ 279 (E.D.N.C.. 2021)

• ruled that the district did not meet the substantive standard for FAPE for a ninth grader with multiple disabilities, including autism, who needed a small class and small school and that the unilateral private placement was appropriate for her progress (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

282. S C.S. v. Johnston Sch. Dep't, 2021 WL 1172691 (D.R.I. Mar. 29, 2021)

• ruled that the district's proposed placement in a substantially separate life skills program provided FAPE to a sixth grader with autism, including his social skills needs--deference to district and specialized expert support [~M]

283. S A.C. v. Owen J. Roberts Sch. Dist., 78 IDELR ¶ 198 (E.D. Pa. 2021)

• ruled, in part, that district's evaluation appropriately determined that the child was eligible under the classification of autism and that the evaluation team had no reason to suspect TBI [E]

**284.** *P* <u>E.C. v. Fullerton Sch. Dist.</u>, 79 IDELR ¶ 17 (C.D. Cal. 2021)

• ruled that (a) the district's failure to allow the parent's expert to observe the district's proposed class for a second grader with autism in violation of state law resulted in loss to parents' opportunity for meaningful participation, warranting tuition reimbursement, and (b) its FBA was not appropriate, warranting IEE at public expense [~M]

285. P/S D.D. v. Garvey Sch. Dist., 79 IDELR ¶ 15 (C.D. Cal. 2021)

• ruled, in part, that district's behavioral services for a student with autism and ID denied FAPE for the first of two disputed periods but that remedy of 3 hours of staff training, rather than parents' requested direct ABA services, was equitably appropriate in the circumstances of this case  $[\sim M]$ 

286. *P* Hood River Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Student, 79 IDELR ¶ 40 (D. Or. 2021)

• ruled that the district's two-year delay after receiving a private diagnosis of autism for evaluation that determined the student was eligible under the IDEA constituted a child find violation warranting the 900-hour compensatory education award [ $\sim$ E]

287. P/(PS)) Robert F. v. N. Syracuse Cent. Sch. Dist., 79 IDELR ¶ 96 (N.D.N.Y. 2021)

• granted summary judgment to parents under § 504 for failure to meet state regulatory minimum and then, despite lack of S/L progress, the district's further reduction of SLT for a preschooler with autism, but denied it to both parties for the other claims, including alleged denial of ABA therapy, based on whether jury determined deliberate indifference [~M]

288. S Jones v. District of Columbia, 2021 WL 3927815 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2021) (R&R)

\*924 • upheld the IEP team's decision not to include ABA therapy for a child with autism based on (a) IEE's lack of justification, (b) judicial deference to local school authorities for methodology, and (c) the child's requisite progress without it [M]

289. S Hills & Dales Child Development Ctr. v. Iowa Dep't of Educ., 968 N.W.3d 238 (Iowa 2021)

• ruled that the IEP team has the authority to determine whether to grant an excuse for an outside provision of ABA therapy by a private agency upon a physician's order [M]

**290.** *S* Does v. Key, 80 IDELR ¶ 10 (E.D. Ark. 2021)

• upheld IHO's rulings that (1) the child did not need ABA therapy (despite medical necessity according to insurer); (2) the IEP sufficiently provided behavioral services for the second grader with autism rather than an FBA and BIP; and (3) the district was not liable for the shortfall in implementing IEP's specified amounts of SLT and OT because the parent opted to pull the child out of school during those times for private ABA therapy rather than do so beyond the school day [M]

**291.** *S* <u>S.M.</u> v. Branchburg Twp. Bd. of Educ., 80 IDELR ¶ 50 (D.N.J. 2021)

• upheld proposed IEP for a preschool child with autism that provided less intensive and supervised ABA than the parents' experts recommended, along with the rejection of parents' claim of predetermination (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

# 292. *S/P* J.T. v. District of Columbia, 80 IDELR ¶ 62 (D.C. Cir. 2022)

• ruled that even if the parent has a right to participate in the selection of the specific school site in the IEP's private placement decision, the parent did not sustain her FAPE-capability concerns with transportation, noise, and class size for the two schools that the team proposed (although leaving intact the lower court's compensatory education award for the indefinite failure to provide a placement for at least the entire following year) [~M]

293. (P) Moynihan v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 80 IDELR ¶ 216 (E.D. Pa. 2022)

• ruled that IEP's college transition programs for a twelfth grader with autism and social anxiety disorder met Endrew F. substantive standard for FAPE [ $\sim$ M]

294. S Isabelle K. v. Manheim Twp. Sch. Dist., 80 IDELR ¶ 100 (E.D. Pa. 2022)

• ruled that the successively revised IEPs in August, October, and November in grade 3 for a child with autism in response to her social/behavioral struggles and anxiety, including FBA-BIP and customized strategies met the *Endrew F.* substantive standard for FAPE based on snapshot approach (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

295. (S) Andrade v. Stewart, 80 IDELR ¶ 245 (M.D. La. 2022)

• denied preliminary injunction for residential placement of a student with autism due to failure to show a substantial likelihood that it was essential to the child's education (i.e., unable to receive the requisite benefit without it)  $[\sim M]$ 

296. S M.S. v. New Hyde Park-Garden City Park Union Free Sch. Dist., 80 IDELR ¶ 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2022)

• ruled that the district's intensive 6:3:1 ABA program, w/o BCBA all the time, offered FAPE to a nine-year-old with autism (tuition reimbursement case) [M]

**297.** *S* <u>G.A. v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ.</u>, 594 F. Supp. 3d 979 (M.D. Tenn. 2022)

• ruled that the district's actions did not constitute predetermination of placement for a seventh grader with autism and ED, distinguishing 6th Circuit ruling in *Deal* [ $\sim$ M]

# \*925 298. S N.F. v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 81 IDELR ¶ 6 (9th Cir. 2022)

• ruled that district's failure to reevaluate a student with OHI for autism after a private diagnosis of autism did not amount to a denial of FAPE in the specific circumstances of this case, which included a 9-month delay in sharing the private diagnosis with the district, failure to cooperate with scheduling of IEP meeting, and disenrollment of the child [ $\sim$ E]

## 299. S J.M. v. Summit City Bd. of Educ., 39 F.4th 126 (3d Cir. 2022)

• rejected parent's partial child find claim despite private neuropsychologist's rule-out diagnosis of autism--district provided proactive behavioral and academic interventions despite district's determination a year later that child qualified under autism classification [ $\sim$ E]

**300.** *S* <u>Peters Twp. Sch. Dist. v. B.B.</u>, 81 IDELR ¶ 106 (W.D. Pa. 2022)

• ruled that failure to evaluate a student with ED for possible autism upon recommendation of the hospital upon student's discharge was a procedural violation that did not result in substantive loss, thus reversing IHO's compensatory remedy for denial of FAPE [ $\sim$ E]

**301.** *S/P* O.A. v. Orcutt Union Sch. Dist., 81 IDELR ¶ 109 (C.D. Cal. 2022)

• ruled that the district denied FAPE to a student for failing to evaluate the student for autism in grade 1, but not in kindergarten when the district evaluated and found the child eligible for OHI (ADHD), because the district did not have requisite suspicion until formal private diagnosis during intervening summer and the remaining IEPs did not meet the student's behavioral needs--moderate comp. ed award with extended deadline [ $\sim$ E/ $\sim$ M]

302. S Alex W. v. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1, 81 IDELR ¶ 133 (D. Colo. 2022)

• ruled that evaluation and IEPs of a student with autism+ were appropriate, including ABA-based behavioral strategies and Endrew F. standard [ $\sim$ E/ $\sim$ M]

## 303. S Smith v. Orcutt Union Sch. Dist., 81 IDELR ¶ 153 (9th Cir. 2022)

• ruled that district's refusal to allow a private provider to deliver at school the 40 hours of ABA therapy family's private insurance covered as medically necessary for a second grader with autism did not violate § 504/ADA--test is educationally, not medically, necessary reasonable accommodation [M]

304. S O.P. v. Weslaco Indep. Sch. Dist., 81 IDELR ¶ 187 (S.D. Tex. 2022)

• ruled that the district committed child find violation for a child with a private diagnosis of autism (and ADHD) but, upholding the district's evaluation that the child was not eligible under the IDEA under the autism (or other classification), denied any relief to the parents [E]

**305.** *P/S* <u>VW v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 81 IDELR ¶ 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)

• ruled that a 16-year-old with autism was entitled to a home-based ABA program for the same year that the review officer awarded tuition reimbursement, but not the travel expenses that his parent provided due to her lack of training for this aide-based provision [ $\sim$ M]

306. P/S Doe v. Newton Pub. Schs., 48 F.4th 42 (1st Cir. 2022)

• ruled that (a) the district's first proposed IEP, which was 80% in general education, was not appropriate in light of the severe mental health needs and very recent crisis of a high school student with autism but (b) the next two annual IEPs, which were for private day **\*926** placement, were sufficiently therapeutic except they did not take into consideration the disruptive effect of immediately changing from his residential placement (tuition reimbursement case) [~M]

307. S S.R. v. Bd. of Educ. of Sylvania City Sch. Dist., 81 IDELR ¶ 212 (6th Cir. 2022)

• ruled that IEP for fourth grader with autism and SLD (dyslexia) that did not include the intensive Lindamood Bell services that the parents' expert recommended and that the parents then arranged for on a tutoring basis met the Endrew F. standard [M]

**308.** *S* J.L. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 81 IDELR ¶ 251 (E.D. Pa. 2022)

• ruled that district did not deny FAPE to nonverbal high school student with autism by ultimately declining to use the "Spelling to Communicate" (facilitated communication and rapid prompting) methodology [M]

309. S Yeger v. E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 82 IDELR ¶ 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)

• ruled that the district's proposed IEP, which provided for a therapeutic setting that offered individual and smallgroup counseling, a positive reinforcement plan, and a project-based learning model that allowed the student to work independently, was FAPE in the LRE rather than residential placement (tuition reimbursement case) [ $\sim$ M]

310. (P)/S M.T. v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 82 IDELR ¶ 63 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)

• ruled that the proposed IEP for a fifth grader with autism was substantively appropriate, including PRR (as methodology issue), thus denying tuition reimbursement but remanding for further IHO proceedings the failure to award compensatory education for denial of FAPE during the previous year [~M]

**311.** *S* <u>Kass v. W. Dubuque Cmty. Sch. Dist.</u>, 82 IDELR ¶ 67 (D. Iowa 2022)

• ruled that district did not deny FAPE to a student with multiple disabilities, including autism, by using a methodology for reading that was not the parent's preference but that resulted in reasonable progress [M]

312. S/P A.C. v. W. Windsor-Plainsboro Bd. of Educ., 82 IDELR ¶ 68 (D.N.J. 2022)

• ruled that upon the transition from Part C to Part B, the district's initial determination that the child, who had a diagnosis of autism, was not eligible was not a denial of FAPE, but subsequent evaluation that found the child ineligible was incorrect, warranting remand to determine compensatory education [E]

#### 313. P/S D.R. v. Redondo Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 56 F.4th 636 (9th Cir. 2022)

• ruled that the current 75% inclusive placement, rather than the district's proposed 56% segregated placement, was the LRE for a fifth grader with autism who was falling further behind his nondisabled classmates academically despite 1:1 aide and substantially modified curriculum - the benchmark for the academic factor was progress toward his IEP goals, and the other factors favored his inclusion; however, the parents were not entitled to reimbursement for their unilateral private arrangements due to its unreasonableness in lieu of stay-put [~M]

#### 314. S Mandeville v. Dep't of Educ. Haw., 82 IDELR ¶ 114 (D. Haw. 2022)

• upheld the IHO's decision that upheld the procedural and substantive FAPE of the IEP for a 17-year-old student with autism who moved from private center placement, including the close adult supervision rather than the parent's preferred private RBT-provided intensive behavioral services [ $\sim$ M]

## \*927 315. S D.O. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 59 F.4th 394 (9th Cir. 2023)

• ruled that the district's 4-month delay in assessing a student for reasonably suspected additional classification of autism was not a procedural violation in the circumstances of this case and, even if it were, did not result in a substantive denial of FAPE [~E]

316. S Beer v. USD 512 Shawnee Mission, 82 IDELR ¶ 223 (D. Kan. 2023)

• ruled that district did not violate child find but did commit various procedural errors in the evaluation and IEP process that resulted in substantive losses to (a) a first grader belatedly determined to be eligible as not only OHI (ADHD) but also autism and (b) his parents' participation rights--also largely affirmed extensive remedies including independent consultants for evaluation, IEP, and BCBA services [~E/~M]

#### 317. S/P Knox Cnty. v. M.Q., 62 F.4th 978 (6th Cir. 2023)

• ruled that the present year's general education teacher on the IEP team at the meeting on the last day of the school year was not a procedural violation, but the placement of the kindergarten child with autism largely in a self-contained class was not the LRE based on the Sixth Circuit's approach--LRE upon two competing placements both providing substantive FAPE [ $\sim$ M]

318. S Abigail P. v. Old Forge Sch. Dist., 82 IDELR ¶ 227 (M.D. Pa. 2023)

• upheld substantive appropriateness of IEP's virtual instruction during the pandemic for nonverbal a 12-year-old with autism and other disabilities [~M]

319. S Miller v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schs. Bd. of Educ., 64 F.4th 569 (4th Cir. 2023)

• upheld the district's evaluation that child was not eligible under the classification for autism and ruled that the 20-day delay in completing it was a procedural violation that did not result in denial of FAPE [ $\sim$ E]

## 320. S B.S. v. Waxahachie Indep. Sch. Dist., 83 IDELR ¶ 2 (5th Cir. 2023)

• ruled that the district's failure to provide FBA-BIP to a third grader with autism did not amount to a denial of FAPE based on the child's steady albeit slow progress and teachers' judgment that he did not need a BIP [~M]

321. S del Rosario v. Nashoba Reg'l Sch. Dist., 83 IDELR ¶ 11 (D. Mass. 2023)

• upheld appropriateness of IEPs, in particular the transition services, for a twelfth grader with autism and SLD  $[\sim M]$ 

322. S E.W. v. Dep't of Educ., 83 IDELR ¶ 14 (D. Haw. 2023)

• upheld appropriateness of IEP that included placement in private school, ESY w/o mainstreaming, and no BIP. [~M]

323. S B.D. v. Eldred Cent. Sch. Dist., F. Supp. 3d (S.D.N.Y. 2023)

• ruled that (a) ruled that eighth grader's eligibility classification as OHI did not amount to denial of FAPE, despite his undisputed autism, because his IEP took into account his individualized needs and would not have changed with the asserted reclassification, and (b) the proposed IEP took reasonable steps, via a safety plan (despite lack of formal IEP meeting and amendment) and was not deliberately indifferent (though based on lower court in <u>T.K.</u>, <u>supra</u> case 176), to address bullying (tuition reimbursement case) [E/~M]

324. P E.E. v. Norris Sch. Dist., 83 IDELR ¶ 68 (E.D. Cal. 2023)

\*928 • ruled that where the three evaluators--two for the district and one for the parents--agreed this child with autism clearly needed ABA services to learn appropriate behaviors, the IEP's failure to include methodology amounted to a denial of FAPE and that the district failed to sufficiently implement the IEP during the pandemic shut-down [M]

325. P Boone v. Rankin Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 83 IDELR ¶ \_\_ (S.D. Miss. 2023)

• ruled that the district denied FAPE to a middle-school student with autism by not addressing his elopement problem, predetermining his placement, and an IEP resulting in regression, but denied compensatory education while upholding prospective relief and attorney's fees denial of compensatory education [~M]

## V. A Checklist of Winning-Losing Factors in Autism Methodology Cases

#### A. Your procedures:

• A.1 Has your district committed procedural violations, especially those that are prejudicial (i.e., amount to a denial of FAPE)?

## **B. Your program:**

• B.1 Is your IEP sufficiently specific to autistic students in general and this student specifically?

• B.2 Does your program/placement include any ABA or Lovaas component?

• B.3 Are the specially designed instruction and related services in the IEP based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable?

• B.4 Do the following have sufficient specialized expertise:

• a) evaluator(s)

- b) IEP team
- c) teacher(s) and related service providers

## C. Your witnesses:

- C.1 Are your expert witnesses credible and convincing:
  - a) child's teacher(s)?
  - b) other district personnel?
  - c) outside specialists?

• C.2 Do they have specific data concerning the child's progress?

## D. Other factors:

• D.1 Is your attorney sufficiently specialized in terms of the world of special education? What about the parents' advocate or attorney?

• D.2. If the case is at the judicial stage, did you win at the due process and/or review officer levels, particularly at the highest level in two-tier states?

## \*929 VI. State Laws

Some states have added requirements, via legislation or regulations (or guidelines, which do not have the force of law) that effectively add to the FAPE foundations established by the IDEA.<sup>38</sup> Here are a few examples:<sup>39</sup>

• <u>Connecticut</u>:<sup>40</sup>

School districts must provide ABA services to any child with ASD if the student's IEP or 504 plan requires these services. The service provider must be either (A) licensed by the Department of Public Health or certified by the State Department of Education, with such services as are within the scope of practice of such license or certificate, or (B) certified by the Behavior Analyst Certification Board as a behavior analyst or, if working under

the supervision of a certified behavior analyst, an assistant behavior analyst, the child's teacher, or the child's paraprofessional.

• <u>New York</u>:<sup>41</sup>

For students with autism, the various additional specifications for IEP appropriateness include: (a) a maximum age range of 36 months for instructional groups of students under **\*930** age 16; (b) a special education teacher "with a background in teaching students with autism" when the child is in a placement with students with other disabilities or with regular education students; (c) parent counseling and training for follow-up intervention activities at home; and (d) transitional support services upon a regular education placement or one containing students with other disabilities.

• Michigan:42

For students with autism, FAPE must include either (a) an IU-approved autism-specific program approved, or (b) a class size limit of 5, with an aide if 3-5 students

• <u>New Mexico<sup>43</sup> and Texas</u>:<sup>44</sup>

For each child eligible under the classification of autism, the IEP team must "consider, based on peer-reviewed, research-based educational programming practices to the extent practicable and, when needed" the following 11 IEP components (with examples not summarized here):

(1) extended day or ESY programming

(2) daily schedules reflecting minimal unstructured time and active engagement in learning activities

(3) in-home and community-based training or viable alternatives that assist the student with the acquisition of social/behavioral skills

(4) positive behavior support strategies based on relevant information (e.g., a BIP based on an FBA)

(5) futures planning (at any age) for integrated living, work, community, and educational environments that consider skills necessary to function in current and post-secondary environments

(6) parent/family training and support, provided by qualified personnel with experience in ASD

(7) suitable staff-to-student ratio appropriate to identified activities and as needed to achieve social/behavioral progress based on the child's developmental and learning level (acquisition, fluency, maintenance, generalization) that encourages work towards individual independence

(8) communication interventions, including language forms and functions that enhance effective communication across settings

(9) social skills supports and strategies based on social skills assessment/curriculum and across settings

(10) professional educator/staff support

(11) teaching strategies based on peer-reviewed, research-based practices for students with ASD

## Footnotes

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- <sup>1</sup> For the earlier versions, see 376 Educ. L. Rep. 1 (2020); 322 Educ. L. Rep. 10 (2015); 262 Educ. L. Rep. 23 (2011); 201 Educ. L. Rep. 1 (2006).
- <sup>2</sup> The scope does not extend to ASD methodology cases in other contexts. *E.g.*, M.R. v. Tajdar, 58 NDLR ¶ 65 (D. Md. 2018) (allowed ADA Title III request for declaratory and injunctive relief to proceed against private daycare facility that rejected ABA services because "it wouldn't be fair to the other kids"); Garrido v. Dudek, 731 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming permanent injunction for Medicaid coverage of ABA therapy for children with ASD); Silver Lining Group v. Ohio Dep't of Educ., 85 N.E.3d 789, 349 Educ. L. Rep. 186 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (upholding state education agency's interpretation of "private provider" under state autism

scholarship law as applied to private school with multiple locations); Burke v. Indep. Blue Cross, 171 A.3d 252, 348 Educ. L. Rep. 911 (Pa. 2017) (ruling that Pennsylvania's Autism Coverage Law invalidated exclusions for ABA services at school).

- <sup>3</sup> The compilation is limited to cases concerning eligibility and FAPE, because autism is not particularly linked to the other categories of the case law, which tend to be generic across the various classifications of disability under the IDEA. For a limited exception, see P.V. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 60 IDELR ¶ 185 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (ruling that system-wide transfer of schools for students with autism qualifies as a change in placement because it is likely to significantly affect the child's learning experience).
- <sup>4</sup> This section is limited to empirical analyses. Thus, it does not extend to more traditional narrative syntheses of the case law specific to students with autism. *E.g.*, Myrna R. Mandlawitz, *The Impact of the Legal System on Educational Programming for Young Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder*, 32 J. Autism & Dev. Disorders 495 (2002). Similarly, it does not extend to specialized issues within state laws. *E.g.*, Kerry Schutte, Kate Piselli, Ara Schmitt, Maura Miglio-Retti, Lauren Lorenzi-Quigley, Amy Tiberi & Noah Krohner, *Identification of ADHD and Autism Spectrum Disorder*, 46 Communiqué 4 (Sept. 2017) (identifying the minority of states that either require medical verification or medical information in determining IDEA eligibility for ASD).
- <sup>5</sup> More recently, a study reported that there had been 354 IDELR-published hearing/review officer and court decisions from 1990 through 2002, but it did not provide enough information to explain the disparity with this total. Mitchell Yell et al., *Developing Legally Correct and Educationally Appropriate Programs for Students with Autism Spectrum Disorders*, 18 Focus on Autism and Other Developmental Disabilities 182 (2003).
- <sup>6</sup> The coverage does not extend to empirical analyses of ASD eligibility that did not applicable case law and/or state law as a key variable. *E.g.*, Suzanne G. Margiano et al., *School Psychologists and Autism Identification: Present Challenges and Potential Solutions*, 60 Psych. in Schs. 441 (2023); McKinzie D. Duesenberg & Matthew K. Burns, *Autism Spectrum Disorder Identification in Schools: Impact of Criteria, Assessments, and Student Data for Identification Decisions*, 59 Psych. in Schs. 845 (2022).
- <sup>7</sup> The Choutka et al. article reviews earlier research studies in this category. For an early sampling of case law in various broader categories, *see* Lyman Boomer & Linda Garrison-Harrell, *Legal Issues Concerning Children with Autism and Pervasive Developmental Disabilities*, 21 Behav. Disorders 553 (1995).
- 8 34 C.F.R. § 300.8. The IDEA legislation, as of the 1990 Amendments, specifies autism as one of the 13 recognized classifications but does not specifically define it. Rather, the definition appears in the IDEA regulations, which also define two other separate, but related classifications:

(b) *Children aged 3 through 9 experiencing developmental delays.* The term *child with a disability* for children aged 3 through 9 may, at the discretion of the State and [school district] and in accordance with [the FAPE regulation], include a child--(1) Who is experiencing developmental delays as defined by appropriate diagnostic instruments and procedures, in one or more of the following areas: physical development, cognitive development, communication development, social or emotional development, or adaptive development; and (2) Who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.

(c)(9) *Other health impairment* means having limited strength, vitality or alertness, ... that results in limited alertness with respect to the educational environment, that (i) Is due to chronic or acute health problems ... and (ii) Adversely affects a child's educational performance.

*Id.* The OSEP policy letters on the following pages clarify the possible connections to developmental delay and other health impairment. Some state special education laws have differing definitions or criteria for ASD eligibility. *E.g.*, Ala. Admin. Code r. 290-8-9-.03(1); Ga. Admin. Code § 160-4-7-.05; La. Admin. Code tit. 28, pt. C1, § 701; Mich. Admin. R. 340.1715; Minn. Admin. Code § 3525.1325; Mich. Admin. Code r. 340.1715; Nev. Admin. Code § 388.387; Or. Admin. R. 581-015-2130; S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 43-243.1(B); S.D. Codified Laws § 13-37-28; Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0520-01-09-.02(4); 7 Wyo. Code R. § 4(d)(1); *cf.* Wis. Admin. Code § PI 11.36(8); 14 Del. Admin. Code § 922.3.0; 925.6.6 (same definition but differential effect in the evaluation criteria). In general, however, the professional or medical definitions of ASD are broader than the IDEA definition of autism. *E.g.*, *https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/autism-spectrum-disorders-asd/index.shtml*?

*utm\_source=rss\_readersutm\_medium=rssutm\_campaign=rss\_full*(National Institute of Mental Health); *https://www.psychiatry.org/ psychiatrists/practice/dsm/educational-resources/dsm-5-fact-sheets* (DSM-5-TR).

- <sup>9</sup> 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2). In addition to procedural, the other categories of FAPE are substantive, failure to implement, and capability to implement. *E.g.*, Perry A. Zirkel, *An Adjudicative Checklist for the Four Dimensions of FAPE under the IDEA*, 346 Educ. L. Rep. 14 (2017).
- 10 Compare the state's complaint resolution process (and OCR's corresponding process). E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, A Comparison of the IDEA's Dispute Resolution Processes: Complaint Resolution and Impartial Hearings" An Update, 369 Educ. L. Rep. 550 (2019); Perry A. Zirkel, The Complaint Procedures Avenue of the IDEA, 30 J. Special Educ. Leadership 88 (2017).
- <sup>11</sup> "OSEP" refers to the Office of Special Education Programs, which is the agency within the U.S. Department of Education that administers the IDEA. Courts accord deference to the policy letters of such agencies within prescribed limits. Perry Zirkel, *Do OSEP Policy Letters Have Legal Weight*? 171 Educ. L. Rep. 391 (2003).
- The rare other published pertinent OSEP interpretations do not provide sufficiently specific and significant information to warrant republication here. *E.g.*, Letter to Anonymous, 60 IDELR ¶ 47 (OSEP 2012); Letter to Anonymous, 55 IDELR ¶ 72 (OSEP 2010); Letter to Anonymous, 30 IDELR 705 (OSEP 1998); Letter to VanWart, 20 IDELR 1217 (OSEP 1993). The scope of pertinence here does not extend to issue related but not particular to autism, such as when must the IEP include methodology. *E.g.*, Letter to Anonymous, 49 IDELR 258 (OSEP 2007); Letter to Wilson, 37 IDELR ¶ 96 (OSEP 2002).
- 13 The recently issued DSM-5-TR collapses the separate diagnoses of autistic disorder, Asperger disorder, childhood integrative disorder, pervasive developmental disorder NOS into one umbrella classification of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) requires showing of symptoms in early childhood even if not recognized until later; and clarifies that all three specified "persistent deficits" are necessary.
- For the specific criteria for eligibility under Section 504 and the ADA, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Identification of 504-Only Students: An Alternate Eligibility Form, 357 Educ. L. Rep. 39 (2018). Of additional significance for high-functioning students with Asperger disorder, the recent ADA Title II regulations added "interacting with others" to the list of examples of major life activities. 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(c)(1)(i)II regulations added "interacting with others" to the list of examples of major life activities. 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(c)(1)(i)II regulations added "interacting with others" to the list of examples of major life activities. 28 C.F.R. §
- <sup>15</sup> The second and third "prongs" (i.e., subsections "ii" and "iii") of this definition cannot be the basis for FAPE. *See* Senior Staff Memorandum, 19 IDELR 894 (OCR 1992).
- 16 Coverage starts in 1998 with the exception of any *Part C (formerly Part H) cases, which are cited in italics.* **Court decisions from the federal appeals courts are cited in bold typeface.** The judicial outcomes are coded to the left of each case citation as follows: *P* = parent won; *S* = school district won; and () = inconclusive victory. Those concerning eligibility and methodology are respectively designated after the citation with "[E]" and "[M]." Those cases that only partially or marginally concern methodology are marked with a "[~M]." The acronyms in the case blurbs include: ABA = applied behavior analysis; ADA = Americans with Disabilities Act; ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AT = assistive technology; BCBA = board certified behavior analyst; BIP = behavior intervention plan; DIR = developmental, individual differences, relationship (model); DTT= discrete trial training; ESY = extended school year; FAPE = free appropriate public education; FBA = functional behavioral assessment; ID = intellectual disabilities; IEE = independent educational evaluation; IFSP = individual family services plan; IHO = impartial hearing officer; LEA = local education agency; LRE = least restrictive environment; OT = occupational therapy; OCR = obsessive compulsive disorder; OHI = other health impaired; OT= occupational therapy; PDD = pervasive developmental disorder; PECS = picture exchange communication system; PRR = peerreviewed research; RBT = registered behavior technician; SEA = state education agency; SLD = specific learning disabilities; SLI = speech/language impairment; SLT = speech/language therapy; and TBI = traumatic brain injury.

For a more comprehensive listing, including other issues, earlier cases, and hearing/review officer decisions, *see*, for example, methodology case law, *see* Elena Gallegos & Jill Schallenberger, Autism Methodologies to Live by: Legal Guidance for Practical

Program Strategies (2011). For significant court decisions concerning children with autism but not specific to this disability category, *see*, for example, **Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist.**, **550 U.S. 516**, **167 Educ. L. Rep. 904 (2007)** (ruling that parents have enforceable rights under the IDEA for proceeding pro se); **L.G. v. Fair Lawn Sch. Dist.**, **486 F. App'x 967**, **287 Educ. L. Rep. 691 (3d Cir. 2012)** (procedural violation and LRE); **Vives v. Fajardo**, **472 F.3d 19**, **215 Educ. L. Rep. 247 (1st Cir. 2007)** (rejecting parent's § 504/ADA retaliation claim for lack of requisite proof); **Pachl v. Seagren**, **453 F.3d 1064**, **210 Educ. L. Rep. 940 (8th Cir. 2006)** (upheld 70% segregated placement rather than parents' proposed fully inclusionary placement). Conversely, for a significant Supreme Court decision that did not involve a child with autism but affects the litigation on behalf of children with autism, *see* **Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs.**, **580 U.S. 154 (2017)** (requiring exhaustion of the IDEA's due process hearing mechanism for non-IDEA claims when their underlying crux is FAPE) and **Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs.**, **143 S. Ct 859 (2023)** (not requiring exhaustion, even if a FAPE case, if the sole requested remedy is money damages). Finally, for a free download of a much more comprehensive compilation, including but not limited to various other decisions concerning students with autism, *see A National Update of Case Law under the IDEA and § 504/ADA Since 1998*, available in the "Publications" section of perryzirkel.com.

- <sup>17</sup> For subsequent separate litigation involving the same child under Part B, see *infra* the Fourth Circuit's 2003 decision and the federal district court's 2004 decision (case nos. 28 and 37).
- 18 The court subsequently upheld the appropriateness of the parents' program and ordered tuition reimbursement. Board of Educ. v. Michael M., 33 IDELR ¶ 185 (S.D. W.Va. 2000).
- <sup>19</sup> The appellate court dismissed the case without prejudice because the hearing officer had not issued a final decision.
- 20 The appellate court vacated and remanded the decision due to lack of findings as to whether the level of services provided in the child's IEP for the summer was adequate to prevent the gains the child made during the previous school year from being significantly jeopardized.
- <sup>21</sup> For the final decision on remand, *see infra* the district court's 2004 <u>Wagner</u> decision (case no. 37).
- <sup>22</sup> For earlier decisions in this case, *see* De Mora v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 768 A.2d 904 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (ruled that the IFSP failed to provide meaningful progress); Bucks Cty. Dep't of MH/MR v. De Mora, 38 IDELR ¶ 2 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (ruled that attorneys' fees are not available under Part C).
- For the remanded decision, which was in the district's favor, *see* Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Dep't of Educ., 46 IDELR ¶ 45 (E.D. Tenn. 2006). However, the appellate court subsequently ruled that, based on the overall outcome of the case, the parents were entitled to 50% reimbursement. Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Dep't of Educ., 258 F. App'x 863 (6th Cir. 2008).
- <sup>24</sup> In an unpublished decision, the district prevailed on remand. Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Z.P., 45 IDELR ¶ 96 (E.D. Va. 2005).
- For the court's subsequent ruling that rejected the district's stay-put claims, *see* Cty. Sch. Bd. v. RT, 433 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 2006).
- On remand, the district court denied the plaintiff-parents' motion for summary judgment, preserving for further proceedings whether the district engaged in deliberate indifference. Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 849 F. Supp. 2d 990 (D. Haw. 2012), reconsideration denied, 58 IDELR ¶ 222 (D. Haw. 2012). Subsequently, the state reportedly agreed to a \$4.4 million settlement subject to approval by its legislature.

- In a subsequent decision, the district awarded the defendant-district \$141k in attorneys' fees and court costs, jointly payable by the parents and their attorney, but the Ninth Circuit reversed this award. Parenteau v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 333 (D. Ariz. 2009), rev'd sub nom R.P. v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist., 631 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2011).
- <sup>28</sup> For another case concerning a student with ASD in which a federal appeals court ruled the opposite on this issue, *see* **A.K. v. Alexandria City Sch. Bd., 484 F.3d 672 (4th Cir. 2007), on remand,** 544 F. Supp. 2d 487 (E.D. Va. 2008).
- <sup>29</sup> The parent ultimately prevailed for the other issues. Aaron P. v. Dep't of Educ. of Haw., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (D. Haw. 2012)
- <sup>30</sup> This case concerns the IEP for the year after the one ultimately addressed in the Second Circuit appeal *infra* (case no. 149).
- 31 Although not at issue on the appeal, the IHO also awarded compensatory education for the period prior to the unilateral placement.
- <sup>32</sup> For an earlier, similar class action suit, *see L.M.P. v. Sch. Bd.*, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding exception to exhaustion doctrine).
- The Second Circuit did not find it necessary to reach the substantive bullying issue, thus leaving in limbo the district court's successive rulings that provided standards for denial of FAPE based on bulling. <u>T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.</u>, 779 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), <u>further proceedings</u>, 32 F. Supp. 3d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
- <sup>34</sup> For a subsequent unpublished decision, *see* Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. Student, 73 IDELR ¶ 115 (D. Or. 2018) (upheld the district's communication protocol as not violating the parent's rights under the IDEA in light of her unreasonably excessive emails).
- <sup>35</sup> For the decision on remand to the district court, *see* <u>infra</u> case no. 230.
- <sup>36</sup> Subsequent to this decision, the district filed an appeal with the Tenth Circuit and, a few months later (on 6/24/18) reportedly reached, with the parents, a settlement of \$1.3 million.
- 37 *See supra* case no. 212.
- 38 For examples of state laws specific to ASD eligibility for special education services, see supra note 8. Additionally, state laws concerning the coverage of private or employee health insurance can play a significant role. E.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 23-99-418 (requiring insurance coverage of children under 18 with ASD, including ABA services up to \$50k per year); Kan. Stat. Ann.. § 40-2,194 (requiring large group health insurance plans to cover ASD for children below age 12); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-7-16, 59A-23-7.9, 59A-47-45 (requiring group or blanket insurance to include diagnosis and treatment within limits); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 287.0276 and 695G.1645 (requiring school districts that offer employees health insurance via a self-insurance plan to provide coverage for screening, diagnosis, and treatment of ASD for covered children through the end of high school); 40 Pa. Stat. § 764h (requiring specified private health insurers to pay up to \$36k for the diagnosis and treatment of covered individuals under age 21 with ASD). Finally, states have a variety of other limited ASD-relevant laws for the K-12 context. E.g., Ala. Code § 22-57-20; Fla. Stat. § 1004.55; 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1705/57.5; Iowa Code § 265.35; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 164.9813; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3323.31-3323.34; Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 3520; W. Va. Code § 18B-11A-3 (establishing state ASD resource or training centers); Cal. Educ. Code § 56847; 19 Del. Admin. Code §929; 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-3.123; Iowa Code § 356.65A); Miss. Code Ann. § 37-169-3 (establishing an advisory committee on students with ASD); Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.155.190 (SEA public info on child find and identification); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 38, § G1/2 (establishing certification endorsement for ASD transition specialists); Minn. R. 8710.5850; Nev. Admin. Code § 391.378 (establishing ASD teacher certification); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 391.260A-391.270 (providing for ASD training for LEA personnel to the extent money is available from the state grant fund); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§18A:26-2.8-18A:26-2.9 (requiring formulation and implementation of recommendations for ASD teacher training); R.I Gen. Laws § 16-24.1-4 (SEA needs assessment, training

modules, and continuing education certificate); Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-298.3 (LEA training of autism aides in behavior management); Ohio Rev. Code Ann § 3310.41 (establishing voucher program for students with ASD); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 161.825 (establishing voucher program for students with either ASD or another of four other "needs conditions").

- <sup>39</sup> In contrast, the following part of the Pennsylvania regulations' definition of "autistic support" does not seem to add substantive requirements: "The IEP for [students with autism] <u>must</u> address needs as identified by the team which <u>may</u> include, as appropriate, the verbal and nonverbal communication needs of the child; social interaction skills and proficiencies; the child's response to sensory experiences and changes in the environment, daily routine and schedules; and, the need for positive behavior supports or behavioral interventions." 22 Pa. Code § 14.131(a)(1)(1) (emphasis supplied).
- 40 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-76ii. This legislation defines ABA as "the design, implementation and evaluation of environmental modifications, using behavioral stimuli and consequences, including the use of direct observation, measurement and functional analysis of the relationship between the environment and behavior, to produce socially significant improvement in human behavior." *Id.*
- 41 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.13.
- 42 Mich. Admin. Code r. 240.1758.
- 43 N.M. Admin. Code § 6.31.2.11(B)(5).
- 44 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1055(e).

#### 412 WELR 883

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